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	---
	base_model: nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
	datasets: []
	language: []
	library_name: sentence-transformers
	metrics:
	- cosine_accuracy
	- dot_accuracy
	- manhattan_accuracy
	- euclidean_accuracy
	- max_accuracy
	pipeline_tag: sentence-similarity
	tags:
	- sentence-transformers
	- sentence-similarity
	- feature-extraction
	- generated_from_trainer
	- dataset_size:10000
	- loss:TripletLoss
	widget:
	- source_sentence: a metaphysical view which, while doing full justice to these considerations,
	refuses to regard them as constituting a sufficient justification for a subjective
	attitude to the worlds of sensory experience or scientific knowledge. II The considerations
	in question may be summarized under three heads. (1) There is Eddington's insistence
	on the symbolic character of our knowledge of the physical world. A scientist
	talks of the aether or the electron, but, if you ask him what such expressions
	mean, he will point to a number of symbols and specify a set of mathematical equations
	which they satisfy. That which the symbols symbolize is an unknown x. Science,
	as Eddington in a famous essay has shown, is concerned not with things in themselves,
	but only with the measurable aspects of things, and measurability is a category
	of the human intellect. Physics has thus created for itself a closed circle, the
	entities with which it deals, potentials, intervals, scales or clocks, matter,
	and mass, momentum and stress being ultimatelv defined in terms of each other;
	what lies outside the circle is unknown to physics, and science is incapable of
	dealing with it. In other words the measurable aspect of things, to which the
	results of physics apply, is an abstraction from their total reality, and the
	IV.-MODERN SCIENCE AND RELIGION. 59 physicist's world is therefore an abstraction
	from the real world. All scientific method involves, it is said, abstractions
	of a similar kind. (2) Atomic theory suggests
	sentences:
	- that we never know a piece of matter directly. Matter consists of atoms; yet we
	only know an atom in terms of the effects of changes in the alleged atom upon
	the surrounding spatio-temporal environment. These changes are ultimately analyzable
	into changes in pieces of matter, that is to say in atoms, these changes again
	being known in terms of their effects upon other atoms, and so on indefinitely.
	At no point do we achieve a direct knowledge of matter. (3) A consideration of
	the machinery of perception only reinforces this conclusion. A ray of light starting
	from a so-called material object impinges on the retina, stimulates a nerve centre
	and starts a series of physical and chemical changes which ultimately reach the
	brain. Upon their impact on the brain there ensues a mystery, the result of which
	is the psychological experience of seeing the object. But what actually causes
	us to be psychologically aware are the events taking place in our bodies. The
	external object is merely an inference from the fact that the body is being stimulated
	in a certain way. Thus the material world is the result of a prolonged and possibly
	precarious set of inferences. III What status in the light of these and similar
	considerations are we to assign to the world which science studies, and what is
	its relation to the world* known in sense perception and revealed to religious
	insight. Two alternative metaphysical hypotheses seem to be possible. (A) We may
	regard scientific knowledge, * I shall use the
	- impor tant respects the thinkers of this dawn-period of modern science were prevented,
	by the very character of their work itself, from apprehending the true perspective
	of their problems and solutions; for like all other workers, they were too close
	to their field of inquiry and too deeply im mersed in its detailed subject matter.
	Hence as uniformity and law became more and more universally apparent in the physical
	world, it was perfectly natural to conclude that matter was the fundamental or
	156 THE MONIST sole reality while consciousness was scarcely real at all. The
	alternative suggestion that physical laws were in this way more readily discoverable
	simply because the mate rial sphere was much less complex than the psychical was
	completely ignored; it required the still profounder re searches of recent biology
	and psychology to reveal the baffling intricacy of all vital and mental processes.
	This persistent overemphasis of the importance of the material world, further,
	radically distorted its relations to the psy chic sphere; and this is all the
	more curious in the light of the evolutionary foundations of last century's knowl
	edge. For the truth that life and mind rest upon an indis pensable physical basis
	was taken to mean that this basis was primary and the superstructures secondary
	; thus over looking the possibility that, simply because it was a basis, matter
	itself formed the subordinate instrument whose essential purpose was the development
	of yet higher levels of immaterial being. II The culmination of this continued
	stress upon matter
	- 'North-Holland Publ. Co., Amsterdam, 1966, pp. 208-218. Philosophy of Science
	(Wissenschaftstheorie) in Finland 121 which seem to attach to the confirmation
	theories of Carnap and Hempel. Philosophically, von Wright''s paper16 is especially
	interesting. It contains many interesting arguments and claims ? against a duality
	of inter pretations (subjective vs. objective) of probability, against numerical
	probabilities of unique (non-repeatable) events, including generalizations, for
	a distinction between retrospective and prospective justification of probability-assignments,
	etc. Other timely problems have been taken up by others. One of the standard criticisms
	of Carnap''s inductive logic (at least in the form so far published) has been
	that it is incapable of handling induc tive generalizations: in infinite domains
	all (contingent) inductive generalizations receive a zero probability (a priori
	and a posteriori), and in finite domains one''s evidence has to be of the same
	order of magnitude as the domain in order to assign non-negligible posterior probabilities
	to such generalizations. Jaakko Hintikka has sought to deepen this criticism by
	arguing that Carnap''s appeal to the notion of instance-confirmation is unsatisfactory19.
	In a series of articles19-21 he has also suggested ways of overcoming this difficulty.
	Carnap12 presented a "continuum of inductive methods'''' which depends on an index
	of caution X. Hintikka21 shows that A can be viewed as an index of caution for
	singular inductive inference only, and that one can introduce a similar index
	of caution a for inductive generalization. The result is a two-dimensional continuum
	of inductive methods'
	- source_sentence: influences and events that allow each person to become for himself
	the person who he is. Conversely, the 'course of world history' only emerges in
	the form of a concrete course of lives, such that in this constitutive reciprocity
	between existence and world history, not only can neither be conceived without
	the other, but it is only in this reciprocal relation that each receives its respec
	tive profile. In this sense our biography represents history, and we can establish
	the notion, along with Picht, that "our ideas about history /determine/ our relation
	to ourselves."4 This brings with it the consequence that when we understand history
	falsely or inadequately, we necessarily also misunderstand ourselves. Thus, the
	question of historical understand ing holds a radical significance for the concepts
	of self-understanding formative of one's existential-apriori self-relation. On
	these suppositions, GADAMER'S CONCEPTION OF EFFECTIVE HISTORY 123 history does
	not add up to an objective determination of the sum of historically datable events;
	yet we have been seduced repeatedly to objectify history in its givenness in analogy
	with nature, while at the same time trying to think it as a process. History,
	in contrast to this view, is factical only in the act of its coming to presence.
	This means, then, that history in the strict sense exists only to the extent that—
	and only as long as—there is a correlative consciousness of it. In a peculiar
	sense, we can only speak of history in a kind of ontological transposition, when
	a factical occurrence transmits itself in memory
	sentences:
	- Parts of works of art are susceptible of functional ascriptions, not because they
	are designed, but because there are humans who see them as having special effects
	in rather unique wholes. The contrast between the view that artistic func? tions
	are design functions and the view that they are natural functions may be further
	underscored. In the case of design functions, the human actually creates the functional
	part. Consequently, in the case of design functions, one can explain the exis?
	tence of a part in a whole by citing its function;10 doing so is but a shorthand
	way of saying that the intention that the part have this effect is the cause of
	its existence. In the case of natural functions, on the other hand, the human
	observer merely dis? covers the functional item. Citing the effect of a part here
	does not constitute an explanation of the existence of the part. One merely makes
	explicit a specific effect of the part. The foregoing suggests that the debate
	over the relevance of the artist's intentions be viewed as a debate over the proper
	analysis of the concept of artistic function. We can accordingly distinguish three
	possible positions with respect to the debate so construed. Let us say that intentionalism
	is the view that artistic functions are to be identified with design functions;
	the true function of the part of the work of art is the artist's intended effect
	of the part. Opposed to intentionalism is anti-inten tionalism. Anti-intentionalism
	is the
	- the past is deftly disclosed as containing embryonically the present. These admissions
	however do not justify the use of the history of philosophy for establishing a
	doctrine or a tradition. We must PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 31 recognize
	that these handicaps are matters of degree and are subject to some control. If
	we should take them over-seriously we must conclude that historical research is
	a sort of sport, a poetical adventure, and history an art, not a science. And
	for that matter, the question whether history is an art or a science is still
	a matter of debate. "History, . . , which passes for the account of facts, is
	in reality a collection of apperceptions of an indeterminate material; for even
	the material of history is not fact, but consists of memories and words subject
	to ever-varying interpretation. No historian can be without bias, because the
	bias defines the history.... Then, after the facts are thus chosen, marshaled,
	and emphasized, comes the indication of causes and relations; and in this part
	of his work the historian plunges avowedly into speculation, and becomes a philosophical
	poet . . . And the value of history is similar to that of poetry, and varies with
	the beauty, power, and adequacy of the form in which the indeterminate material
	of human life is presented. ' It would hardly be profitable to discuss the question
	whether the history of philosophy is an art or a science. Perhaps the simplest
	attitude to take is that the impediments
	- as speech in its ongoing historical reformulations. Since history ties itself,
	in this sense, to its realization, there is there fore no history without historical
	consciousness. In the project of the matizing history according to these hermeneutical
	conditions, successful reflection on history will have to avoid any form of hypostatization
	that oversubscribes to history's course as a development, for example, the way
	that Augustine eschatologically raises his historical theology to a sacred history.
	At the same time, those hypostases must also be avoided that, in the wake of the
	Enlightenment, anchor human history down in an optimism of progress, as the concept
	of the philosophy of history formed by Voltaire tied itself to the course of the
	rational sub ject's modern enthronement. Such optimism can be seen in the mon
	umental designs of Hegel and Marx, entering as they did with the claim to a unified,
	systematically interpretable meaning of history. Now the acknowledged collapse
	of idealistic systems of thought in the middle of the previous century has driven
	philosophy of history into a crisis. This crisis has initiated a kind of thinking
	that, as a result, com bines philosophical thematization of the historical with
	a decisive skep ticism toward monistic conceptions of history that would, in virtue
	of their systematicity, claim for themselves possession of an inner mea sure of
	historical lawfulness. Names such as Droysen, Burckhardt, Dilthey, or even Nietzsche
	stand for this critique of idealist specula tive history and the excessive rationalist
	demand
	- source_sentence: 'the other side, we can combine the functions of advocate and judge.")
	In Section IV, in support of the third answer, this simple commitment to rational
	argument, but not to 192 ETHICS any single one of its expressions, which politicians
	might learn from dialecticians, is faced with the difficulty that it has not been
	achieved by philosophers and it might be impractical in the larger political community.
	A dilemma lurks in the final statement of the practical problem: "That those who
	can build and use an argument are as rare as those who might do so are plentiful
	is the world''s practical challenge to philosophy and its teachers." Has Professor
	Wick resolved the dilemma he detected in philosophy, communication, and community
	and in their intercourse with each other? I think not. The resolution of the theoretical
	dilemma which he suggests is attractive. We shall learn to philosophize only from
	the example of philosophers, and no philosopher has inspired imitation more than
	Socrates. But the acceptability of this resolution of the theoretical dilemma
	is tested by the other two dilemmas. Would the sectarian oppositions of schools
	of philosophy, adhering dogmatically to doctrines or playing relativistically
	with them, be reduced if we all learned in this late crisis of philosophy to practice
	the dialectic of Plato? Even the ancient history of the influence of Socrates
	suggests a negative answer. There were many "Socratic" schools besides the Platonic
	version; the history of the Platonic Academy led through skepticisms, probabilisms,
	and relativisms, on the one hand, to assorted dogmatisms, on the'
	sentences:
	- 'forms. In place of that, the author points to other biotic laws and to jumps
	in the appearance of new life forms, especially to those with new (additional)
	modal qualifications. For example, there can be no gradualist account, he says,
	of the jump from plants to animals or from animals to humans because they are
	qualified by additional modal functions each of which are ordered by a distinct
	kind of laws. These he terms ''idionomies." Thus he objects that the present preoccupation
	of evolutionary theory with finding transitional life forms assumes gradualism:
	"Not the BOOK REVIEWS 83 increasing complexity but the new articulations of life
	challenges thought" (p. 79). Lastly in this first set, is the GTEE thesis itself.
	As a neglected option it certainly deserves to be put on the table for discussion.
	We need to ask whether it is more plausible that fundamentally different kinds
	of life forms of a different idionomy suddenly emerged from or supervened upon
	previously existing forms, rather than thinking of them as having arisen step
	by step. The author clearly stakes this claim, and just as clearly proposes a
	version of it which is controlled by his belief in God in that it avoids not only
	physicalism but all reductionism. I ne second set ot comments begins witn tne
	wisn that the ditrerence between aspectual or "modal" levels among living things
	had emphasized more clearly that the central issue at stake is one of quales.
	There is a cluster of concepts and claims involved'
	- other, within the time that separated Plato from the revival of the Old Academy
	or the inception of Neoplatonism; Academics and Stoics were opposed on the question
	of who practiced the genuine Platonic method, and even modern scholars sometimes
	accept the reconciliation proposed by the skeptical new Academy, that Platonists,
	Aristotelians, and Stoics, in spite of their differences on almost every point
	of philosophic doctrine and discipline, really practiced the same method.6 In
	more recent times, both John Stuart Mill and S0ren Kierkegaard took inspiration
	from the Socratic method. Socrates could doubtless have reconciled Stoics and
	Epicureans, utilitarians and phenomenologists, but although the enterprise is
	conceivable, simple commitment to rational argument does not afford sufficient
	guidance to enable philosophers and politicians to accomplish like feats daily,
	and the success of the enterprise would doubtless be the beginning of new dogmatisms
	and relativisms. If, finally, dialectic is used to resolve the practical dilemma,
	it is involved in the additional dilemma of explaining those philosophers and
	publicists who derive the "closed state," fascist or communist, by direct lineage
	from the Republic constructed by Socrates in Plato's pages and the paucity of
	historians who find support for democracy in any form of dialectic. I agree with
	Professor Wick's objection, even before he makes it, that these are misuses of
	Socrates' method and misinterpretations of his influence; but if philosophers
	have not practiced the dialectical method, as Professor Wick would have them,
	what hope is there that
	- 'inquiry and dialectic to simple assent and dissent, and argumentation to repetition.
	By general consent Socrates was the champion user of this method. Plato presents
	him to us as victor in every debate; Aristophanes as the master of the new learning
	which undermines the authority of the old order to the point where a son may beat
	his father shouting: "Am I not as freeborn as you!" That father, chants the chorus
	in The Clouds. Too late he''ll curse the Sophist school That taught his son to
	cheat by rule And turned the modest life of youth In the vile art of torturing
	truth; A modern logic much in use Invented for the law''s abuse, A subtle knack
	of spying flaws To cast in doubt the clearest cause Whereby, in honesty''s despite
	The wrong side triumphs o''er the right. In their libel on the Sophists, Aristophanes
	and Plato were attacking the force which the vested interests of their caste and
	station most feared. The arts of oratoryand argumentation had become the most
	potent weapons in the arsenal of Athenian democracy. But weapons are neutral,
	and it was the achievement of Socrates and Plato to apply them to the vindication
	of birth, privilege, and station. They added dialectic to the older Aristophanic
	curriculum of "virtue," i.e., the vocation of the "free man" or citizen, employing
	it as an instrument of indoctrination and regimentation instead of inquiry, deliberation,
	and judgment. For the "free man" of antiquity was a member of the master class,
	a fighter and a'
	- source_sentence: sensation-language seems to be incomplete without an examination
	of the pre-linguistic systems on which any language must be based, and something
	similar seems to be true of his deflationary account of following a linguistic
	rule. This suggests that, perhaps, his naturalism should not have been re stricted
	to the therapeutic treatment of the myths that we generate when we reflect on
	our own language and thought. Ought it not to have ranged more freely across the
	border between philosophy, conceived in that way, and science? I do not know.
	I do not even feel sure exactly what issues are raised by this question, or how
	to set about answering it. So in this paper I merely offer some notes on this
	obscure but important topic in the hope that something clearer may emerge later.
	II The similarity between Wittgenstein's account of the regular appli cation of
	a word and Hume's account of causal inference has attracted a WITTGENSTEIN'S NATURALISM
	413 lot of attention in the last 30 years.2 Both belong to the anti-intellectualist
	tradition in Western philosophy, and both owe much, directly or indirect ly to
	the work of Sextus Empiricus. It is, of course, the intellectualist tradition,
	originating in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, that has dominated the scene
	and made us feel that scepticism (always taken in its negative sense) ought to
	be rationally answerable. But there may really be no purely intellectual defense
	of our modes of thought and Wittgenstein may have
	sentences:
	- desire-modifying thoughts (and attitudes and feelings) that constitutes the exercise
	of synchronic self-control. Kennett and Smith offer an ingenious approach to solving
	the puzzle of synchronic self-control. Their account no doubt captures at least
	some of the ways in which we manage to stay in control at the time of temptation,
	as surely habits and other non-actional mental routines play an important role
	in maintaining continence. However, there is a further question of whether the
	non-actional strategies proposed by Kennett and Smith represent all the ways that
	we can possibly exert synchronic self-control. Kennett and Smith argue that this
	is indeed the case. Our claim, then, generalizing on the basis of this [Frog and
	Toad] case, is that all exercises of synchronic self-control are non-actional.
	They are non-actional because there is no suitable strongest desire to set up
	an exercise of actional synchronic selfcontrol (Kennett and Smith 1997, pg. 128).
	If Kennett and Smith are right, then this sets strong constraints on what willpower
	can be. Willpower must turn out to be some species of non-actional disposition,
	in the same family as the passive desire-modifying thoughts that help Frog and
	Toad maintain control. Is a non-actional account of willpower crafted along these
	lines plausible? An obvious initial objection to a non-actional account of willpower
	is that it deviates quite fundamentally from common sense. While there surely
	are certain forms of synchronic self-control that are non-actional, the forms
	of synchronic selfcontrol
	- 'been right when he said, The origin and the primitive form of the language-game
	is a reaction: only from this can more complicated forms develop. Language, I
	want to say, is a refinement and in the beginning was the deed.3 Most recent accounts
	of Wittgenstein''s investigation of following a linguistic rule have been written
	from the intellectualist standpoint. They start from the assumption that there
	really ought to be a definite rule dictating the use of every word, and that there
	really ought to be a simple method of achieving undisputed access to the rule.
	This implies that rules have, or ought to have a character almost as Platonic
	as the realism which is the other target of Wittgenstein''s attack. However, his
	treatment of rules is not so reverential. His concern is really with the regular
	use of a word, and if we suppose that regularity can be achieved only by following
	a rule, then the rule will often amount to very little. In any case, rules never
	have the complete independence of linguistic practice that they would need in
	order to achieve the complete explanatory power that conventionalism sees in them.
	This deflation of the concept of a linguistic rule starts from a point in his
	early philosophy of language. The picture theory was based on the idea that rules
	correlate names with objects, and so, when the names are put into a sentence,
	the sentence becomes the projection of a definite state of affairs involving the
	objects.4 But even at this early'
	- of a rule is a matter of deciding to apply the rule in a certain way. These changes
	are followed by a transitional period during the first 206 DAVID STERN half of
	the 1930s in which Wittgenstein explored their implications. The transitional
	period comes to end in the mid 1930s, with the first expo sition of what has since
	become known as "the private language argu ment", and the construction of the
	first part of what von Wright has called the "Early Investigations", which roughly
	corresponds to the first 188 sections of the published Philosophical Investigations.
	During this period, he moves away from a conception of language as constitut ing
	a formal system of rules, embracing the view that mastery of rules is dependent
	on a background of shared practices. As he stresses in the Investigations, his
	use of "the term 'language-game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that
	the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life".7 Though
	these forms of life, the taken for-granted ways of acting which make language
	possible, are social and practical, not individual and incorrigible, they occupy
	an analogous role in Wittgenstein's later philosophy to the role he gave to the
	experi entially given in 1929 or objects in the Tractatus, for they are the point
	at which the later Wittgenstein acknowledges the limits of language. Thus the
	Philosophical Investigations also states that "what has to be accepted, the given,
	is so one could say -forms of life" .* Consequently, he
	- source_sentence: 1993]. So being a "visual display" or being dependent on visual
	processing cannot be what distinguishes pictures from other modes of representation.
	Second, the distinction between the visual and the cognitive is not only unclear
	and empirically suspect [Schwartz 1994, 1996], it does not seem up to the job.
	Standard proposals for drawing a visual/cognitive boundary fail to support the
	surrogate theorist's core intuition. For example, it is often said picture perception
	is non-cognitive, since it does not involve active deliberation or contemplation.
	But the same holds for everyday cases of language comprehension. Without delay,
	pondering, or conscious inference we read and understand immediately most sentences
	we encounter. Identifying the cognitive with the learned, and the visual with
	the innate, will not work either. Many animal signal systems are instinctive,
	but they are not pictorial. And were humans equipped at birth with Latin, or as
	some claim "Mentalese," it would not mean these representational systems were
	pictorial.' Still, I think, proponents of the symbolic model can do more to accommodate
	the intuition of there being something more "visual" about pictures than natural
	languages, music notation, and various other forms of representation. And it is
	to this task I wish to turn my attention. The account I shall sketch makes use
	of ideas Goodman employs in his taxonomy of symbolic systems. Goodman argues that
	pictures, in contrast, say, to sentences in language or scores in music notation,
	belong to dense schemes of representa2 Variations of this criticism are
	sentences:
	- leveled against the model not only by vision theorists, but by art historians
	and philosophers who balk at what they take to be the symbolic paradigm's conventionalist
	implications. 3 Much is often made of evidence suggesting that infants [Hochberg
	and Brooks, 1962] and people from non-Western cultures [Derogowski, 1989] can
	understand pictures without training. My point here is not to challenge these
	empirical findings but to call attention to the need to separate issues of learning
	and innateness from claims about the form and conventionality of symbols. 708
	ROBERT SCHWARTZ tion. Pictorial symbols are analog, while English sentences constitute
	a digital system. Goodman further claims pictorial schemes are comparatively replete.
	Many more of the symbols' own properties function in determining its representational
	content. A given line may be understood as a graph, plotting the height of a mountain
	range, or as a picture of the same mountain (fig. 1). Fig. 1 Read as a graph,
	the thickness of the line, its color, and background have no significance. Interpreted
	as a picture, all these properties go to constitute the displays representational
	force. Notice, something phenomenal, akin to a Gestalt switch or aspect change,
	occurs when shifting between the two readings. And experience of the line takes
	on another much different character when read in the context of figure 2. Fig.
	2 Simply making a graph more replete, however, will not turn it into a picture.
	Nor will assigning representational significance to the background do the trick.
	For if these additional features of the graph
	- 'Goodman''s account of depiction may be described as minimalist at best. Pictures
	denote or refer. Among his undisputed contributions is his discussion of what
	he calls the routes of reference-denotation, predication, exemplification, and
	expression. Pictures represent in all these ways. But Goodman is not interested
	in the roots of reference-how referential relationships are established.5 His
	remarks about what determines what a picture represents are entirely negative:
	resemblance is neither necessary nor sufficient for depiction.6 Beyond rejecting
	the resemblance theory, Goodman refuses to give "general instructions for determining
	what a work describes or represents."7 Every system of pictures includes a plan
	of correlation mapping 228 pictures onto what they represent, but Goodman is silent
	about what determines or constrains these plans of correlation. Others have been
	tempted to fill the lacuna, drawing on resources internal or external to Goodman''s
	account of pictures.8 In particular, it is widely held that Goodman favors a convention
	theory of depiction. Some go so far as to ascribe to him the view that pictures
	are verbal symbols!9 But Goodman denies that he holds either view, insisting that
	"there is no vocabulary of picturing as there is of saying," and depiction does
	not depend on "rule-following."''0 Indeed, the convention view is incompatible
	with the claim that pictures belong to analog schemes, as conventions are rules
	operating upon disjoint and differentiated characters. "I That Goodman refuses
	to give an account of depiction does not mean that he thinks none can be'
	- 'reasons of different kinds, and interpreting vague concepts. Taking these two
	ideas together, we are to conclude that a reasonable person, seeking to justify
	the exercise of political power to his fellow citizens, won''t appeal to reasons
	that are only valid from within his own comprehensive doctrine ("comprehensive
	reasons"), but will instead recognize a duty to rely on "public reasons" about
	which there is an overlapping consensus among reasonable citizens who hold different
	comprehensive doctrines.9 Clayton''s contention is that parental authority is
	sufficiently analogous to political power to imply that parents, too, ought to
	be subject to the public reason restriction in justifying their conduct in their
	role as parents. (Though, like a lot of our responsibilities as parents and citizens,
	this is not to be understood as a legally enforceable duty, since that would require
	intolerable levels of surveillance and interference.) Clayton''s case rests on
	three points of comparison with the Rawlsian case for public reason in the political
	domain. First, like political power, parental authority is coercive: parents have
	authority to impose a range of sanctions to discipline their children which they
	could not impose on others. Second, for children, the family is a non-voluntary
	association. Although children are eventually freed from parental authority, their
	almost two-decades of subjection to parental authority is not by consent. Finally,
	like other institutions of the basic structure, the family has a profound and
	lasting effect on our life prospects by shaping our aspirations and transmitting
	unequal advantages. Since parental authority shares'
	model-index:
	- name: SentenceTransformer based on nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
	results:
	- task:
	type: triplet
	name: Triplet
	dataset:
	name: nomic
	type: nomic
	metrics:
	- type: cosine_accuracy
	value: 0.96
	name: Cosine Accuracy
	- type: dot_accuracy
	value: 0.04
	name: Dot Accuracy
	- type: manhattan_accuracy
	value: 0.956
	name: Manhattan Accuracy
	- type: euclidean_accuracy
	value: 0.96
	name: Euclidean Accuracy
	- type: max_accuracy
	value: 0.96
	name: Max Accuracy
	- type: cosine_accuracy
	value: 0.963
	name: Cosine Accuracy
	- type: dot_accuracy
	value: 0.037
	name: Dot Accuracy
	- type: manhattan_accuracy
	value: 0.9625
	name: Manhattan Accuracy
	- type: euclidean_accuracy
	value: 0.963
	name: Euclidean Accuracy
	- type: max_accuracy
	value: 0.963
	name: Max Accuracy
	- type: cosine_accuracy
	value: 0.963
	name: Cosine Accuracy
	- type: dot_accuracy
	value: 0.037
	name: Dot Accuracy
	- type: manhattan_accuracy
	value: 0.9625
	name: Manhattan Accuracy
	- type: euclidean_accuracy
	value: 0.963
	name: Euclidean Accuracy
	- type: max_accuracy
	value: 0.963
	name: Max Accuracy
	---

	# SentenceTransformer based on nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1

	This is a [sentence-transformers](https://www.SBERT.net) model finetuned from [nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1](https://huggingface.co./nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1). It maps sentences & paragraphs to a 768-dimensional dense vector space and can be used for semantic textual similarity, semantic search, paraphrase mining, text classification, clustering, and more.

	## Model Details

	### Model Description
	- Model Type: Sentence Transformer
	- Base model: [nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1](https://huggingface.co./nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1) <!-- at revision ec7a86b7066613e0a8acf87e1fcaaf23f8733dd6 -->
	- Maximum Sequence Length: 8192 tokens
	- Output Dimensionality: 768 tokens
	- Similarity Function: Cosine Similarity
	<!-- - Training Dataset: Unknown -->
	<!-- - Language: Unknown -->
	<!-- - License: Unknown -->

	### Model Sources

	- Documentation: [Sentence Transformers Documentation](https://sbert.net)
	- Repository: [Sentence Transformers on GitHub](https://github.com/UKPLab/sentence-transformers)
	- Hugging Face: [Sentence Transformers on Hugging Face](https://huggingface.co./models?library=sentence-transformers)

	### Full Model Architecture

	```
	SentenceTransformer(
	(0): Transformer({'max_seq_length': 8192, 'do_lower_case': False}) with Transformer model: NomicBertModel
	(1): Pooling({'word_embedding_dimension': 768, 'pooling_mode_cls_token': False, 'pooling_mode_mean_tokens': True, 'pooling_mode_max_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_mean_sqrt_len_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_weightedmean_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_lasttoken': False, 'include_prompt': True})
	(2): Normalize()
	)
	```

	## Usage

	### Direct Usage (Sentence Transformers)

	First install the Sentence Transformers library:

	```bash
	pip install -U sentence-transformers
	```

	Then you can load this model and run inference.
	```python
	from sentence_transformers import SentenceTransformer

	# Download from the 🤗 Hub
	model = SentenceTransformer("m7n/nomic-embed-philosophy-triplets_v5")
	# Run inference
	sentences = [
	'1993]. So being a "visual display" or being dependent on visual processing cannot be what distinguishes pictures from other modes of representation. Second, the distinction between the visual and the cognitive is not only unclear and empirically suspect [Schwartz 1994, 1996], it does not seem up to the job. Standard proposals for drawing a visual/cognitive boundary fail to support the surrogate theorist\'s core intuition. For example, it is often said picture perception is non-cognitive, since it does not involve active deliberation or contemplation. But the same holds for everyday cases of language comprehension. Without delay, pondering, or conscious inference we read and understand immediately most sentences we encounter. Identifying the cognitive with the learned, and the visual with the innate, will not work either. Many animal signal systems are instinctive, but they are not pictorial. And were humans equipped at birth with Latin, or as some claim "Mentalese," it would not mean these representational systems were pictorial.\' Still, I think, proponents of the symbolic model can do more to accommodate the intuition of there being something more "visual" about pictures than natural languages, music notation, and various other forms of representation. And it is to this task I wish to turn my attention. The account I shall sketch makes use of ideas Goodman employs in his taxonomy of symbolic systems. Goodman argues that pictures, in contrast, say, to sentences in language or scores in music notation, belong to dense schemes of representa2 Variations of this criticism are',
	"leveled against the model not only by vision theorists, but by art historians and philosophers who balk at what they take to be the symbolic paradigm's conventionalist implications. 3 Much is often made of evidence suggesting that infants [Hochberg and Brooks, 1962] and people from non-Western cultures [Derogowski, 1989] can understand pictures without training. My point here is not to challenge these empirical findings but to call attention to the need to separate issues of learning and innateness from claims about the form and conventionality of symbols. 708 ROBERT SCHWARTZ tion. Pictorial symbols are analog, while English sentences constitute a digital system. Goodman further claims pictorial schemes are comparatively replete. Many more of the symbols' own properties function in determining its representational content. A given line may be understood as a graph, plotting the height of a mountain range, or as a picture of the same mountain (fig. 1). Fig. 1 Read as a graph, the thickness of the line, its color, and background have no significance. Interpreted as a picture, all these properties go to constitute the displays representational force. Notice, something phenomenal, akin to a Gestalt switch or aspect change, occurs when shifting between the two readings. And experience of the line takes on another much different character when read in the context of figure 2. Fig. 2 Simply making a graph more replete, however, will not turn it into a picture. Nor will assigning representational significance to the background do the trick. For if these additional features of the graph",
	'Goodman\'s account of depiction may be described as minimalist at best. Pictures denote or refer. Among his undisputed contributions is his discussion of what he calls the routes of reference-denotation, predication, exemplification, and expression. Pictures represent in all these ways. But Goodman is not interested in the roots of reference-how referential relationships are established.5 His remarks about what determines what a picture represents are entirely negative: resemblance is neither necessary nor sufficient for depiction.6 Beyond rejecting the resemblance theory, Goodman refuses to give "general instructions for determining what a work describes or represents."7 Every system of pictures includes a plan of correlation mapping 228 pictures onto what they represent, but Goodman is silent about what determines or constrains these plans of correlation. Others have been tempted to fill the lacuna, drawing on resources internal or external to Goodman\'s account of pictures.8 In particular, it is widely held that Goodman favors a convention theory of depiction. Some go so far as to ascribe to him the view that pictures are verbal symbols!9 But Goodman denies that he holds either view, insisting that "there is no vocabulary of picturing as there is of saying," and depiction does not depend on "rule-following."\'0 Indeed, the convention view is incompatible with the claim that pictures belong to analog schemes, as conventions are rules operating upon disjoint and differentiated characters. "I That Goodman refuses to give an account of depiction does not mean that he thinks none can be',
	]
	embeddings = model.encode(sentences)
	print(embeddings.shape)
	# [3, 768]

	# Get the similarity scores for the embeddings
	similarities = model.similarity(embeddings, embeddings)
	print(similarities.shape)
	# [3, 3]
	```

	<!--
	### Direct Usage (Transformers)

	<details><summary>Click to see the direct usage in Transformers</summary>

	</details>
	-->

	<!--
	### Downstream Usage (Sentence Transformers)

	You can finetune this model on your own dataset.

	<details><summary>Click to expand</summary>

	</details>
	-->

	<!--
	### Out-of-Scope Use

	List how the model may foreseeably be misused and address what users ought not to do with the model.
	-->

	## Evaluation

	### Metrics

	#### Triplet
	* Dataset: `nomic`
	* Evaluated with [<code>TripletEvaluator</code>](https://sbert.net/docs/package_reference/sentence_transformer/evaluation.html#sentence_transformers.evaluation.TripletEvaluator)

	\| Metric \| Value \|
	\|:-------------------\|:---------\|
	\| cosine_accuracy \| 0.96 \|
	\| dot_accuracy \| 0.04 \|
	\| manhattan_accuracy \| 0.956 \|
	\| euclidean_accuracy \| 0.96 \|
	\| max_accuracy \| 0.96 \|

	#### Triplet
	* Dataset: `nomic`
	* Evaluated with [<code>TripletEvaluator</code>](https://sbert.net/docs/package_reference/sentence_transformer/evaluation.html#sentence_transformers.evaluation.TripletEvaluator)

	\| Metric \| Value \|
	\|:-------------------\|:----------\|
	\| cosine_accuracy \| 0.963 \|
	\| dot_accuracy \| 0.037 \|
	\| manhattan_accuracy \| 0.9625 \|
	\| euclidean_accuracy \| 0.963 \|
	\| max_accuracy \| 0.963 \|

	#### Triplet
	* Dataset: `nomic`
	* Evaluated with [<code>TripletEvaluator</code>](https://sbert.net/docs/package_reference/sentence_transformer/evaluation.html#sentence_transformers.evaluation.TripletEvaluator)

	\| Metric \| Value \|
	\|:-------------------\|:----------\|
	\| cosine_accuracy \| 0.963 \|
	\| dot_accuracy \| 0.037 \|
	\| manhattan_accuracy \| 0.9625 \|
	\| euclidean_accuracy \| 0.963 \|
	\| max_accuracy \| 0.963 \|

	<!--
	## Bias, Risks and Limitations

	What are the known or foreseeable issues stemming from this model? You could also flag here known failure cases or weaknesses of the model.
	-->

	<!--
	### Recommendations

	What are recommendations with respect to the foreseeable issues? For example, filtering explicit content.
	-->

	## Training Details

	### Training Dataset

	#### Unnamed Dataset


	* Size: 10,000 training samples
	* Columns: <code>anchor</code>, <code>positive</code>, and <code>negative</code>
	* Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:
	\| \| anchor \| positive \| negative \|
	\|:--------\|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\|
	\| type \| string \| string \| string \|
	\| details \| <ul><li>min: 271 tokens</li><li>mean: 333.67 tokens</li><li>max: 570 tokens</li></ul> \| <ul><li>min: 272 tokens</li><li>mean: 333.9 tokens</li><li>max: 727 tokens</li></ul> \| <ul><li>min: 263 tokens</li><li>mean: 332.95 tokens</li><li>max: 571 tokens</li></ul> \|
	* Samples:
	\| anchor \| positive \| negative \|
	\|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\|:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\|
	\| <code>such as Argentina, Brazil and Mexico (Sagasti and Guerrero 1974; Stepan 1981; Chambers 1987; Lafuente and Sala Catala 1989). However, recent studies on the sociology of science, philosophy of science, and scientific literature which stress and validate a more local and comparative perspective have lead to identify key elements in the diffusion process of © 2013 Stazione Zoologica Anton Dohm 70 ANA BARAHONA scientific knowledge and to more accurate approaches with respect to local complexities. There is, nevertheless, a need for historical studies that acknowledge the complex interactions generated after the contact between imported scientific novelties and local cultural traditions, which have yielded different results in different countries and cultural settings. Many problems have caught my attention influenced by the innovative perspective of Hans-Jörg Rheinberger 's project A Cultural History of Heredity. Especially the perspective on "the emergence of specific practices [...] the shaping of standards, and the conjunctions of these elements in a variety of social arenas" (MüllerWille and Rheinberger 2007, 13) has proved to be a useful lens through which to study many problems related to the history of genetics in Mexico. In my reconstructions I have analyzed the conditions for scientific research and the social relationships that allowed the establishment of genetics in Mexico, in the laboratory, the clinic and in agronomy. I included in this historical reconstruction the institutions, the interests, the bodies of norms, and the practices that contributed to the circulation of knowledge and methods imported from abroad, the effects that small local communities</code> \| <code>had during the early stages of the consolidation of genetics in Mexico, and the idiosyncrasies involved in the uses, diffusion and acceptance of genetics by agricultural, academic, and professional communities. In MüllerWille and Rheinberger 's words, my research thus took "a fresh approach to the history of heredity, drawing on a wealth of well-researched case studies, in order to embrace the cultural history of heredity [in Mexico]. This involves tracing the emergence of the knowledge of heredity in broader social and historical contexts, from a wide synchronic and diachronic perspective" (MüllerWille and Rheinberger 2007, 8). In this paper I give three examples to illustrate how the cultural history of heredity has enlightened my work: the introduction and institutionalization of Mendelism in Mexico in the early twentieth century, the hereditarian ideas of medical doctors in the late nineteenth century, and the introduction of medical genetics in Mexico. I have shown that Mendelism in Mexico was introduced taking into account the cultural particularities of Mexican peasants (Barahona et al. 2005; Barahona 2008). I have also explored the distinctive characteristics of Mexico's society, politics and history that impacted on the establishment of genetics in Mexico, as a new disciplinary field. The beginnings of this process of introduction and institutionalization in the early twentieth century, finally, have been traced by following the work of agronomist Edmundo Taboada and his group during the government of General Lázaro Cardenas (1934-1940), and the role played by the Rockefeller Foundation in Mexican agricultural research. This process was consoliTHE</code> \| <code>Exeter. This project included five large-scale conferences, which have thus far produced four preprint volumes (Staffan Müller-Wille, ed., A Cultural History of Heredity I: 17th and 18th Centuries [Berlin: Max-Planck-Institut für Wissenschaftsgeschichte, 2002]; Hans-Jörg Rheinberger and Staffan Müller-Wille, eds., A Cultural History of Heredity II: 18th and 19th Centuries [Berlin: Max-Planck-Institut für Wissenschaftsgeschichte, 2003]; Staffan Müller-Wille and Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, eds., A Cultural History of Heredity III: 19th and Early 20th Centuries [Berlin: Max-Planck-Institut für Wissenschaftsgeschichte, 2005]; Staffan Müller-Wile, Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, and John Dupré, eds., A Cultural History of Heredity IV: Heredity in the Century of the Gene [Berlin: Max-Planck-Institut für Wissenschaftsgeschichte, 2008]), one published edited volume (Staffan Müller-Wille and Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, eds., Heredity Produced: At the Crossroads of Biology, Politics, and Culture, 1500–1870 [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007]), and a further edited volume in preparation (Staffan Müller-Wille and Christina Brandt, eds., Heredity Explored: Between Public Domain and Experimental Science, 1850–1930). This book, then, is the authors’ own narrative synthesis, as project directors, of the results of this long and extremely fruitful international scholarly collaboration. The work begins with an introductory chapter that presents the authors’ broad scope by reference to the writings of Francis Galton, whose metaphors of heredity as a “post office” and a “parliament”—in which the hereditary materials are packed and shipped in mailbags before competing for a limited number of “places” in the developed character of an individual—immediately situate that work in a broader sociocultural context. The</code> \|
	\| <code>differentiated from mentoring in that it does not require a Springer close, personal relationship between models and observers. In fact, there are wide varieties of potentially important people who can be selected as role models such as distant leaders, co-workers, and inspiring individuals from all walks of life (e.g., teachers, sports heroes, religious figures, family members). We focus on role models because prior research grounded in social learning theory has demonstrated their impact on moral judgment and action (Bandura 1991). Modeling influences have been associated with the development of prosocial behavior in children (Eisenberg and Fabes 1998) and ethical behavior in the workplace (Moberg 2000; Sims and Brinkmann 2002; Weaver et al. 2005). Within the leadership literature, both transformational leaders (Avolio 1999) and ethical leaders (Brown et al. 2005) have been described as ethical role models for others. The assumption is that having been exposed to ethical role models contributes to the development of one's ethical leadership (Brown and Treviño 2006; Weaver et al. 2005). In this research, we investigate whether the ethical role models of leaders are related to employees' ratings of their ethical leadership. Because ethical role models can take many forms, we consider three different types of ethical role models that are potential influences on the development of ethical leadership (a) childhood models (e.g., parents, teachers, and coaches); (b) career models (e.g., mentors or supervisors), and (c) top managers who model ethics for employees in the organization (Treviño et al. 2000). We ground our hypotheses in social learning</code> \| <code>theory (Bandura 1986, 1991) and the influence of modeling on the acquisition of moral reasoning and standards. Three main questions guided our research. Are role models related to ethical leadership? If so, what types of models (i.e., childhood models, career mentors, top managers) are influential? Given that the types of role models selected as well as the lessons learned from such models change over the lifetime of the learner (Gibson 2003), does leader age moderate the relationships between different types of role models and ethical leadership? Theory and Hypotheses Modeling, Social Learning, and Ethical Leadership Social learning theory helps explain why individuals are likely to seek guidance from role models, and how role modeling might be related to ethical leadership. Social learning theory posits that individuals learn what to do and how to behave largely by observing and emulating role models. Most adults are not ethically self-sufficient. Rather, they look outside themselves to peers and significant others for Role Modeling and Perceived Ethical Leadership 589 ethical guidance (Kohlberg 1969; Treviño 1986). This is particularly true because ethical dilemmas often involve ambiguity and individuals attempt to reduce such ambiguity by turning to others for guidance. The social learning process begins when individuals focus their attention on modeled behaviors. Among the potential models to choose from, attractive models capture a learner's attention. Attractiveness is based on a number of model characteristics such as nurturance (Yussen and Levy 1975), status (Lippitt et al. 1952; Lefkowitz et al. 1955), competence (Kanareff and Lanzetta</code> \| <code>interpersonal relationships and the promotion of such conduct to followers through two-way communication, reinforcement and decision-making.' ' These authors take a social learning perspective (e.g., Brown and Treviño, 2006). Social learning theory highlights that leaders are role models of appropriate behaviors and emphasizes that people learn from reward and punishment (Bandura, 1986). In other words, ethical leaders use transactional efforts (i.e., communication, rewarding, and punishing) as well as role modeling of desired behavior to stimulate subordinates ethical behavior (Brown et al., 2005; Treviño et al., 2003). Other authors conceptualize ethical leadership more in terms of a basic tension between altruistic and egoistic motives (e.g., Aronson, 2001; Turner et al., 2002). Kanungo and Mendonca (2001) expect an ethical leader to be driven by a system of accepted beließ and appropriate judgments instead of self-interest, which is beneficial for followers, organizations, and society. Brown et al. (2005) developed a 10-item unidimensional measure of ethical leadership combining various ethical leader behaviors (e.g., acting fairly, allowing voice, and rewarding ethical conduct). Walumbwa and Schaubroeck also use this unidimensional measure in their study of ethical leadership and traits. Other authors see the ethical leader behaviors that are combined in this measure as theoretically different and argue that these behaviors may have different antecedents and consequences and should ideally be measured separately (e.g., De Hoogh and Den Hartog, 2008; Kalshoven et al., in press; Resick et al., 2006). As with other leadership styles (e.g., transactional, transformational), the identification of multiple dimensions increases the comprehension</code> \|
	\| <code>is ultimately trival. Based upon such an explication of deduction, Popper or a Popperian could then simply admit that deductive rules are apriori justified without creating problems for the justification of deduction analogous to the problems of an apriori defense of induction. One way to show that the rules of deduction are ultimately trivial analytic truths and as such acceptable candidates for apriori knowledge is to explain how the truths of deductive logic depend solely on the meanings or a conceptual analysis of the logical constants, 'not', 'if...then', 'either...or'. This task turns out to be more difficult than it sounds, however. Tarski showed that if one presuppposes an account of some logical constants, then one can define the notion of logical conse quence. But one's definition of logical consequence was relative to one's presuppositions about which terms are logical constants. Popper's idea was that this problem could be solved without any nontrivial assumptions, and so in this way deduction might be justified apriori. In retrospect Popper explains: My papers were...inspired by the hope of solving a problem which Tarski...indicates as insoluble; rightly, I now suspect. This was the problem of distinguishing between logical (or as I prefer to call them, 'formative') signs and descriptive signs...Tarski showed that the concept of logical consequence can easily be elucidated (with the help of the concept of truth of a 'model') once we have decided upon a list of logical or formative signs. My idea was very simple: I have suggested we take</code> \| <code>the concept 'logical consequence' as primitive and try to show that those signs are logical or formative which can be defined with the help of this primitive concept. It is only fair to say that my papers did not succeed in this (as emerges from Lejewski's analysis).4 (emphasis added) Popper's primitive was actually the relation of 'being deducible from', which supposedly he takes to be the same as the technical notion of logical consequence. Taking the meaning of the deducibility relation to be clear and trivial, he then attempts to define the logical constants without any presuppositions. What Lejewski shows is that Popper must presuppose exactly those notions he does not want to presuppose. Lejewski concludes, 'The upshot seems to be that Popper's claim to have constructed a logic without assumptions or a logic without axioms; i.e. a logic based on defi nitions alone, can hardly be upheld'.5 Given this failure, one might think that Popper could still fall back on Tarski's account of logical consequence as an analysis which justifies the apriori defense of deduction. Tarski rigo rously shows that the logical truths are analytic and thus apriori justified. That Tarski's 'definition' does this or is capable of doing this is far from obvious. As John Etchemendy argues A REFUTATION OF PURE CONJECTURE 59 ...his [Tarski's] account of logical truth and logical consequence does not capture, or even come close to capturing, any pretheoretic conception of the logical properties...Applying the model-theoretic account of consequence, I claim, is no more reliable</code> \| <code>In the view of many authors, the intuitive notion of logical truth is closely tied to the notion of analytic truth. A clear recent example is John Etche mendy, in his book The Concept of Logical Consequence (an all-out attack on Tarski's theory of logical consequence, whose main argument against the extensional adequacy of the theory will be discussed at length in Sec tion 3.1). On Etchemendy's view, the intuitive notion of logical truth is especially linked to the notion of analyticity.9 In fact, in his book he often (though not always) assumes that a sentence S is logically true in the intuitive sense when it is true by virtue of the meanings of some of its expressions, its standard logical constants. One may justifiably wonder whether TVMC is a clearly delimited in tuitive notion within the languages in the classical hierarchy that Tarski intended the standard definition to be applicable to. One may wonder this without having any skeptical worries about the notion of meaning in gen eral. These worries might not be justified for natural language and the kind of worry that concerns us here would still remain. The issue is whether there is a sufficiently clear pretheoretical use of the notion of TVMC as applied to the formal logico-mathematical languages for which Tarski's definition is especially intended. A way to approach the issue is through examples that seem to generate conflicting intuitions about truth by virtue of meaning in formal languages. Consider, to begin with, one of those</code> \|
	* Loss: [<code>TripletLoss</code>](https://sbert.net/docs/package_reference/sentence_transformer/losses.html#tripletloss) with these parameters:
	```json
	{
	"distance_metric": "TripletDistanceMetric.COSINE",
	"triplet_margin": 0.05
	}
	```

	### Evaluation Dataset

	#### Unnamed Dataset


	* Size: 500 evaluation samples
	* Columns: <code>anchor</code>, <code>positive</code>, and <code>negative</code>
	* Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:
	\| \| anchor \| positive \| negative \|
	\|:--------\|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\|
	\| type \| string \| string \| string \|
	\| details \| <ul><li>min: 285 tokens</li><li>mean: 336.93 tokens</li><li>max: 569 tokens</li></ul> \| <ul><li>min: 279 tokens</li><li>mean: 336.47 tokens</li><li>max: 633 tokens</li></ul> \| <ul><li>min: 263 tokens</li><li>mean: 335.47 tokens</li><li>max: 560 tokens</li></ul> \|
	* Samples:
	\| anchor \| positive \| negative \|
	\|:-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\|:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\|:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\|
	\| <code>silence. In Koffler's terms, the feminine is engendered, then expelled, and finally pathologized. And Melville's purpose, in this version of the narrative, is to fight against the mechanisms of repression. By presenting charac ters who merge conventional gender characteristics, the novel sub verts those very conventions which are part of the repressive power structures that Melville fights against. The narrative itself presents the tragedy of repression, since the progressive expulsion and pathologiz ing of the feminine mark the ultimate "feminine absence." The final censorship, in this reading, is the silencing of the feminine. So to those who would say to Professor Koffler, "But there aren't any women in Billy Budd," I'd reply on her behalf, "Yes, and that's pre cisely the point." A doubt arises, however, concerning this version of the narra tive and whether we can escape the very mechanisms of repression we might want to resist. Foucault raises that same doubt concerning his own "repressive hypothesis": 21 Does the critical discourse that addresses itself to repression come to act as a roadblock to a power mechanism that has operated unchallenged up to that point, or is it not in fact part of the same histori cal network as the thing it denounces (and doubt less misrepresents) by calling it "repression"?3 The power of Foucault's doubt concerns the possibility of a metalan guage. That is, Foucault is primarily interested in describing linguis tic/discursive mechanisms of repression ? especially censorship, law, and silence. And his point is that any attempt at describing</code> \| <code>the discur sive mechanisms of repression may well find itself becoming part of these very discursive mechanisms themselves. Foucault carries this argument a step further, too, by doubting whether the historical net work of sexuality and power is accurately represented as repressive. In other parts of the History of Sexuality, for instance, Foucault shows that the discourse on sex during the past two or three centuries has in fact proliferated: so the conspiracy of silence and censorship becomes instead a strategy for producing more and more discourse. The final point I want to make about Foucault here is that this "incitement to discourse" is a mechanism of power. The dis courses Foucault cites tend to be medical, psychiatric, and juridical, and the function these discourses serve is, broadly speaking, "to drive sex out of hiding and constrain [it] to lead a discursive existence." So-called "perversions" are thus persecuted by being incorporated within the discursive institutions; individuals are specified by entomologizing, categorizing discourses. This means, in short, that Foucault's version of discourse as the all-pervasive medium of power, sexuality, and silence calls into question our own ability to stand outside or apart from the very mech anisms of power we denounce. Foucault recognizes, of course, that this applies equally well to his own History of Sexuality. I wish through my introductory paragraphs on Foucault to raise a doubt concerning the two discourses before us (three, if you count mine, and I think this appropriate). First, then, does Melville successfully</code> \| <code>about that each one of us embodies a particular sexuality that needs to be known, taken care of, and expressed positively and fully? How and why did this region of human experience come to exist and get organized as it has? To understand Foucault's answer-and, thus, to understand my claim about the "intersection" of sex and race-it is necessary first to understand Foucault's conception of power. For the last several hundred years, Westerners have understood power as analogous to tools. What does it take to change a tire? It takes a jack and a lug wrench. What does it take to change a law? It takes money for communication with representatives, a piece of proposed legislation, and the power to pressure opponents to cooperate. Power is a tool like any other. Some people have that tool in their tool kit, and others lack it. A shift in the balance of power is simply a transferal of some of those tools from some people's tool kits to others'. Power is an object, then, under the control of subjects with whom its deployment originates. Those subjects who have power-tools sometimes choose to bring them out and turn them on, and other times they choose to leave them in the box.5 As he studied the history of sexuality and also the histories of criminality, military discipline, and pedagogy, Foucault found that conceiving of power as a tool under the ownership of a controlling subject simply did not work. He realized it would be necessary to rethink the entire concept, construing it</code> \|
	\| <code>consists in outdoing him, in espousing "a more thorough pragmatism" (FLPV, p. 46). Because any statement can be accepted or rejected as a result of our decision, the search for a distinction between single statements that are known a priori and ones that are known a posteriori is doomed to failure. There is 'empirical slack' in all our beliefs, and since the whole body of our knowledge is 'under-determined' by experience, accepting or rejecting particular items will always be a matter of decision. Is Quine's general epistemological theory true? Is he justified in rejecting the a priori-a posteriori distinction on the grounds that no statement is immune to revision? In this paper I examine the extent to which the more recent arguments in chapter two of Word and Object support his position. 83 BARRY STROUD I think there are important consequences of those arguments that have not been clearly recognized. The aim of the chapter is to make plausible the following thesis about how much of language can be made sense of in terms of its stimulus conditions: ... the infinite totality of sentences of any given speaker's language can be so permuted, or mapped onto itself, that (a) the totality of the speaker's dispo sitions to verbal behavior remains invariant, and yet (b) the mapping is no mere correlation of sentences with equivalent sentences, in any plausible sense of equivalence however loose. Sentences without number can diverge drastically from their respective correlates, yet the divergences can systematically so offset</code> \| <code>one another that the overall pattern of associations of sentences with one another and with non-verbal stimulation is preserved, (p. 27) Putting it interlinguistically, translation between languages is said to be 'indeterminate' in the sense that: ... manuals for translating one language into another can be set up in divergent ways, all compatible with the totality of speech dispositions, yet incompatible with one another. In countless places they will diverge in giving, as their res pective translations of a sentence of the one language, sentences of the other language which stand to each other in no sort of equivalence however loose. (P. 27) It is tempting to take the thesis of the indeterminacy of translation as a less metaphorical and more precise way of making Quine's earlier point that there is always some 'slippage' or 'empirical slack' between our full blown language and the stimuli which give rise to our verbal behavior. If we can produce two or more incompatible manuals for translating a foreigner's remark, all of which square with his dispositions to respond verbally to non-verbal stimuli, then the choice of one or another of those manuals is underdetermined by those dispositions and stimuli. Or, in the domestic case, if two non-equivalent sentences S1 and S2 are correlated in the mapping of the sentences, our saying Sx rather than S2 is not deter mined by sense-experience or by non-verbal stimulation alone. Since we are bound only by the need to square the totality of our utterances with experience</code> \| <code>genuine evidential basis: namely, native assent and dissent to the linguist's queries under concurrent observable circumstances. If Evans' attack is sound, it may prove fatal since Quine will not be able to reply by claiming that Evans' criticism relies on non-factual considSemantic Perversity 67 erations. Evans' anti-Quinean line of argument is a powerful one, and I shall spend some time in this section to review it2. Evans starts by pointing out the divergencies between the task of a translator and the task of a semanticist. The aim of the former is simply to facilitate communication between two linguistic communities. In order to do so, she must devise a manual of translation. Evans does not manifest any concern with the claim that translation suffers from indeterminacy. The reason is simply that a translator is not devoted to revealing any semantic truth. The translator's aim is simply to find smooth vehicles of communication, and insofar as this target is achieved, the way the translator dissects native utterances is completely irrelevant to her task. By contrast, the semanticist is involved in the project of constructing a theory of meaning. She is not concerned merely with correlating expressions of native with lumps of home language, but rather with stating what the native expressions actually mear i3. The sentences of Native are potentially infinite in number. The semanticist, similarly to the translator, will be obliged to dissect native sentences. The target now, however, is to account for the meaning of those previously unencountered</code> \|
	\| <code>any definition or justification he gave of any particular democratic ideal, such as can be found in the Public and Its Problems or Liberalism and Social Action, are not solutions to be applied but hypotheses to be evaluated in a manner outlined by his methodological work. There are many possible democratic values and procedures, problems for which they might be useful, and peoples who might share them. Thus, it is vital to understand when, where, why, how, and for whom they are valid. For this task Dewey provides an account of experimental political inquiry. This framework can best be understood by—and requires—rethinking the problem of legitimacy as understood by many philosophers. Of course, since the value of an experimental approach must itself be shown experimentally, I will conclude by outlining the ways it suggests that the “current economic crisis” might be addressed. 160 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 47 Number 2 Experimental Method Before we turn to Dewey’s suggestions for realizing experimental political inquiry, it will be useful to rehearse his characterization of experimental inquiry more broadly. Like Charles S. Peirce, Dewey understood inquiry as a means by which organisms deal with changes in their environments (“The Fixation of Belief ”; LW 12). Humans might rely on forms of authority—whether that of experts or past experience—to make decisions about what to do, but, as no problem is exactly the same as any previous one, there are likely to be situations for which authorities provide unhelpful advice. For this reason,</code> \| <code>the successes of the past ought to have some bearing on our conduct without exclusively determining what should be done now. Avoiding mechanical habits cannot be as simple as following a strict set of rules, though outlining some characteristics of experimental inquiry may help us create the conditions for dealing with problems more effectively when they arise. Most generally, Dewey suggests that experimental inquiry should (1) be based in specific conflicts; (2) trace out the conditions and effects of possible ends and means; and (3) involve deliberation and action undertaken to address a problem. He writes, experimental inquiries should (1) grow out of actual social tensions, needs, ‘troubles’; (2) have their subject-matter determined by the conditions that are material means of bringing about a unified situation, and (3) be related to some hypothesis, which is a plan and policy for existential resolution of the conflicting social situation. [LW 12:493] Reflection meant to deal with problems should undertake to explore tensions among different courses of action and the goals they are likely to realize by investigating their conditions and effects. One should not assume any particular relationship between ends and means, as any set of ends—like happiness or duty, community or difference, truth or justice—will make possible a variety of courses of action in different contexts, and their effects may have bearing upon the validity of such values. Acting so as to maximize happiness may not lead to happiness, just as reforming the basic</code> \| <code>engage and fulfill their operative interests. Inquiry into the constituents and possibilities of the situation will, if successful, yield a plan of action to accomplish 2. John Dewey, "The Construction of Good," in The Quest for Certainty (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1929). 3. White, "Value and Obligation in Dewey and Lewis," p. 322. 4. White, Social Thought in America, p. 213. 5. White, "Value and Obligation in Dewey and Lewis," p. 329. 6. See John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1920), esp. chaps. 1 and 2; Experience and Nature (New York: Dover Publications, 1958), esp. chap. 10; and the article "Philosophy," in The Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan Co., 1934), 12:118-28. 220 Ethics the transformation. The features of the situation which are experienced as immediately attractive (or unattractive) prior to inquiry Dewey calls problematic goods. The particular action that is expected to integrate the situation he calls the end-in-view, and the unified activity itself he calls value proper, or consummatory experience. The plan of action which would transform the situation from problematic to consummatory he designates, idiosyncratically, a moral judgment.7 A clarification of the generic features of these situations is necessary for the agents involved to avail themselves of the intellectual and material instrumentalities at their disposal. Dewey's intent as a moral philosopher was precisely this: He wished to clarify the nature of the human situation in such a way that its resources and limitations could be identified and</code> \|
	* Loss: [<code>TripletLoss</code>](https://sbert.net/docs/package_reference/sentence_transformer/losses.html#tripletloss) with these parameters:
	```json
	{
	"distance_metric": "TripletDistanceMetric.COSINE",
	"triplet_margin": 0.05
	}
	```

	### Training Hyperparameters
	#### Non-Default Hyperparameters

	- `eval_strategy`: steps
	- `per_device_train_batch_size`: 4
	- `per_device_eval_batch_size`: 4
	- `warmup_ratio`: 0.1
	- `batch_sampler`: no_duplicates

	#### All Hyperparameters
	<details><summary>Click to expand</summary>

	- `overwrite_output_dir`: False
	- `do_predict`: False
	- `eval_strategy`: steps
	- `prediction_loss_only`: True
	- `per_device_train_batch_size`: 4
	- `per_device_eval_batch_size`: 4
	- `per_gpu_train_batch_size`: None
	- `per_gpu_eval_batch_size`: None
	- `gradient_accumulation_steps`: 1
	- `eval_accumulation_steps`: None
	- `learning_rate`: 5e-05
	- `weight_decay`: 0.0
	- `adam_beta1`: 0.9
	- `adam_beta2`: 0.999
	- `adam_epsilon`: 1e-08
	- `max_grad_norm`: 1.0
	- `num_train_epochs`: 3
	- `max_steps`: -1
	- `lr_scheduler_type`: linear
	- `lr_scheduler_kwargs`: {}
	- `warmup_ratio`: 0.1
	- `warmup_steps`: 0
	- `log_level`: passive
	- `log_level_replica`: warning
	- `log_on_each_node`: True
	- `logging_nan_inf_filter`: True
	- `save_safetensors`: True
	- `save_on_each_node`: False
	- `save_only_model`: False
	- `restore_callback_states_from_checkpoint`: False
	- `no_cuda`: False
	- `use_cpu`: False
	- `use_mps_device`: False
	- `seed`: 42
	- `data_seed`: None
	- `jit_mode_eval`: False
	- `use_ipex`: False
	- `bf16`: False
	- `fp16`: False
	- `fp16_opt_level`: O1
	- `half_precision_backend`: auto
	- `bf16_full_eval`: False
	- `fp16_full_eval`: False
	- `tf32`: None
	- `local_rank`: 0
	- `ddp_backend`: None
	- `tpu_num_cores`: None
	- `tpu_metrics_debug`: False
	- `debug`: []
	- `dataloader_drop_last`: False
	- `dataloader_num_workers`: 0
	- `dataloader_prefetch_factor`: None
	- `past_index`: -1
	- `disable_tqdm`: False
	- `remove_unused_columns`: True
	- `label_names`: None
	- `load_best_model_at_end`: False
	- `ignore_data_skip`: False
	- `fsdp`: []
	- `fsdp_min_num_params`: 0
	- `fsdp_config`: {'min_num_params': 0, 'xla': False, 'xla_fsdp_v2': False, 'xla_fsdp_grad_ckpt': False}
	- `fsdp_transformer_layer_cls_to_wrap`: None
	- `accelerator_config`: {'split_batches': False, 'dispatch_batches': None, 'even_batches': True, 'use_seedable_sampler': True, 'non_blocking': False, 'gradient_accumulation_kwargs': None}
	- `deepspeed`: None
	- `label_smoothing_factor`: 0.0
	- `optim`: adamw_torch
	- `optim_args`: None
	- `adafactor`: False
	- `group_by_length`: False
	- `length_column_name`: length
	- `ddp_find_unused_parameters`: None
	- `ddp_bucket_cap_mb`: None
	- `ddp_broadcast_buffers`: False
	- `dataloader_pin_memory`: True
	- `dataloader_persistent_workers`: False
	- `skip_memory_metrics`: True
	- `use_legacy_prediction_loop`: False
	- `push_to_hub`: False
	- `resume_from_checkpoint`: None
	- `hub_model_id`: None
	- `hub_strategy`: every_save
	- `hub_private_repo`: False
	- `hub_always_push`: False
	- `gradient_checkpointing`: False
	- `gradient_checkpointing_kwargs`: None
	- `include_inputs_for_metrics`: False
	- `eval_do_concat_batches`: True
	- `fp16_backend`: auto
	- `push_to_hub_model_id`: None
	- `push_to_hub_organization`: None
	- `mp_parameters`:
	- `auto_find_batch_size`: False
	- `full_determinism`: False
	- `torchdynamo`: None
	- `ray_scope`: last
	- `ddp_timeout`: 1800
	- `torch_compile`: False
	- `torch_compile_backend`: None
	- `torch_compile_mode`: None
	- `dispatch_batches`: None
	- `split_batches`: None
	- `include_tokens_per_second`: False
	- `include_num_input_tokens_seen`: False
	- `neftune_noise_alpha`: None
	- `optim_target_modules`: None
	- `batch_eval_metrics`: False
	- `eval_on_start`: False
	- `batch_sampler`: no_duplicates
	- `multi_dataset_batch_sampler`: proportional

	</details>

	### Training Logs
	\| Epoch \| Step \| Training Loss \| loss \| nomic_max_accuracy \|
	\|:------:\|:----:\|:-------------:\|:------:\|:------------------:\|
	\| 0 \| 0 \| - \| - \| 0.932 \|
	\| 0.04 \| 100 \| 0.0072 \| 0.0070 \| 0.946 \|
	\| 0.08 \| 200 \| 0.0047 \| 0.0061 \| 0.95 \|
	\| 0.12 \| 300 \| 0.0051 \| 0.0061 \| 0.956 \|
	\| 0.16 \| 400 \| 0.0051 \| 0.0076 \| 0.944 \|
	\| 0.2 \| 500 \| 0.0084 \| 0.0071 \| 0.946 \|
	\| 0.24 \| 600 \| 0.0076 \| 0.0079 \| 0.95 \|
	\| 0.28 \| 700 \| 0.0097 \| 0.0076 \| 0.95 \|
	\| 0.32 \| 800 \| 0.0092 \| 0.0110 \| 0.92 \|
	\| 0.36 \| 900 \| 0.01 \| 0.0125 \| 0.9 \|
	\| 0.4 \| 1000 \| 0.0114 \| 0.1029 \| 0.714 \|
	\| 0.44 \| 1100 \| 0.012 \| 0.0091 \| 0.932 \|
	\| 0.48 \| 1200 \| 0.0121 \| 0.0088 \| 0.936 \|
	\| 0.52 \| 1300 \| 0.0096 \| 0.0117 \| 0.912 \|
	\| 0.56 \| 1400 \| 0.008 \| 0.0080 \| 0.938 \|
	\| 0.6 \| 1500 \| 0.0079 \| 0.0088 \| 0.928 \|
	\| 0.64 \| 1600 \| 0.0105 \| 0.0106 \| 0.92 \|
	\| 0.68 \| 1700 \| 0.0079 \| 0.0077 \| 0.936 \|
	\| 0.72 \| 1800 \| 0.0095 \| 0.0083 \| 0.938 \|
	\| 0.76 \| 1900 \| 0.0095 \| 0.0075 \| 0.946 \|
	\| 0.8 \| 2000 \| 0.0083 \| 0.0094 \| 0.93 \|
	\| 0.84 \| 2100 \| 0.0117 \| 0.0097 \| 0.912 \|
	\| 0.88 \| 2200 \| 0.0105 \| 0.0085 \| 0.944 \|
	\| 0.92 \| 2300 \| 0.0103 \| 0.0110 \| 0.906 \|
	\| 0.96 \| 2400 \| 0.0092 \| 0.0096 \| 0.92 \|
	\| 1.0 \| 2500 \| 0.0101 \| 0.0103 \| 0.92 \|
	\| 1.04 \| 2600 \| 0.0074 \| 0.0098 \| 0.922 \|
	\| 1.08 \| 2700 \| 0.0056 \| 0.0084 \| 0.94 \|
	\| 1.12 \| 2800 \| 0.0038 \| 0.0074 \| 0.948 \|
	\| 1.16 \| 2900 \| 0.0033 \| 0.0071 \| 0.938 \|
	\| 1.2 \| 3000 \| 0.0045 \| 0.0076 \| 0.93 \|
	\| 1.24 \| 3100 \| 0.0029 \| 0.0089 \| 0.936 \|
	\| 1.28 \| 3200 \| 0.0024 \| 0.0076 \| 0.94 \|
	\| 1.32 \| 3300 \| 0.0024 \| 0.0076 \| 0.942 \|
	\| 1.3600 \| 3400 \| 0.0015 \| 0.0068 \| 0.946 \|
	\| 1.4 \| 3500 \| 0.0027 \| 0.0068 \| 0.948 \|
	\| 1.44 \| 3600 \| 0.0029 \| 0.0076 \| 0.944 \|
	\| 1.48 \| 3700 \| 0.0027 \| 0.0070 \| 0.954 \|
	\| 1.52 \| 3800 \| 0.0035 \| 0.0077 \| 0.944 \|
	\| 1.56 \| 3900 \| 0.0034 \| 0.0056 \| 0.96 \|
	\| 1.6 \| 4000 \| 0.0022 \| 0.0068 \| 0.952 \|
	\| 1.6400 \| 4100 \| 0.002 \| 0.0062 \| 0.958 \|
	\| 1.6800 \| 4200 \| 0.0029 \| 0.0074 \| 0.948 \|
	\| 1.72 \| 4300 \| 0.004 \| 0.0067 \| 0.95 \|
	\| 1.76 \| 4400 \| 0.0024 \| 0.0066 \| 0.956 \|
	\| 1.8 \| 4500 \| 0.0018 \| 0.0066 \| 0.95 \|
	\| 1.8400 \| 4600 \| 0.0034 \| 0.0067 \| 0.948 \|
	\| 1.88 \| 4700 \| 0.0014 \| 0.0057 \| 0.952 \|
	\| 1.92 \| 4800 \| 0.0015 \| 0.0054 \| 0.96 \|
	\| 1.96 \| 4900 \| 0.0016 \| 0.0061 \| 0.95 \|
	\| 2.0 \| 5000 \| 0.0017 \| 0.0069 \| 0.942 \|
	\| 2.04 \| 5100 \| 0.0015 \| 0.0059 \| 0.956 \|
	\| 2.08 \| 5200 \| 0.0013 \| 0.0062 \| 0.942 \|
	\| 2.12 \| 5300 \| 0.0016 \| 0.0061 \| 0.944 \|
	\| 2.16 \| 5400 \| 0.0013 \| 0.0055 \| 0.952 \|
	\| 2.2 \| 5500 \| 0.0005 \| 0.0055 \| 0.95 \|
	\| 2.24 \| 5600 \| 0.0012 \| 0.0047 \| 0.96 \|
	\| 2.2800 \| 5700 \| 0.0017 \| 0.0052 \| 0.956 \|
	\| 2.32 \| 5800 \| 0.0001 \| 0.0056 \| 0.948 \|
	\| 2.36 \| 5900 \| 0.0007 \| 0.0055 \| 0.952 \|
	\| 2.4 \| 6000 \| 0.0005 \| 0.0052 \| 0.964 \|
	\| 2.44 \| 6100 \| 0.001 \| 0.0050 \| 0.968 \|
	\| 2.48 \| 6200 \| 0.0008 \| 0.0051 \| 0.966 \|
	\| 2.52 \| 6300 \| 0.0005 \| 0.0049 \| 0.964 \|
	\| 2.56 \| 6400 \| 0.0009 \| 0.0050 \| 0.962 \|
	\| 2.6 \| 6500 \| 0.0006 \| 0.0050 \| 0.956 \|
	\| 2.64 \| 6600 \| 0.0006 \| 0.0049 \| 0.96 \|
	\| 2.68 \| 6700 \| 0.0002 \| 0.0049 \| 0.954 \|
	\| 2.7200 \| 6800 \| 0.0004 \| 0.0050 \| 0.95 \|
	\| 2.76 \| 6900 \| 0.0004 \| 0.0050 \| 0.952 \|
	\| 2.8 \| 7000 \| 0.0004 \| 0.0048 \| 0.966 \|
	\| 2.84 \| 7100 \| 0.0006 \| 0.0049 \| 0.958 \|
	\| 2.88 \| 7200 \| 0.0003 \| 0.0049 \| 0.964 \|
	\| 2.92 \| 7300 \| 0.0004 \| 0.0048 \| 0.964 \|
	\| 2.96 \| 7400 \| 0.0001 \| 0.0048 \| 0.96 \|
	\| 3.0 \| 7500 \| 0.0 \| 0.0048 \| 0.963 \|


	### Framework Versions
	- Python: 3.10.12
	- Sentence Transformers: 3.0.1
	- Transformers: 4.42.4
	- PyTorch: 2.3.1+cu121
	- Accelerate: 0.32.1
	- Datasets: 2.21.0
	- Tokenizers: 0.19.1

	## Citation

	### BibTeX

	#### Sentence Transformers
	```bibtex
	@inproceedings{reimers-2019-sentence-bert,
	title = "Sentence-BERT: Sentence Embeddings using Siamese BERT-Networks",
	author = "Reimers, Nils and Gurevych, Iryna",
	booktitle = "Proceedings of the 2019 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing",
	month = "11",
	year = "2019",
	publisher = "Association for Computational Linguistics",
	url = "https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.10084",
	}
	```

	#### TripletLoss
	```bibtex
	@misc{hermans2017defense,
	title={In Defense of the Triplet Loss for Person Re-Identification},
	author={Alexander Hermans and Lucas Beyer and Bastian Leibe},
	year={2017},
	eprint={1703.07737},
	archivePrefix={arXiv},
	primaryClass={cs.CV}
	}
	```

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