README.md

metadata

base_model: nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
datasets: []
language: []
library_name: sentence-transformers
metrics:
  - cosine_accuracy
  - dot_accuracy
  - manhattan_accuracy
  - euclidean_accuracy
  - max_accuracy
pipeline_tag: sentence-similarity
tags:
  - sentence-transformers
  - sentence-similarity
  - feature-extraction
  - generated_from_trainer
  - dataset_size:10000
  - loss:TripletLoss
widget:
  - source_sentence: >-
      a metaphysical view which, while doing full justice to these
      considerations, refuses to regard them as constituting a sufficient
      justification for a subjective attitude to the worlds of sensory
      experience or scientific knowledge. II The considerations in question may
      be summarized under three heads. (1) There is Eddington's insistence on
      the symbolic character of our knowledge of the physical world. A scientist
      talks of the aether or the electron, but, if you ask him what such
      expressions mean, he will point to a number of symbols and specify a set
      of mathematical equations which they satisfy. That which the symbols
      symbolize is an unknown x. Science, as Eddington in a famous essay has
      shown, is concerned not with things in themselves, but only with the
      measurable aspects of things, and measurability is a category of the human
      intellect. Physics has thus created for itself a closed circle, the
      entities with which it deals, potentials, intervals, scales or clocks,
      matter, and mass, momentum and stress being ultimatelv defined in terms of
      each other; what lies outside the circle is unknown to physics, and
      science is incapable of dealing with it. In other words the measurable
      aspect of things, to which the results of physics apply, is an abstraction
      from their total reality, and the IV.-MODERN SCIENCE AND RELIGION. 59
      physicist's world is therefore an abstraction from the real world. All
      scientific method involves, it is said, abstractions of a similar kind.
      (2) Atomic theory suggests
    sentences:
      - >-
        that we never know a piece of matter directly. Matter consists of atoms;
        yet we only know an atom in terms of the effects of changes in the
        alleged atom upon the surrounding spatio-temporal environment. These
        changes are ultimately analyzable into changes in pieces of matter, that
        is to say in atoms, these changes again being known in terms of their
        effects upon other atoms, and so on indefinitely. At no point do we
        achieve a direct knowledge of matter. (3) A consideration of the
        machinery of perception only reinforces this conclusion. A ray of light
        starting from a so-called material object impinges on the retina,
        stimulates a nerve centre and starts a series of physical and chemical
        changes which ultimately reach the brain. Upon their impact on the brain
        there ensues a mystery, the result of which is the psychological
        experience of seeing the object. But what actually causes us to be
        psychologically aware are the events taking place in our bodies. The
        external object is merely an inference from the fact that the body is
        being stimulated in a certain way. Thus the material world is the result
        of a prolonged and possibly precarious set of inferences. III What
        status in the light of these and similar considerations are we to assign
        to the world which science studies, and what is its relation to the
        world* known in sense perception and revealed to religious insight. Two
        alternative metaphysical hypotheses seem to be possible. (A) We may
        regard scientific knowledge, * I shall use the
      - >-
        impor tant respects the thinkers of this dawn-period of modern science
        were prevented, by the very character of their work itself, from
        apprehending the true perspective of their problems and solutions; for
        like all other workers, they were too close to their field of inquiry
        and too deeply im mersed in its detailed subject matter. Hence as
        uniformity and law became more and more universally apparent in the
        physical world, it was perfectly natural to conclude that matter was the
        fundamental or 156 THE MONIST sole reality while consciousness was
        scarcely real at all. The alternative suggestion that physical laws were
        in this way more readily discoverable simply because the mate rial
        sphere was much less complex than the psychical was completely ignored;
        it required the still profounder re searches of recent biology and
        psychology to reveal the baffling intricacy of all vital and mental
        processes. This persistent overemphasis of the importance of the
        material world, further, radically distorted its relations to the psy
        chic sphere; and this is all the more curious in the light of the
        evolutionary foundations of last century's knowl edge. For the truth
        that life and mind rest upon an indis pensable physical basis was taken
        to mean that this basis was primary and the superstructures secondary ;
        thus over looking the possibility that, simply because it was a basis,
        matter itself formed the subordinate instrument whose essential purpose
        was the development of yet higher levels of immaterial being. II The
        culmination of this continued stress upon matter
      - >-
        North-Holland Publ. Co., Amsterdam, 1966, pp. 208-218. Philosophy of
        Science (Wissenschaftstheorie) in Finland 121 which seem to attach to
        the confirmation theories of Carnap and Hempel. Philosophically, von
        Wright's paper16 is especially interesting. It contains many interesting
        arguments and claims ? against a duality of inter pretations (subjective
        vs. objective) of probability, against numerical probabilities of unique
        (non-repeatable) events, including generalizations, for a distinction
        between retrospective and prospective justification of
        probability-assignments, etc. Other timely problems have been taken up
        by others. One of the standard criticisms of Carnap's inductive logic
        (at least in the form so far published) has been that it is incapable of
        handling induc tive generalizations: in infinite domains all
        (contingent) inductive generalizations receive a zero probability (a
        priori and a posteriori), and in finite domains one's evidence has to be
        of the same order of magnitude as the domain in order to assign
        non-negligible posterior probabilities to such generalizations. Jaakko
        Hintikka has sought to deepen this criticism by arguing that Carnap's
        appeal to the notion of instance-confirmation is unsatisfactory19. In a
        series of articles19-21 he has also suggested ways of overcoming this
        difficulty. Carnap12 presented a "continuum of inductive methods'' which
        depends on an index of caution X. Hintikka21 shows that A can be viewed
        as an index of caution for singular inductive inference only, and that
        one can introduce a similar index of caution a for inductive
        generalization. The result is a two-dimensional continuum of inductive
        methods
  - source_sentence: >-
      influences and events that allow each person to become for himself the
      person who he is. Conversely, the 'course of world history' only emerges
      in the form of a concrete course of lives, such that in this constitutive
      reciprocity between existence and world history, not only can neither be
      conceived without the other, but it is only in this reciprocal relation
      that each receives its respec tive profile. In this sense our biography
      represents history, and we can establish the notion, along with Picht,
      that "our ideas about history /determine/ our relation to ourselves."4
      This brings with it the consequence that when we understand history
      falsely or inadequately, we necessarily also misunderstand ourselves.
      Thus, the question of historical understand ing holds a radical
      significance for the concepts of self-understanding formative of one's
      existential-apriori self-relation. On these suppositions, GADAMER'S
      CONCEPTION OF EFFECTIVE HISTORY 123 history does not add up to an
      objective determination of the sum of historically datable events; yet we
      have been seduced repeatedly to objectify history in its givenness in
      analogy with nature, while at the same time trying to think it as a
      process. History, in contrast to this view, is factical only in the act of
      its coming to presence. This means, then, that history in the strict sense
      exists only to the extent that— and only as long as—there is a correlative
      consciousness of it. In a peculiar sense, we can only speak of history in
      a kind of ontological transposition, when a factical occurrence transmits
      itself in memory
    sentences:
      - >-
        Parts of works of art are susceptible of functional ascriptions, not
        because they are designed, but because there are humans who see them as
        having special effects in rather unique wholes. The contrast between the
        view that artistic func? tions are design functions and the view that
        they are natural functions may be further underscored. In the case of
        design functions, the human actually creates the functional part.
        Consequently, in the case of design functions, one can explain the exis?
        tence of a part in a whole by citing its function;10 doing so is but a
        shorthand way of saying that the intention that the part have this
        effect is the cause of its existence. In the case of natural functions,
        on the other hand, the human observer merely dis? covers the functional
        item. Citing the effect of a part here does not constitute an
        explanation of the existence of the part. One merely makes explicit a
        specific effect of the part. The foregoing suggests that the debate over
        the relevance of the artist's intentions be viewed as a debate over the
        proper analysis of the concept of artistic function. We can accordingly
        distinguish three possible positions with respect to the debate so
        construed. Let us say that intentionalism is the view that artistic
        functions are to be identified with design functions; the true function
        of the part of the work of art is the artist's intended effect of the
        part. Opposed to intentionalism is anti-inten tionalism.
        Anti-intentionalism is the
      - >-
        the past is deftly disclosed as containing embryonically the present.
        These admissions however do not justify the use of the history of
        philosophy for establishing a doctrine or a tradition. We must
        PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 31 recognize that these handicaps are
        matters of degree and are subject to some control. If we should take
        them over-seriously we must conclude that historical research is a sort
        of sport, a poetical adventure, and history an art, not a science. And
        for that matter, the question whether history is an art or a science is
        still a matter of debate. "History, . . , which passes for the account
        of facts, is in reality a collection of apperceptions of an
        indeterminate material; for even the material of history is not fact,
        but consists of memories and words subject to ever-varying
        interpretation. No historian can be without bias, because the bias
        defines the history.... Then, after the facts are thus chosen,
        marshaled, and emphasized, comes the indication of causes and relations;
        and in this part of his work the historian plunges avowedly into
        speculation, and becomes a philosophical poet . . . And the value of
        history is similar to that of poetry, and varies with the beauty, power,
        and adequacy of the form in which the indeterminate material of human
        life is presented. ' It would hardly be profitable to discuss the
        question whether the history of philosophy is an art or a science.
        Perhaps the simplest attitude to take is that the impediments
      - >-
        as speech in its ongoing historical reformulations. Since history ties
        itself, in this sense, to its realization, there is there fore no
        history without historical consciousness. In the project of the matizing
        history according to these hermeneutical conditions, successful
        reflection on history will have to avoid any form of hypostatization
        that oversubscribes to history's course as a development, for example,
        the way that Augustine eschatologically raises his historical theology
        to a sacred history. At the same time, those hypostases must also be
        avoided that, in the wake of the Enlightenment, anchor human history
        down in an optimism of progress, as the concept of the philosophy of
        history formed by Voltaire tied itself to the course of the rational sub
        ject's modern enthronement. Such optimism can be seen in the mon umental
        designs of Hegel and Marx, entering as they did with the claim to a
        unified, systematically interpretable meaning of history. Now the
        acknowledged collapse of idealistic systems of thought in the middle of
        the previous century has driven philosophy of history into a crisis.
        This crisis has initiated a kind of thinking that, as a result, com
        bines philosophical thematization of the historical with a decisive skep
        ticism toward monistic conceptions of history that would, in virtue of
        their systematicity, claim for themselves possession of an inner mea
        sure of historical lawfulness. Names such as Droysen, Burckhardt,
        Dilthey, or even Nietzsche stand for this critique of idealist specula
        tive history and the excessive rationalist demand
  - source_sentence: >-
      the other side, we can combine the functions of advocate and judge.") In
      Section IV, in support of the third answer, this simple commitment to
      rational argument, but not to 192 ETHICS any single one of its
      expressions, which politicians might learn from dialecticians, is faced
      with the difficulty that it has not been achieved by philosophers and it
      might be impractical in the larger political community. A dilemma lurks in
      the final statement of the practical problem: "That those who can build
      and use an argument are as rare as those who might do so are plentiful is
      the world's practical challenge to philosophy and its teachers." Has
      Professor Wick resolved the dilemma he detected in philosophy,
      communication, and community and in their intercourse with each other? I
      think not. The resolution of the theoretical dilemma which he suggests is
      attractive. We shall learn to philosophize only from the example of
      philosophers, and no philosopher has inspired imitation more than
      Socrates. But the acceptability of this resolution of the theoretical
      dilemma is tested by the other two dilemmas. Would the sectarian
      oppositions of schools of philosophy, adhering dogmatically to doctrines
      or playing relativistically with them, be reduced if we all learned in
      this late crisis of philosophy to practice the dialectic of Plato? Even
      the ancient history of the influence of Socrates suggests a negative
      answer. There were many "Socratic" schools besides the Platonic version;
      the history of the Platonic Academy led through skepticisms, probabilisms,
      and relativisms, on the one hand, to assorted dogmatisms, on the
    sentences:
      - >-
        forms. In place of that, the author points to other biotic laws and to
        jumps in the appearance of new life forms, especially to those with new
        (additional) modal qualifications. For example, there can be no
        gradualist account, he says, of the jump from plants to animals or from
        animals to humans because they are qualified by additional modal
        functions each of which are ordered by a distinct kind of laws. These he
        terms 'idionomies." Thus he objects that the present preoccupation of
        evolutionary theory with finding transitional life forms assumes
        gradualism: "Not the BOOK REVIEWS 83 increasing complexity but the new
        articulations of life challenges thought" (p. 79). Lastly in this first
        set, is the GTEE thesis itself. As a neglected option it certainly
        deserves to be put on the table for discussion. We need to ask whether
        it is more plausible that fundamentally different kinds of life forms of
        a different idionomy suddenly emerged from or supervened upon previously
        existing forms, rather than thinking of them as having arisen step by
        step. The author clearly stakes this claim, and just as clearly proposes
        a version of it which is controlled by his belief in God in that it
        avoids not only physicalism but all reductionism. I ne second set ot
        comments begins witn tne wisn that the ditrerence between aspectual or
        "modal" levels among living things had emphasized more clearly that the
        central issue at stake is one of quales. There is a cluster of concepts
        and claims involved
      - >-
        other, within the time that separated Plato from the revival of the Old
        Academy or the inception of Neoplatonism; Academics and Stoics were
        opposed on the question of who practiced the genuine Platonic method,
        and even modern scholars sometimes accept the reconciliation proposed by
        the skeptical new Academy, that Platonists, Aristotelians, and Stoics,
        in spite of their differences on almost every point of philosophic
        doctrine and discipline, really practiced the same method.6 In more
        recent times, both John Stuart Mill and S0ren Kierkegaard took
        inspiration from the Socratic method. Socrates could doubtless have
        reconciled Stoics and Epicureans, utilitarians and phenomenologists, but
        although the enterprise is conceivable, simple commitment to rational
        argument does not afford sufficient guidance to enable philosophers and
        politicians to accomplish like feats daily, and the success of the
        enterprise would doubtless be the beginning of new dogmatisms and
        relativisms. If, finally, dialectic is used to resolve the practical
        dilemma, it is involved in the additional dilemma of explaining those
        philosophers and publicists who derive the "closed state," fascist or
        communist, by direct lineage from the Republic constructed by Socrates
        in Plato's pages and the paucity of historians who find support for
        democracy in any form of dialectic. I agree with Professor Wick's
        objection, even before he makes it, that these are misuses of Socrates'
        method and misinterpretations of his influence; but if philosophers have
        not practiced the dialectical method, as Professor Wick would have them,
        what hope is there that
      - >-
        inquiry and dialectic to simple assent and dissent, and argumentation to
        repetition. By general consent Socrates was the champion user of this
        method. Plato presents him to us as victor in every debate; Aristophanes
        as the master of the new learning which undermines the authority of the
        old order to the point where a son may beat his father shouting: "Am I
        not as freeborn as you!" That father, chants the chorus in The Clouds.
        Too late he'll curse the Sophist school That taught his son to cheat by
        rule And turned the modest life of youth In the vile art of torturing
        truth; A modern logic much in use Invented for the law's abuse, A subtle
        knack of spying flaws To cast in doubt the clearest cause Whereby, in
        honesty's despite The wrong side triumphs o'er the right. In their libel
        on the Sophists, Aristophanes and Plato were attacking the force which
        the vested interests of their caste and station most feared. The arts of
        oratoryand argumentation had become the most potent weapons in the
        arsenal of Athenian democracy. But weapons are neutral, and it was the
        achievement of Socrates and Plato to apply them to the vindication of
        birth, privilege, and station. They added dialectic to the older
        Aristophanic curriculum of "virtue," i.e., the vocation of the "free
        man" or citizen, employing it as an instrument of indoctrination and
        regimentation instead of inquiry, deliberation, and judgment. For the
        "free man" of antiquity was a member of the master class, a fighter and
        a
  - source_sentence: >-
      sensation-language seems to be incomplete without an examination of the
      pre-linguistic systems on which any language must be based, and something
      similar seems to be true of his deflationary account of following a
      linguistic rule. This suggests that, perhaps, his naturalism should not
      have been re stricted to the therapeutic treatment of the myths that we
      generate when we reflect on our own language and thought. Ought it not to
      have ranged more freely across the border between philosophy, conceived in
      that way, and science? I do not know. I do not even feel sure exactly what
      issues are raised by this question, or how to set about answering it. So
      in this paper I merely offer some notes on this obscure but important
      topic in the hope that something clearer may emerge later. II The
      similarity between Wittgenstein's account of the regular appli cation of a
      word and Hume's account of causal inference has attracted a WITTGENSTEIN'S
      NATURALISM 413 lot of attention in the last 30 years.2 Both belong to the
      anti-intellectualist tradition in Western philosophy, and both owe much,
      directly or indirect ly to the work of Sextus Empiricus. It is, of course,
      the intellectualist tradition, originating in the philosophy of Plato and
      Aristotle, that has dominated the scene and made us feel that scepticism
      (always taken in its negative sense) ought to be rationally answerable.
      But there may really be no purely intellectual defense of our modes of
      thought and Wittgenstein may have
    sentences:
      - >-
        desire-modifying thoughts (and attitudes and feelings) that constitutes
        the exercise of synchronic self-control. Kennett and Smith offer an
        ingenious approach to solving the puzzle of synchronic self-control.
        Their account no doubt captures at least some of the ways in which we
        manage to stay in control at the time of temptation, as surely habits
        and other non-actional mental routines play an important role in
        maintaining continence. However, there is a further question of whether
        the non-actional strategies proposed by Kennett and Smith represent all
        the ways that we can possibly exert synchronic self-control. Kennett and
        Smith argue that this is indeed the case. Our claim, then, generalizing
        on the basis of this [Frog and Toad] case, is that all exercises of
        synchronic self-control are non-actional. They are non-actional because
        there is no suitable strongest desire to set up an exercise of actional
        synchronic selfcontrol (Kennett and Smith 1997, pg. 128). If Kennett and
        Smith are right, then this sets strong constraints on what willpower can
        be. Willpower must turn out to be some species of non-actional
        disposition, in the same family as the passive desire-modifying thoughts
        that help Frog and Toad maintain control. Is a non-actional account of
        willpower crafted along these lines plausible? An obvious initial
        objection to a non-actional account of willpower is that it deviates
        quite fundamentally from common sense. While there surely are certain
        forms of synchronic self-control that are non-actional, the forms of
        synchronic selfcontrol
      - >-
        been right when he said, The origin and the primitive form of the
        language-game is a reaction: only from this can more complicated forms
        develop. Language, I want to say, is a refinement and in the beginning
        was the deed.3 Most recent accounts of Wittgenstein's investigation of
        following a linguistic rule have been written from the intellectualist
        standpoint. They start from the assumption that there really ought to be
        a definite rule dictating the use of every word, and that there really
        ought to be a simple method of achieving undisputed access to the rule.
        This implies that rules have, or ought to have a character almost as
        Platonic as the realism which is the other target of Wittgenstein's
        attack. However, his treatment of rules is not so reverential. His
        concern is really with the regular use of a word, and if we suppose that
        regularity can be achieved only by following a rule, then the rule will
        often amount to very little. In any case, rules never have the complete
        independence of linguistic practice that they would need in order to
        achieve the complete explanatory power that conventionalism sees in
        them. This deflation of the concept of a linguistic rule starts from a
        point in his early philosophy of language. The picture theory was based
        on the idea that rules correlate names with objects, and so, when the
        names are put into a sentence, the sentence becomes the projection of a
        definite state of affairs involving the objects.4 But even at this early
      - >-
        of a rule is a matter of deciding to apply the rule in a certain way.
        These changes are followed by a transitional period during the first 206
        DAVID STERN half of the 1930s in which Wittgenstein explored their
        implications. The transitional period comes to end in the mid 1930s,
        with the first expo sition of what has since become known as "the
        private language argu ment", and the construction of the first part of
        what von Wright has called the "Early Investigations", which roughly
        corresponds to the first 188 sections of the published Philosophical
        Investigations. During this period, he moves away from a conception of
        language as constitut ing a formal system of rules, embracing the view
        that mastery of rules is dependent on a background of shared practices.
        As he stresses in the Investigations, his use of "the term
        'language-game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the
        speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life".7
        Though these forms of life, the taken for-granted ways of acting which
        make language possible, are social and practical, not individual and
        incorrigible, they occupy an analogous role in Wittgenstein's later
        philosophy to the role he gave to the experi entially given in 1929 or
        objects in the Tractatus, for they are the point at which the later
        Wittgenstein acknowledges the limits of language. Thus the Philosophical
        Investigations also states that "what has to be accepted, the given, is
        so one could say -forms of life" .* Consequently, he
  - source_sentence: >-
      1993]. So being a "visual display" or being dependent on visual processing
      cannot be what distinguishes pictures from other modes of representation.
      Second, the distinction between the visual and the cognitive is not only
      unclear and empirically suspect [Schwartz 1994, 1996], it does not seem up
      to the job. Standard proposals for drawing a visual/cognitive boundary
      fail to support the surrogate theorist's core intuition. For example, it
      is often said picture perception is non-cognitive, since it does not
      involve active deliberation or contemplation. But the same holds for
      everyday cases of language comprehension. Without delay, pondering, or
      conscious inference we read and understand immediately most sentences we
      encounter. Identifying the cognitive with the learned, and the visual with
      the innate, will not work either. Many animal signal systems are
      instinctive, but they are not pictorial. And were humans equipped at birth
      with Latin, or as some claim "Mentalese," it would not mean these
      representational systems were pictorial.' Still, I think, proponents of
      the symbolic model can do more to accommodate the intuition of there being
      something more "visual" about pictures than natural languages, music
      notation, and various other forms of representation. And it is to this
      task I wish to turn my attention. The account I shall sketch makes use of
      ideas Goodman employs in his taxonomy of symbolic systems. Goodman argues
      that pictures, in contrast, say, to sentences in language or scores in
      music notation, belong to dense schemes of representa2 Variations of this
      criticism are
    sentences:
      - >-
        leveled against the model not only by vision theorists, but by art
        historians and philosophers who balk at what they take to be the
        symbolic paradigm's conventionalist implications. 3 Much is often made
        of evidence suggesting that infants [Hochberg and Brooks, 1962] and
        people from non-Western cultures [Derogowski, 1989] can understand
        pictures without training. My point here is not to challenge these
        empirical findings but to call attention to the need to separate issues
        of learning and innateness from claims about the form and
        conventionality of symbols. 708 ROBERT SCHWARTZ tion. Pictorial symbols
        are analog, while English sentences constitute a digital system. Goodman
        further claims pictorial schemes are comparatively replete. Many more of
        the symbols' own properties function in determining its representational
        content. A given line may be understood as a graph, plotting the height
        of a mountain range, or as a picture of the same mountain (fig. 1). Fig.
        1 Read as a graph, the thickness of the line, its color, and background
        have no significance. Interpreted as a picture, all these properties go
        to constitute the displays representational force. Notice, something
        phenomenal, akin to a Gestalt switch or aspect change, occurs when
        shifting between the two readings. And experience of the line takes on
        another much different character when read in the context of figure 2.
        Fig. 2 Simply making a graph more replete, however, will not turn it
        into a picture. Nor will assigning representational significance to the
        background do the trick. For if these additional features of the graph
      - >-
        Goodman's account of depiction may be described as minimalist at best.
        Pictures denote or refer. Among his undisputed contributions is his
        discussion of what he calls the routes of reference-denotation,
        predication, exemplification, and expression. Pictures represent in all
        these ways. But Goodman is not interested in the roots of reference-how
        referential relationships are established.5 His remarks about what
        determines what a picture represents are entirely negative: resemblance
        is neither necessary nor sufficient for depiction.6 Beyond rejecting the
        resemblance theory, Goodman refuses to give "general instructions for
        determining what a work describes or represents."7 Every system of
        pictures includes a plan of correlation mapping 228 pictures onto what
        they represent, but Goodman is silent about what determines or
        constrains these plans of correlation. Others have been tempted to fill
        the lacuna, drawing on resources internal or external to Goodman's
        account of pictures.8 In particular, it is widely held that Goodman
        favors a convention theory of depiction. Some go so far as to ascribe to
        him the view that pictures are verbal symbols!9 But Goodman denies that
        he holds either view, insisting that "there is no vocabulary of
        picturing as there is of saying," and depiction does not depend on
        "rule-following."'0 Indeed, the convention view is incompatible with the
        claim that pictures belong to analog schemes, as conventions are rules
        operating upon disjoint and differentiated characters. "I That Goodman
        refuses to give an account of depiction does not mean that he thinks
        none can be
      - >-
        reasons of different kinds, and interpreting vague concepts. Taking
        these two ideas together, we are to conclude that a reasonable person,
        seeking to justify the exercise of political power to his fellow
        citizens, won't appeal to reasons that are only valid from within his
        own comprehensive doctrine ("comprehensive reasons"), but will instead
        recognize a duty to rely on "public reasons" about which there is an
        overlapping consensus among reasonable citizens who hold different
        comprehensive doctrines.9 Clayton's contention is that parental
        authority is sufficiently analogous to political power to imply that
        parents, too, ought to be subject to the public reason restriction in
        justifying their conduct in their role as parents. (Though, like a lot
        of our responsibilities as parents and citizens, this is not to be
        understood as a legally enforceable duty, since that would require
        intolerable levels of surveillance and interference.) Clayton's case
        rests on three points of comparison with the Rawlsian case for public
        reason in the political domain. First, like political power, parental
        authority is coercive: parents have authority to impose a range of
        sanctions to discipline their children which they could not impose on
        others. Second, for children, the family is a non-voluntary association.
        Although children are eventually freed from parental authority, their
        almost two-decades of subjection to parental authority is not by
        consent. Finally, like other institutions of the basic structure, the
        family has a profound and lasting effect on our life prospects by
        shaping our aspirations and transmitting unequal advantages. Since
        parental authority shares
model-index:
  - name: SentenceTransformer based on nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
    results:
      - task:
          type: triplet
          name: Triplet
        dataset:
          name: nomic
          type: nomic
        metrics:
          - type: cosine_accuracy
            value: 0.96
            name: Cosine Accuracy
          - type: dot_accuracy
            value: 0.04
            name: Dot Accuracy
          - type: manhattan_accuracy
            value: 0.956
            name: Manhattan Accuracy
          - type: euclidean_accuracy
            value: 0.96
            name: Euclidean Accuracy
          - type: max_accuracy
            value: 0.96
            name: Max Accuracy
          - type: cosine_accuracy
            value: 0.963
            name: Cosine Accuracy
          - type: dot_accuracy
            value: 0.037
            name: Dot Accuracy
          - type: manhattan_accuracy
            value: 0.9625
            name: Manhattan Accuracy
          - type: euclidean_accuracy
            value: 0.963
            name: Euclidean Accuracy
          - type: max_accuracy
            value: 0.963
            name: Max Accuracy
          - type: cosine_accuracy
            value: 0.963
            name: Cosine Accuracy
          - type: dot_accuracy
            value: 0.037
            name: Dot Accuracy
          - type: manhattan_accuracy
            value: 0.9625
            name: Manhattan Accuracy
          - type: euclidean_accuracy
            value: 0.963
            name: Euclidean Accuracy
          - type: max_accuracy
            value: 0.963
            name: Max Accuracy

SentenceTransformer based on nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1

This is a sentence-transformers model finetuned from nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1. It maps sentences & paragraphs to a 768-dimensional dense vector space and can be used for semantic textual similarity, semantic search, paraphrase mining, text classification, clustering, and more.

Model Details

Model Description

• Model Type: Sentence Transformer
• Base model: nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
• Maximum Sequence Length: 8192 tokens
• Output Dimensionality: 768 tokens
• Similarity Function: Cosine Similarity

Model Sources

• Documentation: Sentence Transformers Documentation
• Repository: Sentence Transformers on GitHub
• Hugging Face: Sentence Transformers on Hugging Face

Full Model Architecture

SentenceTransformer(
  (0): Transformer({'max_seq_length': 8192, 'do_lower_case': False}) with Transformer model: NomicBertModel 
  (1): Pooling({'word_embedding_dimension': 768, 'pooling_mode_cls_token': False, 'pooling_mode_mean_tokens': True, 'pooling_mode_max_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_mean_sqrt_len_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_weightedmean_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_lasttoken': False, 'include_prompt': True})
  (2): Normalize()
)

Usage

Direct Usage (Sentence Transformers)

First install the Sentence Transformers library:

pip install -U sentence-transformers

Then you can load this model and run inference.

from sentence_transformers import SentenceTransformer

# Download from the 🤗 Hub
model = SentenceTransformer("m7n/nomic-embed-philosophy-triplets_v5")
# Run inference
sentences = [
    '1993]. So being a "visual display" or being dependent on visual processing cannot be what distinguishes pictures from other modes of representation. Second, the distinction between the visual and the cognitive is not only unclear and empirically suspect [Schwartz 1994, 1996], it does not seem up to the job. Standard proposals for drawing a visual/cognitive boundary fail to support the surrogate theorist\'s core intuition. For example, it is often said picture perception is non-cognitive, since it does not involve active deliberation or contemplation. But the same holds for everyday cases of language comprehension. Without delay, pondering, or conscious inference we read and understand immediately most sentences we encounter. Identifying the cognitive with the learned, and the visual with the innate, will not work either. Many animal signal systems are instinctive, but they are not pictorial. And were humans equipped at birth with Latin, or as some claim "Mentalese," it would not mean these representational systems were pictorial.\' Still, I think, proponents of the symbolic model can do more to accommodate the intuition of there being something more "visual" about pictures than natural languages, music notation, and various other forms of representation. And it is to this task I wish to turn my attention. The account I shall sketch makes use of ideas Goodman employs in his taxonomy of symbolic systems. Goodman argues that pictures, in contrast, say, to sentences in language or scores in music notation, belong to dense schemes of representa2 Variations of this criticism are',
    "leveled against the model not only by vision theorists, but by art historians and philosophers who balk at what they take to be the symbolic paradigm's conventionalist implications. 3 Much is often made of evidence suggesting that infants [Hochberg and Brooks, 1962] and people from non-Western cultures [Derogowski, 1989] can understand pictures without training. My point here is not to challenge these empirical findings but to call attention to the need to separate issues of learning and innateness from claims about the form and conventionality of symbols. 708 ROBERT SCHWARTZ tion. Pictorial symbols are analog, while English sentences constitute a digital system. Goodman further claims pictorial schemes are comparatively replete. Many more of the symbols' own properties function in determining its representational content. A given line may be understood as a graph, plotting the height of a mountain range, or as a picture of the same mountain (fig. 1). Fig. 1 Read as a graph, the thickness of the line, its color, and background have no significance. Interpreted as a picture, all these properties go to constitute the displays representational force. Notice, something phenomenal, akin to a Gestalt switch or aspect change, occurs when shifting between the two readings. And experience of the line takes on another much different character when read in the context of figure 2. Fig. 2 Simply making a graph more replete, however, will not turn it into a picture. Nor will assigning representational significance to the background do the trick. For if these additional features of the graph",
    'Goodman\'s account of depiction may be described as minimalist at best. Pictures denote or refer. Among his undisputed contributions is his discussion of what he calls the routes of reference-denotation, predication, exemplification, and expression. Pictures represent in all these ways. But Goodman is not interested in the roots of reference-how referential relationships are established.5 His remarks about what determines what a picture represents are entirely negative: resemblance is neither necessary nor sufficient for depiction.6 Beyond rejecting the resemblance theory, Goodman refuses to give "general instructions for determining what a work describes or represents."7 Every system of pictures includes a plan of correlation mapping 228 pictures onto what they represent, but Goodman is silent about what determines or constrains these plans of correlation. Others have been tempted to fill the lacuna, drawing on resources internal or external to Goodman\'s account of pictures.8 In particular, it is widely held that Goodman favors a convention theory of depiction. Some go so far as to ascribe to him the view that pictures are verbal symbols!9 But Goodman denies that he holds either view, insisting that "there is no vocabulary of picturing as there is of saying," and depiction does not depend on "rule-following."\'0 Indeed, the convention view is incompatible with the claim that pictures belong to analog schemes, as conventions are rules operating upon disjoint and differentiated characters. "I That Goodman refuses to give an account of depiction does not mean that he thinks none can be',
]
embeddings = model.encode(sentences)
print(embeddings.shape)
# [3, 768]

# Get the similarity scores for the embeddings
similarities = model.similarity(embeddings, embeddings)
print(similarities.shape)
# [3, 3]

Evaluation

Metrics

Triplet

• Dataset: nomic
• Evaluated with TripletEvaluator

Metric	Value
cosine_accuracy	0.96
dot_accuracy	0.04
manhattan_accuracy	0.956
euclidean_accuracy	0.96
max_accuracy	0.96

Triplet

• Dataset: nomic
• Evaluated with TripletEvaluator

Metric	Value
cosine_accuracy	0.963
dot_accuracy	0.037
manhattan_accuracy	0.9625
euclidean_accuracy	0.963
max_accuracy	0.963

Triplet

• Dataset: nomic
• Evaluated with TripletEvaluator

Metric	Value
cosine_accuracy	0.963
dot_accuracy	0.037
manhattan_accuracy	0.9625
euclidean_accuracy	0.963
max_accuracy	0.963

Training Details

Training Dataset

Unnamed Dataset

• Size: 10,000 training samples
• Columns: anchor, positive, and negative
• Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:

  	anchor	positive	negative
  type	string	string	string
  details	min: 271 tokens mean: 333.67 tokens max: 570 tokens	min: 272 tokens mean: 333.9 tokens max: 727 tokens	min: 263 tokens mean: 332.95 tokens max: 571 tokens

• Samples:

  anchor	positive	negative
  such as Argentina, Brazil and Mexico (Sagasti and Guerrero 1974; Stepan 1981; Chambers 1987; Lafuente and Sala Catala 1989). However, recent studies on the sociology of science, philosophy of science, and scientific literature which stress and validate a more local and comparative perspective have lead to identify key elements in the diffusion process of © 2013 Stazione Zoologica Anton Dohm 70 ANA BARAHONA scientific knowledge and to more accurate approaches with respect to local complexities. There is, nevertheless, a need for historical studies that acknowledge the complex interactions generated after the contact between imported scientific novelties and local cultural traditions, which have yielded different results in different countries and cultural settings. Many problems have caught my attention influenced by the innovative perspective of Hans-Jörg Rheinberger 's project A Cultural History of Heredity. Especially the perspective on "the emergence of specific practices [...] the shaping of standards, and the conjunctions of these elements in a variety of social arenas" (MüllerWille and Rheinberger 2007, 13) has proved to be a useful lens through which to study many problems related to the history of genetics in Mexico. In my reconstructions I have analyzed the conditions for scientific research and the social relationships that allowed the establishment of genetics in Mexico, in the laboratory, the clinic and in agronomy. I included in this historical reconstruction the institutions, the interests, the bodies of norms, and the practices that contributed to the circulation of knowledge and methods imported from abroad, the effects that small local communities	had during the early stages of the consolidation of genetics in Mexico, and the idiosyncrasies involved in the uses, diffusion and acceptance of genetics by agricultural, academic, and professional communities. In MüllerWille and Rheinberger 's words, my research thus took "a fresh approach to the history of heredity, drawing on a wealth of well-researched case studies, in order to embrace the cultural history of heredity [in Mexico]. This involves tracing the emergence of the knowledge of heredity in broader social and historical contexts, from a wide synchronic and diachronic perspective" (MüllerWille and Rheinberger 2007, 8). In this paper I give three examples to illustrate how the cultural history of heredity has enlightened my work: the introduction and institutionalization of Mendelism in Mexico in the early twentieth century, the hereditarian ideas of medical doctors in the late nineteenth century, and the introduction of medical genetics in Mexico. I have shown that Mendelism in Mexico was introduced taking into account the cultural particularities of Mexican peasants (Barahona et al. 2005; Barahona 2008). I have also explored the distinctive characteristics of Mexico's society, politics and history that impacted on the establishment of genetics in Mexico, as a new disciplinary field. The beginnings of this process of introduction and institutionalization in the early twentieth century, finally, have been traced by following the work of agronomist Edmundo Taboada and his group during the government of General Lázaro Cardenas (1934-1940), and the role played by the Rockefeller Foundation in Mexican agricultural research. This process was consoliTHE	Exeter. This project included five large-scale conferences, which have thus far produced four preprint volumes (Staffan Müller-Wille, ed., A Cultural History of Heredity I: 17th and 18th Centuries [Berlin: Max-Planck-Institut für Wissenschaftsgeschichte, 2002]; Hans-Jörg Rheinberger and Staffan Müller-Wille, eds., A Cultural History of Heredity II: 18th and 19th Centuries [Berlin: Max-Planck-Institut für Wissenschaftsgeschichte, 2003]; Staffan Müller-Wille and Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, eds., A Cultural History of Heredity III: 19th and Early 20th Centuries [Berlin: Max-Planck-Institut für Wissenschaftsgeschichte, 2005]; Staffan Müller-Wile, Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, and John Dupré, eds., A Cultural History of Heredity IV: Heredity in the Century of the Gene [Berlin: Max-Planck-Institut für Wissenschaftsgeschichte, 2008]), one published edited volume (Staffan Müller-Wille and Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, eds., Heredity Produced: At the Crossroads of Biology, Politics, and Culture, 1500–1870 [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007]), and a further edited volume in preparation (Staffan Müller-Wille and Christina Brandt, eds., Heredity Explored: Between Public Domain and Experimental Science, 1850–1930). This book, then, is the authors’ own narrative synthesis, as project directors, of the results of this long and extremely fruitful international scholarly collaboration. The work begins with an introductory chapter that presents the authors’ broad scope by reference to the writings of Francis Galton, whose metaphors of heredity as a “post office” and a “parliament”—in which the hereditary materials are packed and shipped in mailbags before competing for a limited number of “places” in the developed character of an individual—immediately situate that work in a broader sociocultural context. The
  differentiated from mentoring in that it does not require a Springer close, personal relationship between models and observers. In fact, there are wide varieties of potentially important people who can be selected as role models such as distant leaders, co-workers, and inspiring individuals from all walks of life (e.g., teachers, sports heroes, religious figures, family members). We focus on role models because prior research grounded in social learning theory has demonstrated their impact on moral judgment and action (Bandura 1991). Modeling influences have been associated with the development of prosocial behavior in children (Eisenberg and Fabes 1998) and ethical behavior in the workplace (Moberg 2000; Sims and Brinkmann 2002; Weaver et al. 2005). Within the leadership literature, both transformational leaders (Avolio 1999) and ethical leaders (Brown et al. 2005) have been described as ethical role models for others. The assumption is that having been exposed to ethical role models contributes to the development of one's ethical leadership (Brown and Treviño 2006; Weaver et al. 2005). In this research, we investigate whether the ethical role models of leaders are related to employees' ratings of their ethical leadership. Because ethical role models can take many forms, we consider three different types of ethical role models that are potential influences on the development of ethical leadership (a) childhood models (e.g., parents, teachers, and coaches); (b) career models (e.g., mentors or supervisors), and (c) top managers who model ethics for employees in the organization (Treviño et al. 2000). We ground our hypotheses in social learning	theory (Bandura 1986, 1991) and the influence of modeling on the acquisition of moral reasoning and standards. Three main questions guided our research. Are role models related to ethical leadership? If so, what types of models (i.e., childhood models, career mentors, top managers) are influential? Given that the types of role models selected as well as the lessons learned from such models change over the lifetime of the learner (Gibson 2003), does leader age moderate the relationships between different types of role models and ethical leadership? Theory and Hypotheses Modeling, Social Learning, and Ethical Leadership Social learning theory helps explain why individuals are likely to seek guidance from role models, and how role modeling might be related to ethical leadership. Social learning theory posits that individuals learn what to do and how to behave largely by observing and emulating role models. Most adults are not ethically self-sufficient. Rather, they look outside themselves to peers and significant others for Role Modeling and Perceived Ethical Leadership 589 ethical guidance (Kohlberg 1969; Treviño 1986). This is particularly true because ethical dilemmas often involve ambiguity and individuals attempt to reduce such ambiguity by turning to others for guidance. The social learning process begins when individuals focus their attention on modeled behaviors. Among the potential models to choose from, attractive models capture a learner's attention. Attractiveness is based on a number of model characteristics such as nurturance (Yussen and Levy 1975), status (Lippitt et al. 1952; Lefkowitz et al. 1955), competence (Kanareff and Lanzetta	interpersonal relationships and the promotion of such conduct to followers through two-way communication, reinforcement and decision-making.' ' These authors take a social learning perspective (e.g., Brown and Treviño, 2006). Social learning theory highlights that leaders are role models of appropriate behaviors and emphasizes that people learn from reward and punishment (Bandura, 1986). In other words, ethical leaders use transactional efforts (i.e., communication, rewarding, and punishing) as well as role modeling of desired behavior to stimulate subordinates ethical behavior (Brown et al., 2005; Treviño et al., 2003). Other authors conceptualize ethical leadership more in terms of a basic tension between altruistic and egoistic motives (e.g., Aronson, 2001; Turner et al., 2002). Kanungo and Mendonca (2001) expect an ethical leader to be driven by a system of accepted beließ and appropriate judgments instead of self-interest, which is beneficial for followers, organizations, and society. Brown et al. (2005) developed a 10-item unidimensional measure of ethical leadership combining various ethical leader behaviors (e.g., acting fairly, allowing voice, and rewarding ethical conduct). Walumbwa and Schaubroeck also use this unidimensional measure in their study of ethical leadership and traits. Other authors see the ethical leader behaviors that are combined in this measure as theoretically different and argue that these behaviors may have different antecedents and consequences and should ideally be measured separately (e.g., De Hoogh and Den Hartog, 2008; Kalshoven et al., in press; Resick et al., 2006). As with other leadership styles (e.g., transactional, transformational), the identification of multiple dimensions increases the comprehension
  is ultimately trival. Based upon such an explication of deduction, Popper or a Popperian could then simply admit that deductive rules are apriori justified without creating problems for the justification of deduction analogous to the problems of an apriori defense of induction. One way to show that the rules of deduction are ultimately trivial analytic truths and as such acceptable candidates for apriori knowledge is to explain how the truths of deductive logic depend solely on the meanings or a conceptual analysis of the logical constants, 'not', 'if...then', 'either...or'. This task turns out to be more difficult than it sounds, however. Tarski showed that if one presuppposes an account of some logical constants, then one can define the notion of logical conse quence. But one's definition of logical consequence was relative to one's presuppositions about which terms are logical constants. Popper's idea was that this problem could be solved without any nontrivial assumptions, and so in this way deduction might be justified apriori. In retrospect Popper explains: My papers were...inspired by the hope of solving a problem which Tarski...indicates as insoluble; rightly, I now suspect. This was the problem of distinguishing between logical (or as I prefer to call them, 'formative') signs and descriptive signs...Tarski showed that the concept of logical consequence can easily be elucidated (with the help of the concept of truth of a 'model') once we have decided upon a list of logical or formative signs. My idea was very simple: I have suggested we take	the concept 'logical consequence' as primitive and try to show that those signs are logical or formative which can be defined with the help of this primitive concept. It is only fair to say that my papers did not succeed in this (as emerges from Lejewski's analysis).4 (emphasis added) Popper's primitive was actually the relation of 'being deducible from', which supposedly he takes to be the same as the technical notion of logical consequence. Taking the meaning of the deducibility relation to be clear and trivial, he then attempts to define the logical constants without any presuppositions. What Lejewski shows is that Popper must presuppose exactly those notions he does not want to presuppose. Lejewski concludes, 'The upshot seems to be that Popper's claim to have constructed a logic without assumptions or a logic without axioms; i.e. a logic based on defi nitions alone, can hardly be upheld'.5 Given this failure, one might think that Popper could still fall back on Tarski's account of logical consequence as an analysis which justifies the apriori defense of deduction. Tarski rigo rously shows that the logical truths are analytic and thus apriori justified. That Tarski's 'definition' does this or is capable of doing this is far from obvious. As John Etchemendy argues A REFUTATION OF PURE CONJECTURE 59 ...his [Tarski's] account of logical truth and logical consequence does not capture, or even come close to capturing, any pretheoretic conception of the logical properties...Applying the model-theoretic account of consequence, I claim, is no more reliable	In the view of many authors, the intuitive notion of logical truth is closely tied to the notion of analytic truth. A clear recent example is John Etche mendy, in his book The Concept of Logical Consequence (an all-out attack on Tarski's theory of logical consequence, whose main argument against the extensional adequacy of the theory will be discussed at length in Sec tion 3.1). On Etchemendy's view, the intuitive notion of logical truth is especially linked to the notion of analyticity.9 In fact, in his book he often (though not always) assumes that a sentence S is logically true in the intuitive sense when it is true by virtue of the meanings of some of its expressions, its standard logical constants. One may justifiably wonder whether TVMC is a clearly delimited in tuitive notion within the languages in the classical hierarchy that Tarski intended the standard definition to be applicable to. One may wonder this without having any skeptical worries about the notion of meaning in gen eral. These worries might not be justified for natural language and the kind of worry that concerns us here would still remain. The issue is whether there is a sufficiently clear pretheoretical use of the notion of TVMC as applied to the formal logico-mathematical languages for which Tarski's definition is especially intended. A way to approach the issue is through examples that seem to generate conflicting intuitions about truth by virtue of meaning in formal languages. Consider, to begin with, one of those

• Loss: TripletLoss with these parameters:

  {
      "distance_metric": "TripletDistanceMetric.COSINE",
      "triplet_margin": 0.05
  }
  

Evaluation Dataset

Unnamed Dataset

• Size: 500 evaluation samples
• Columns: anchor, positive, and negative
• Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:

  	anchor	positive	negative
  type	string	string	string
  details	min: 285 tokens mean: 336.93 tokens max: 569 tokens	min: 279 tokens mean: 336.47 tokens max: 633 tokens	min: 263 tokens mean: 335.47 tokens max: 560 tokens

• Samples:

  anchor	positive	negative
  silence. In Koffler's terms, the feminine is engendered, then expelled, and finally pathologized. And Melville's purpose, in this version of the narrative, is to fight against the mechanisms of repression. By presenting charac ters who merge conventional gender characteristics, the novel sub verts those very conventions which are part of the repressive power structures that Melville fights against. The narrative itself presents the tragedy of repression, since the progressive expulsion and pathologiz ing of the feminine mark the ultimate "feminine absence." The final censorship, in this reading, is the silencing of the feminine. So to those who would say to Professor Koffler, "But there aren't any women in Billy Budd," I'd reply on her behalf, "Yes, and that's pre cisely the point." A doubt arises, however, concerning this version of the narra tive and whether we can escape the very mechanisms of repression we might want to resist. Foucault raises that same doubt concerning his own "repressive hypothesis": 21 Does the critical discourse that addresses itself to repression come to act as a roadblock to a power mechanism that has operated unchallenged up to that point, or is it not in fact part of the same histori cal network as the thing it denounces (and doubt less misrepresents) by calling it "repression"?3 The power of Foucault's doubt concerns the possibility of a metalan guage. That is, Foucault is primarily interested in describing linguis tic/discursive mechanisms of repression ? especially censorship, law, and silence. And his point is that any attempt at describing	the discur sive mechanisms of repression may well find itself becoming part of these very discursive mechanisms themselves. Foucault carries this argument a step further, too, by doubting whether the historical net work of sexuality and power is accurately represented as repressive. In other parts of the History of Sexuality, for instance, Foucault shows that the discourse on sex during the past two or three centuries has in fact proliferated: so the conspiracy of silence and censorship becomes instead a strategy for producing more and more discourse. The final point I want to make about Foucault here is that this "incitement to discourse" is a mechanism of power. The dis courses Foucault cites tend to be medical, psychiatric, and juridical, and the function these discourses serve is, broadly speaking, "to drive sex out of hiding and constrain [it] to lead a discursive existence." So-called "perversions" are thus persecuted by being incorporated within the discursive institutions; individuals are specified by entomologizing, categorizing discourses. This means, in short, that Foucault's version of discourse as the all-pervasive medium of power, sexuality, and silence calls into question our own ability to stand outside or apart from the very mech anisms of power we denounce. Foucault recognizes, of course, that this applies equally well to his own History of Sexuality. I wish through my introductory paragraphs on Foucault to raise a doubt concerning the two discourses before us (three, if you count mine, and I think this appropriate). First, then, does Melville successfully	about that each one of us embodies a particular sexuality that needs to be known, taken care of, and expressed positively and fully? How and why did this region of human experience come to exist and get organized as it has? To understand Foucault's answer-and, thus, to understand my claim about the "intersection" of sex and race-it is necessary first to understand Foucault's conception of power. For the last several hundred years, Westerners have understood power as analogous to tools. What does it take to change a tire? It takes a jack and a lug wrench. What does it take to change a law? It takes money for communication with representatives, a piece of proposed legislation, and the power to pressure opponents to cooperate. Power is a tool like any other. Some people have that tool in their tool kit, and others lack it. A shift in the balance of power is simply a transferal of some of those tools from some people's tool kits to others'. Power is an object, then, under the control of subjects with whom its deployment originates. Those subjects who have power-tools sometimes choose to bring them out and turn them on, and other times they choose to leave them in the box.5 As he studied the history of sexuality and also the histories of criminality, military discipline, and pedagogy, Foucault found that conceiving of power as a tool under the ownership of a controlling subject simply did not work. He realized it would be necessary to rethink the entire concept, construing it
  consists in outdoing him, in espousing "a more thorough pragmatism" (FLPV, p. 46). Because any statement can be accepted or rejected as a result of our decision, the search for a distinction between single statements that are known a priori and ones that are known a posteriori is doomed to failure. There is 'empirical slack' in all our beliefs, and since the whole body of our knowledge is 'under-determined' by experience, accepting or rejecting particular items will always be a matter of decision. Is Quine's general epistemological theory true? Is he justified in rejecting the a priori-a posteriori distinction on the grounds that no statement is immune to revision? In this paper I examine the extent to which the more recent arguments in chapter two of Word and Object support his position. 83 BARRY STROUD I think there are important consequences of those arguments that have not been clearly recognized. The aim of the chapter is to make plausible the following thesis about how much of language can be made sense of in terms of its stimulus conditions: ... the infinite totality of sentences of any given speaker's language can be so permuted, or mapped onto itself, that (a) the totality of the speaker's dispo sitions to verbal behavior remains invariant, and yet (b) the mapping is no mere correlation of sentences with equivalent sentences, in any plausible sense of equivalence however loose. Sentences without number can diverge drastically from their respective correlates, yet the divergences can systematically so offset	one another that the overall pattern of associations of sentences with one another and with non-verbal stimulation is preserved, (p. 27) Putting it interlinguistically, translation between languages is said to be 'indeterminate' in the sense that: ... manuals for translating one language into another can be set up in divergent ways, all compatible with the totality of speech dispositions, yet incompatible with one another. In countless places they will diverge in giving, as their res pective translations of a sentence of the one language, sentences of the other language which stand to each other in no sort of equivalence however loose. (P. 27) It is tempting to take the thesis of the indeterminacy of translation as a less metaphorical and more precise way of making Quine's earlier point that there is always some 'slippage' or 'empirical slack' between our full blown language and the stimuli which give rise to our verbal behavior. If we can produce two or more incompatible manuals for translating a foreigner's remark, all of which square with his dispositions to respond verbally to non-verbal stimuli, then the choice of one or another of those manuals is underdetermined by those dispositions and stimuli. Or, in the domestic case, if two non-equivalent sentences S1 and S2 are correlated in the mapping of the sentences, our saying Sx rather than S2 is not deter mined by sense-experience or by non-verbal stimulation alone. Since we are bound only by the need to square the totality of our utterances with experience	genuine evidential basis: namely, native assent and dissent to the linguist's queries under concurrent observable circumstances. If Evans' attack is sound, it may prove fatal since Quine will not be able to reply by claiming that Evans' criticism relies on non-factual considSemantic Perversity 67 erations. Evans' anti-Quinean line of argument is a powerful one, and I shall spend some time in this section to review it2. Evans starts by pointing out the divergencies between the task of a translator and the task of a semanticist. The aim of the former is simply to facilitate communication between two linguistic communities. In order to do so, she must devise a manual of translation. Evans does not manifest any concern with the claim that translation suffers from indeterminacy. The reason is simply that a translator is not devoted to revealing any semantic truth. The translator's aim is simply to find smooth vehicles of communication, and insofar as this target is achieved, the way the translator dissects native utterances is completely irrelevant to her task. By contrast, the semanticist is involved in the project of constructing a theory of meaning. She is not concerned merely with correlating expressions of native with lumps of home language, but rather with stating what the native expressions actually mear i3. The sentences of Native are potentially infinite in number. The semanticist, similarly to the translator, will be obliged to dissect native sentences. The target now, however, is to account for the meaning of those previously unencountered
  any definition or justification he gave of any particular democratic ideal, such as can be found in the Public and Its Problems or Liberalism and Social Action, are not solutions to be applied but hypotheses to be evaluated in a manner outlined by his methodological work. There are many possible democratic values and procedures, problems for which they might be useful, and peoples who might share them. Thus, it is vital to understand when, where, why, how, and for whom they are valid. For this task Dewey provides an account of experimental political inquiry. This framework can best be understood by—and requires—rethinking the problem of legitimacy as understood by many philosophers. Of course, since the value of an experimental approach must itself be shown experimentally, I will conclude by outlining the ways it suggests that the “current economic crisis” might be addressed. 160 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 47 Number 2 Experimental Method Before we turn to Dewey’s suggestions for realizing experimental political inquiry, it will be useful to rehearse his characterization of experimental inquiry more broadly. Like Charles S. Peirce, Dewey understood inquiry as a means by which organisms deal with changes in their environments (“The Fixation of Belief ”; LW 12). Humans might rely on forms of authority—whether that of experts or past experience—to make decisions about what to do, but, as no problem is exactly the same as any previous one, there are likely to be situations for which authorities provide unhelpful advice. For this reason,	the successes of the past ought to have some bearing on our conduct without exclusively determining what should be done now. Avoiding mechanical habits cannot be as simple as following a strict set of rules, though outlining some characteristics of experimental inquiry may help us create the conditions for dealing with problems more effectively when they arise. Most generally, Dewey suggests that experimental inquiry should (1) be based in specific conflicts; (2) trace out the conditions and effects of possible ends and means; and (3) involve deliberation and action undertaken to address a problem. He writes, experimental inquiries should (1) grow out of actual social tensions, needs, ‘troubles’; (2) have their subject-matter determined by the conditions that are material means of bringing about a unified situation, and (3) be related to some hypothesis, which is a plan and policy for existential resolution of the conflicting social situation. [LW 12:493] Reflection meant to deal with problems should undertake to explore tensions among different courses of action and the goals they are likely to realize by investigating their conditions and effects. One should not assume any particular relationship between ends and means, as any set of ends—like happiness or duty, community or difference, truth or justice—will make possible a variety of courses of action in different contexts, and their effects may have bearing upon the validity of such values. Acting so as to maximize happiness may not lead to happiness, just as reforming the basic	engage and fulfill their operative interests. Inquiry into the constituents and possibilities of the situation will, if successful, yield a plan of action to accomplish 2. John Dewey, "The Construction of Good," in The Quest for Certainty (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1929). 3. White, "Value and Obligation in Dewey and Lewis," p. 322. 4. White, Social Thought in America, p. 213. 5. White, "Value and Obligation in Dewey and Lewis," p. 329. 6. See John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1920), esp. chaps. 1 and 2; Experience and Nature (New York: Dover Publications, 1958), esp. chap. 10; and the article "Philosophy," in The Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan Co., 1934), 12:118-28. 220 Ethics the transformation. The features of the situation which are experienced as immediately attractive (or unattractive) prior to inquiry Dewey calls problematic goods. The particular action that is expected to integrate the situation he calls the end-in-view, and the unified activity itself he calls value proper, or consummatory experience. The plan of action which would transform the situation from problematic to consummatory he designates, idiosyncratically, a moral judgment.7 A clarification of the generic features of these situations is necessary for the agents involved to avail themselves of the intellectual and material instrumentalities at their disposal. Dewey's intent as a moral philosopher was precisely this: He wished to clarify the nature of the human situation in such a way that its resources and limitations could be identified and

• Loss: TripletLoss with these parameters:

  {
      "distance_metric": "TripletDistanceMetric.COSINE",
      "triplet_margin": 0.05
  }
  

Training Hyperparameters

Non-Default Hyperparameters

• eval_strategy: steps
• per_device_train_batch_size: 4
• per_device_eval_batch_size: 4
• warmup_ratio: 0.1
• batch_sampler: no_duplicates

All Hyperparameters

Click to expand

• overwrite_output_dir: False
• do_predict: False
• eval_strategy: steps
• prediction_loss_only: True
• per_device_train_batch_size: 4
• per_device_eval_batch_size: 4
• per_gpu_train_batch_size: None
• per_gpu_eval_batch_size: None
• gradient_accumulation_steps: 1
• eval_accumulation_steps: None
• learning_rate: 5e-05
• weight_decay: 0.0
• adam_beta1: 0.9
• adam_beta2: 0.999
• adam_epsilon: 1e-08
• max_grad_norm: 1.0
• num_train_epochs: 3
• max_steps: -1
• lr_scheduler_type: linear
• lr_scheduler_kwargs: {}
• warmup_ratio: 0.1
• warmup_steps: 0
• log_level: passive
• log_level_replica: warning
• log_on_each_node: True
• logging_nan_inf_filter: True
• save_safetensors: True
• save_on_each_node: False
• save_only_model: False
• restore_callback_states_from_checkpoint: False
• no_cuda: False
• use_cpu: False
• use_mps_device: False
• seed: 42
• data_seed: None
• jit_mode_eval: False
• use_ipex: False
• bf16: False
• fp16: False
• fp16_opt_level: O1
• half_precision_backend: auto
• bf16_full_eval: False
• fp16_full_eval: False
• tf32: None
• local_rank: 0
• ddp_backend: None
• tpu_num_cores: None
• tpu_metrics_debug: False
• debug: []
• dataloader_drop_last: False
• dataloader_num_workers: 0
• dataloader_prefetch_factor: None
• past_index: -1
• disable_tqdm: False
• remove_unused_columns: True
• label_names: None
• load_best_model_at_end: False
• ignore_data_skip: False
• fsdp: []
• fsdp_min_num_params: 0
• fsdp_config: {'min_num_params': 0, 'xla': False, 'xla_fsdp_v2': False, 'xla_fsdp_grad_ckpt': False}
• fsdp_transformer_layer_cls_to_wrap: None
• accelerator_config: {'split_batches': False, 'dispatch_batches': None, 'even_batches': True, 'use_seedable_sampler': True, 'non_blocking': False, 'gradient_accumulation_kwargs': None}
• deepspeed: None
• label_smoothing_factor: 0.0
• optim: adamw_torch
• optim_args: None
• adafactor: False
• group_by_length: False
• length_column_name: length
• ddp_find_unused_parameters: None
• ddp_bucket_cap_mb: None
• ddp_broadcast_buffers: False
• dataloader_pin_memory: True
• dataloader_persistent_workers: False
• skip_memory_metrics: True
• use_legacy_prediction_loop: False
• push_to_hub: False
• resume_from_checkpoint: None
• hub_model_id: None
• hub_strategy: every_save
• hub_private_repo: False
• hub_always_push: False
• gradient_checkpointing: False
• gradient_checkpointing_kwargs: None
• include_inputs_for_metrics: False
• eval_do_concat_batches: True
• fp16_backend: auto
• push_to_hub_model_id: None
• push_to_hub_organization: None
• mp_parameters:
• auto_find_batch_size: False
• full_determinism: False
• torchdynamo: None
• ray_scope: last
• ddp_timeout: 1800
• torch_compile: False
• torch_compile_backend: None
• torch_compile_mode: None
• dispatch_batches: None
• split_batches: None
• include_tokens_per_second: False
• include_num_input_tokens_seen: False
• neftune_noise_alpha: None
• optim_target_modules: None
• batch_eval_metrics: False
• eval_on_start: False
• batch_sampler: no_duplicates
• multi_dataset_batch_sampler: proportional

Training Logs

Epoch	Step	Training Loss	loss	nomic_max_accuracy
0	0	-	-	0.932
0.04	100	0.0072	0.0070	0.946
0.08	200	0.0047	0.0061	0.95
0.12	300	0.0051	0.0061	0.956
0.16	400	0.0051	0.0076	0.944
0.2	500	0.0084	0.0071	0.946
0.24	600	0.0076	0.0079	0.95
0.28	700	0.0097	0.0076	0.95
0.32	800	0.0092	0.0110	0.92
0.36	900	0.01	0.0125	0.9
0.4	1000	0.0114	0.1029	0.714
0.44	1100	0.012	0.0091	0.932
0.48	1200	0.0121	0.0088	0.936
0.52	1300	0.0096	0.0117	0.912
0.56	1400	0.008	0.0080	0.938
0.6	1500	0.0079	0.0088	0.928
0.64	1600	0.0105	0.0106	0.92
0.68	1700	0.0079	0.0077	0.936
0.72	1800	0.0095	0.0083	0.938
0.76	1900	0.0095	0.0075	0.946
0.8	2000	0.0083	0.0094	0.93
0.84	2100	0.0117	0.0097	0.912
0.88	2200	0.0105	0.0085	0.944
0.92	2300	0.0103	0.0110	0.906
0.96	2400	0.0092	0.0096	0.92
1.0	2500	0.0101	0.0103	0.92
1.04	2600	0.0074	0.0098	0.922
1.08	2700	0.0056	0.0084	0.94
1.12	2800	0.0038	0.0074	0.948
1.16	2900	0.0033	0.0071	0.938
1.2	3000	0.0045	0.0076	0.93
1.24	3100	0.0029	0.0089	0.936
1.28	3200	0.0024	0.0076	0.94
1.32	3300	0.0024	0.0076	0.942
1.3600	3400	0.0015	0.0068	0.946
1.4	3500	0.0027	0.0068	0.948
1.44	3600	0.0029	0.0076	0.944
1.48	3700	0.0027	0.0070	0.954
1.52	3800	0.0035	0.0077	0.944
1.56	3900	0.0034	0.0056	0.96
1.6	4000	0.0022	0.0068	0.952
1.6400	4100	0.002	0.0062	0.958
1.6800	4200	0.0029	0.0074	0.948
1.72	4300	0.004	0.0067	0.95
1.76	4400	0.0024	0.0066	0.956
1.8	4500	0.0018	0.0066	0.95
1.8400	4600	0.0034	0.0067	0.948
1.88	4700	0.0014	0.0057	0.952
1.92	4800	0.0015	0.0054	0.96
1.96	4900	0.0016	0.0061	0.95
2.0	5000	0.0017	0.0069	0.942
2.04	5100	0.0015	0.0059	0.956
2.08	5200	0.0013	0.0062	0.942
2.12	5300	0.0016	0.0061	0.944
2.16	5400	0.0013	0.0055	0.952
2.2	5500	0.0005	0.0055	0.95
2.24	5600	0.0012	0.0047	0.96
2.2800	5700	0.0017	0.0052	0.956
2.32	5800	0.0001	0.0056	0.948
2.36	5900	0.0007	0.0055	0.952
2.4	6000	0.0005	0.0052	0.964
2.44	6100	0.001	0.0050	0.968
2.48	6200	0.0008	0.0051	0.966
2.52	6300	0.0005	0.0049	0.964
2.56	6400	0.0009	0.0050	0.962
2.6	6500	0.0006	0.0050	0.956
2.64	6600	0.0006	0.0049	0.96
2.68	6700	0.0002	0.0049	0.954
2.7200	6800	0.0004	0.0050	0.95
2.76	6900	0.0004	0.0050	0.952
2.8	7000	0.0004	0.0048	0.966
2.84	7100	0.0006	0.0049	0.958
2.88	7200	0.0003	0.0049	0.964
2.92	7300	0.0004	0.0048	0.964
2.96	7400	0.0001	0.0048	0.96
3.0	7500	0.0	0.0048	0.963

Framework Versions

• Python: 3.10.12
• Sentence Transformers: 3.0.1
• Transformers: 4.42.4
• PyTorch: 2.3.1+cu121
• Accelerate: 0.32.1
• Datasets: 2.21.0
• Tokenizers: 0.19.1

Citation

BibTeX

Sentence Transformers

@inproceedings{reimers-2019-sentence-bert,
    title = "Sentence-BERT: Sentence Embeddings using Siamese BERT-Networks",
    author = "Reimers, Nils and Gurevych, Iryna",
    booktitle = "Proceedings of the 2019 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing",
    month = "11",
    year = "2019",
    publisher = "Association for Computational Linguistics",
    url = "https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.10084",
}

TripletLoss

@misc{hermans2017defense,
    title={In Defense of the Triplet Loss for Person Re-Identification}, 
    author={Alexander Hermans and Lucas Beyer and Bastian Leibe},
    year={2017},
    eprint={1703.07737},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    primaryClass={cs.CV}
}