metadata

base_model: nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
datasets: []
language: []
library_name: sentence-transformers
metrics:
  - cosine_accuracy
  - dot_accuracy
  - manhattan_accuracy
  - euclidean_accuracy
  - max_accuracy
pipeline_tag: sentence-similarity
tags:
  - sentence-transformers
  - sentence-similarity
  - feature-extraction
  - generated_from_trainer
  - dataset_size:10000
  - loss:TripletLoss
widget:
  - source_sentence: >-
      met, Peter van Inwagen, a libertarian, concludes that free will is a
      mystery. Recently, the Mind Argument has drawn a number of criticisms.
      Here I seek to add to its woes. Quite apart from its other problems, I
      argue, the Mind Argument does a poor job of isolating the important
      concern for libertarians that it raises. Once this concern has been
      clarified,
    sentences:
      - >-
        however, another argument serves to renew the challenge. The
        Assimilation Argument challenges libertarians to explain how ostensible
        exercises of free will are relevantly different from other causally
        undetermined outcomes, outcomes that nobody would count as exercises of
        free will. In particular, libertarians must explain how agents can have
        the power
      - >-
        contended that the Assimilation Argument is unsound. Here I defend the
        Assimilation Argument and the Rollback Argument, a second challenge to
        libertarianism that Franklin rejects. My aim in doing so is to
        underscore the force of these challenges, and thereby to resist what
        appears to be an emerging trend in
      - >-
        is meant to bring out a number of crucial points about the process
        itself: (a) Scientific theories are formed at many levels of generality,
        ranging from simple' generalizations covering a small portion of the
        data to complex theories covering the whole area of inquiry. There are,
        of course, no rules dic tating which level is most appropriate at a
        given stage of inquiry; the history of science suggests, however (i)
        that it rarely works if one jumps from the data to an all-encompassing
        theory but that (ii) one need not progress 448 BARUCH A. BRODY through
        all the intermediary levels of generalization before one formulates a
        broad theory. I want to claim that the history of morals suggests the
        same conclusions, and that (i) in particular, suggests that moral theory
        and moral philosophy have been operating in a fundamentally incorrect
        fashion. Full scale systematizations (such as utilitarianism) have
        emerged long before we have had any even half-successful lower-level
        moral generalizations of any sophistication. John Stuart Mill was, at
        least, sensitive about this issue, and he3 put forward the following
        distinction between the methods of science and of moral reasoning: The
        truths which are ultimately accepted as the first principles of a
        science, are really the last result of metaphysical analysis, practised
        on the elementary no tions with which the science is conversant; and
        their relation to this science is not that of foundations to an edifice,
        but of roots to a tree, which may
  - source_sentence: >-
      when he comes to deal with the general theory of relativity and with
      quantum theory, the reader has to have an elementary knowledge of tensor
      analysis and of matrix mechanics. That Lenzen makes this demand upon his
      reader is not his fault. We have reached a stage where the student of the
      philosophy of science must equip himself with knowledge of at least the
      elements of a number of mathematical disciplines. I shall touch only those
      parts of his book that any intelligent reader can understand. First, what
      is " a physical thing"? "A fundamental property of a thing is that it has
      aspects. If I look at a book upon the table I experience in sensation a
      partial aspect of the book. A thing presents different aspects from
      different points of view. We can describe an aspect by saying that it is
      colored, that it has a certain shape, that it is smooth, etc. Knowledge of
      a thing is ultimately based upon acquaintance with aspects of the thing.
      However, the concept of thina implies more than the concept of given
      aspects; there are also possible aspects. Thus while I am merely seeing
      the book some visible aspect is given, whereas the tangible aspects are
      merely possible. Hence a thing may be characterized as an entity which has
      given and possible aspects. . . . An aspect is a union of particular
      qualities, complexities and relationships" (pp. 15-16). "A physical body
      is a class of aspects which are or can be given to some mind." "The
      problem of physics is the
    sentences:
      - >-
        But functions are cheap and determination is not there is probably a
        function from the GDP of each country to the number of its bald citizens
        but the former surely does not determine the latter. Obviously, (C) says
        more than that a certain function exists. However, since it is a matter
        of controversy how much more it says, for the purposes of this paper I
        won't assume any strong construal of compositional determination.8 There
        is a key ambiguity in (C) that has long been neglected in the
        literature: the plural definite description in it can be construed
        either distributively or collectively. The collective reading is
        compatible with the possibility that the meanings of certain complex
        expressions depend not only on the meanings their constituents have in
        themselves, but also on relations that hold among these meanings. I will
        follow the usual practice in reading 'the meanings of its constituents'
        in (C) distributively.9 Thus construed (C) (together with certain
        straightforward assumptions about the syntax of the language under
        consideration10) entails that ambiguity in a complex expression is
        either syntactic (derives from the fact that the expression has more
        than one structure) or lexical (derives from the fact that some lexical
        constituent of the expression has more than one meaning). (C) is not a
        principle anyone is interested in for its own sake. Philosophers,
        linguists, and psychologists are all concerned with substantially
        stronger theses. The philosopher's compositionality is a claim about
        explanatory priority. It says that
      - >-
        and their possible solution' the book is divided into six parts, these
        into sections and chapters. There are also two appendixes, one offering
        a scheme for the history of philosophy, the other a bibliography. Under
        the 'Metaphysics of Nature' 'substance and quality,' the PSYCHOLOGY AND
        SCIENTIFIC METHODS 133 mechanical and atomic theories, time and space,
        are ably discussed, and much that is said represents very modern
        tendencies in physical science. It being the work of science to discover
        universal characteristics, and the sciences being classifiable on the
        basis of the degrees of the universality of their concepts, mechanics
        presents itself as the most universal because it deals with extension,
        impenetrability, location and motion. But the mere ubiquitousness of
        these does not disprove the objectivity also of the 'secondary
        qualities.' "Exceptional existence is not necessarily subjective
        existence." Both classes of qualities are revealed upon the same sense
        basis. In any case, we in treating of them make use only of
        abstractions, and science is justified in using the more universally
        occurring qualities, for they make all things comparable and
        systematizable. Therewith, because of this genesis, this isolation of
        the primary from the secondary qualities in the process of abstraction,
        the two coexisting in the concrete object, it is impossible to reduce
        the secondary to the primary, although the latter may serve as an index,
        or means of comparison, for the former. The question, fundamental for
        the understanding of the meaning of mechanics, which the reviewer would
        ask here, is:
      - >-
        description of the characters and relations of aspects which may be
        represented by numbers." "The objectivity of the physical order in
        grounded in correlations between aspects given to different minds" (p.
        6). From this it appears that "an important relation to which aspects
        may be terms is the relation of objects to subject. The discussion of
        this specific very pervasive relationship raises the problem of the
        status of aspects with respect to their dependence on, or independence
        of, being given to some mind. . . . I do not wish, however, to discuss
        this question in the present book; it appears to me that it is possible
        608 JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY to construct science without answering, or
        even raising, the metaphysical problem. I have endeavored to use the
        term aspect without giving it a subjectivistic or realistic
        interpretation. . . . We can describe given and possible aspects, or
        elements, without considering the problem of their subjectivity or
        independent reality. The systematic description and correlation of
        aspects of reality is the problem of science. "Now the reference to the
        metaphysical problem has provided us with additional concepts for the
        expression of the criterion of physical reality. The fundamental
        principle is that in the construction of a physical theory one employs a
        subjectivistic criterion of reality and assumes a realistic attitude. A
        thing is real because it is an object of possible experience; yet one
        describes it as if it
  - source_sentence: >-
      of touch which one has learned to expect, does not in fact occur in these
      cases. It may be, on the other hand, that the matter of correlation is
      merely unusual, as for example if one dreamt night after night of a
      certain object being at a certain place: i. e., if one's sense-data were
      correlated in a certain way. Then if one went to the place at which the
      sense-data ordinarily would have led one to expect to see certain
      sense-data correlated with the others in a particular way, one might not
      experience such a sense datum. Again, if in what is called "waking life"
      one saw sense data at different times which one could correlate by saying
      that they all belong to the sun, one would probably see certain sense-data
      as expected at other times ; but if the sense-data had only been given in
      dreams, any reference of that kind would very probably be fallacious. Thus
      sense-data are said to be unreal when inferences usually true turn out to
      be false. Thus while it appears essential to predicate primary existence
      of all sense-data with which we are 142 THE MONIST. acquainted, sense-data
      can be said to be real or unreal in a definite sense. The things which
      make up the outside world appear to be par ticulars and facts. Facts
      therefore have a kind of existence, which we will call "primary existence
      of facts," but which is not of the same kind as that for particulars : for
      the intrinsic nature of facts
    sentences:
      - >-
        situations. Propositions (unlocated ones-there are also located
        propositions) are sets P of situation types satisfying a monotonicity
        principle: If s e P and s c s' then s' E P. These propositions are the
        objects of propositional attitudes in general and so will serve to
        interpret the complements of indirect discourse predicates such as
        'believe' and 'say,' as well as NI complements. Intensionality comes
        into propositions from two sources: through relations, which are not
        characterized extensionally in this theory, and through the multiplicity
        of situation types. The use of partial functions means that the logic of
        propositions will be non-Boolean in some way. Semantic innocence and
        uncompromising situations (SIUS) sketches the same theoretical
        apparatus, adding to it an extended discussion of innocence, and of an
        argument (called "the slingshot" by the authors) that is felt to
        threaten innocence. The authors devote much of these three articles to
        locating their approach historically and to motivating it; relatively
        little space is spent on formulating the theory. Mathematically-minded
        logicians interested in situation semantics will probably be most
        concerned with technical matters. But the 1984, Association for Symbolic
        Logic 0022-4812/84/4901-0032/$03.30 1403 1404 REVIEWS motivation of
        theories is an indispensable part both of philosophical logic and of
        natural language semantics, and in this review I will try to give equal
        attention to motivation and to the theory itself. I will begin with
        semantic innocence, a recurrent theme in the three articles. The term is
        meant to suggest a natural, direct
      - >-
        is different from the nature of particulars, and in view of their
        intrinsically different natures, the same property cannot signifi cantly
        be predicated of both. As far as one can see, this apparatus of
        particulars and facts is adequate for the building up of empirical
        knowledge. Thus, we do not postulate existence of the primary kind to
        any other objects of our thought. We do not assume primary existence for
        physical objects and points and other non experienced things. Having
        considered briefly the crude data given empirically, we have to build up
        the other objects of thought by means of logical construction. It would
        perhaps be advisable to state shortly what appears to be the essence of
        this method. The problem for the solution of which this method is to be
        used is as follows. Cer tain things are given in
        experience?sense-particulars of various kinds and facts. We then wish to
        find other terms, such that in analyzing any proposition in which they
        occur, they themselves do not occur, but only the things which are given
        in experience. At the same time, these terms, are to have certain
        definite properties. Then although a term a (say) appears in a
        proposition a yet it will be possible to analyze a into a proposition
        not containing a if a stand for a logical construction. In this way we
        shall be able to use propositions apparently containing a without in any
        way pre judging whether a is
      - >-
        particular (Socrates), so that it can't be predicated of Socrates
        without redundancy. According to Preston, this suggests that a concrete
        particular and its property instances aren't genuinely related. We argue
        that Preston's proffered solution here-to treat property instances as
        "mental constructs"-is fraught with difficulty. We then go on to
  - source_sentence: >-
      just seeing and feeling the total push and pressure of the cosmos .... " 6
      THE EXPLORATION OF THE LIFE-WORLD In France, this primordial mode of
      reflection by which each person in a free society to some degree works out
      his own style of life and his own way of understanding the world is now
      distinguished as primary thinking from what is called secondary
      reflection, that critical reflection on the former to which we may devote
      a calm moment in life, and which has been judged important enough to be
      handed over to a special group, known as philosophers, for disciplined
      attention throughout a large part of our history. Primary thought is
      spontaneous, always concerned and interested, often creative, but
      uncritical. It is to this type of thought that we owe the first original
      answers that have been given to the ambiguities and agonies of life. But
      when left to itself, without criticism, this style of reflection becomes
      provincial, fanatical, and closed to what is universally human. Secondary
      reflection, on the other hand, is reflective and disinterested,
      self-conscious, critical, and open to the universal. It is through this
      type of secondary reflection, when it is in touch with the former, that
      fanaticism is avoided, and our existence in the life-world is kept open
      and free. When left to itself, however, it becomes abstract, sterile, and
      uncreative. The original aim of academic philosophy was not to replace
      primary thought by developing special techniques of its own. As expressed
      in the ancient ideal of
    sentences:
      - >-
        assertions of modernity. Only observed "constant conjunctions" of
        variables and entities (e.g., heat and fire) allow us to state real (and
        even here he is skeptical) and law-like relationships.2 This, of course,
        immediately entails problems for forms of natural rights, which are then
        compounded by Hume's second assertion, his guillotine: that facts and
        values are separate things: In every system of morality which I have
        hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for
        some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the 576
        Philosophy East & West being of God or makes observations concerning
        human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of
        the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no
        proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This
        change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For
        as this ought or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation,
        it is necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the
        same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether
        inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others,
        which are entirely different from it.3 Modern analogues are provided by
        Alfred Jules Ayer's Logical Positivist statement that "exhortations of
        moral virtue ... do not belong to any branch of philosophy or science"
        or Richard Lipsey's influential positive-normative distinction in
        economics.4 The point, however, is that Empiricist philosophy splits
        apart the possibility that being contributes something to a connection
        between the rights
      - >-
        wisdom, it was rather to exercise a kind of therapy over the acts of
        primary reflection that constitute an essential phase of human
        existence, warning it against serious errors, clarifying the basic
        meanings and issues, and thus helping it, so far as possible, to face
        those decisions between different global interpretations of the world
        which every free man must make. In so far as it has actually exercised
        this therapeutic function, philosophy is properly regarded as the
        discipline of freedom, and I believe that by its pressing of basic
        questions in the face of political and theological tyranny, and by its
        maintenance of communication between radically divergent worlds it has
        made an essential contribution to what we may call the discipline of
        freedom, and the life of free societies in the West. But it is easy for
        special groups, set aside to perform a basic therapeutic function, to
        develop special aims and techniques of their own in its place. James had
        a keen sense for the needlessly abstract and academic, and hated it with
        all his heart and soul. He realized that the traditional philosophy of
        his time had become separated from the primary thinking of our lived
        existence. Instead of trying to clarify and criticize this vital process
        of the Lebenswelt, it was concerned with formulating special techniques
        and artificial constructions in a very different world of its own. There
        are many passages where James con7 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION
        trasts the pattern, the meaning, the very feeling
      - >-
        both the benign and the morbid in James's spiritual state. Moreover, the
        book is philosophical in the further sense that it is by far the best
        account of James's philosophical and psychological views, their
        development, their aims, and their potencies that has yet appeared or (I
        should say) is ever likely to appear. Nothing is lost by the
        biographical form of presentation or by the choice (wherever possible)
        of a literary rather than of a technical vocabulary. Furthermore,
        James's many contacts with the Europe of his day as well as with the
        American continent, his polyglot 104 NEW BOOKS acquaintance with the
        antecedents of the contemporary ideas that confronted him and that he
        did so much to improve; in a word, his intense professional sociality,
        make an account of his thoughts very largely an account of the thought
        of his times. Mr. Perry, half incidentally, has become the historian of
        all philosophy at the turn of the present century with rather extensive
        retrospects and prospects. There are very few living writers who could
        have done the job half so well. Indeed, Mr. Perry's altogether peculiar
        opportunities for performing this immense task are only equalled by his
        competence to perform it. He enjoyed James's professional esteem as well
        as his friendship. Thus we read in the Letters (II, I2I) that James, in
        I900, regarded Perry as "certainly the soundest, most normal all-round
        man of our recent production" (i.e. in Harvard), and again, in I907,
        that in James's opinion (II, 295) Perry "had
  - source_sentence: >-
      of aU governments, including democracy, as follows: If moraUty presupposes
      individual autonomy, and every government denies that auto nomy, then no
      government can be moraUy justified, (p. 1) An autonomous person, Cohen
      points out, foUowing Kant, is one who is self-legislating, "Acting out of
      respect for a rule which he imposes upon Studies in Soviet Thought 25
      (1983) 219. 220 REVIEWS himself, not out of fear or habit" (pp. 1?2). How,
      then, can an individual be self-legislating on the one hand, but obligated
      to obey the commands of the state on the other? Cohen finds the answer to
      this apparent d?emma in the notion of partici pation : In a democracy but
      only in a democracy each citizen has a right to a voice in the lawmaking
      process. Enjoyment of this right commits the citizen to respect the laws
      'resulting from that process. The agreement to participate is not
      contingent upon getting one's own way. Each citizen knows, even before
      learning what issues w?l arise, that no one w?l always get his way. But
      be?eving the legislative process fair, each person is com mitted in
      advance to observe the rules that are its outcome. To that system, full
      consent is given. Governments derive their just powers from the consent of
      the governed, (pp. 3-4) Cohen explains that the obligation to obey the
      law, wh?e a "prima facie and very powerful" one, is not absolute, (p. 5) A
      citizen is not required to do the bidding of the state as though he were
      its slave. The 'promise' which a citizen makes to obey the law, as
    sentences:
      - >-
        any other promise, may be broken moraUy in "truly exceptional
        circumstances" where a duty stronger than the duty to obey the law
        arises.3 Having argued that democracy is the only moraUy viable poUtical
        system, Professor Cohen moves next to explore whether democracy thrives
        better in a sociaUst or capitaUst economic setting. Cohen asserts that
        sociaUst democracy is bu?t on two main principles: (1) pubUc ownership
        of the means of production and distribution; and (2) planning production
        and distribution for the common good. (p. 58) SociaUsm is a logical
        extension of democracy, he notes, bringing the popular w?l to matters of
        production and wealth. SociaUsm involves "the democratic control of aU
        resources in the community by society as a whole", (p. 41) Socialism
        meshes weU with human nature, Cohen arugues, for human beings have "a
        deep and natural inclination to help (one another) ..." (p. 64) He Usts
        a number of practical advantages of socialism over capitaUsm. SociaUsm,
        he claims, is less subject to, if not immune from, inherent flaws in
        capitaUsm, including extremes in wealth, cycles of boom and bust,
        unemploy ment, wastes of competition associated with costly
        advertisement and packag ing, and the subordination of workers. Further,
        socialism has an impressive track record: "Many socialist countries,
        mamtaining five and seven year economic plans under continual
        adjustment, have met with phenomenal success", (p. 59) Even capitaUst
        countries impUcitly affirm the viab?ity of REVIEWS 221 sociaUsm
      - >-
        efficiency, the design of the market can reflect other social values, as
        we shall see. A version of the market which is likely to appeal to
        socialists is the following: the means of production are owned by the
        state but leased to groups of workers in such a way that each worker
        gets productive resources of roughly equal value. Each cooperative
        decides on the nature and volume of its production, and sells its goods
        on the market. The profits are distributed among the members of each
        cooperative according to mutually agreed rules, though we may suppose
        that profits above a certain point are heavily taxed by the state,
        partly to accumulate resources for future generations, partly to finance
        an extensive welfare state which provides for essential needs without
        charge. For cooperatives which are unable to make a profit, there is a
        social security system which supplements their members' incomes until
        they find a more profitable line of production or move elsewhere. The
        private hiring of labour is, however, made illegal in the same way as
        slavery is today. This brief sketch of a socialist market system needs
        to be filled out in various ways. There are difficulties in setting down
        the terms on [476] POLITICAL THEORY / NOVEMBER 1977 which capital would
        be leased by the state to the workers' cooperatives; for instance, in
        establishing how far cooperatives should be allowed to accumulate
        capital for their own expansion. The rules of association for each
        cooperative need to be specified, particularly those governing the entry
        and exit
      - >-
        the kinetropic and lexigraphemic to inaugurate the kinetic cogito.
        Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological exposition of corporeality
        further amplified the reflexive potential of movement and the
        philosophical understanding of kinesthesia, and King cites as well
model-index:
  - name: SentenceTransformer based on nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
    results:
      - task:
          type: triplet
          name: Triplet
        dataset:
          name: nomic
          type: nomic
        metrics:
          - type: cosine_accuracy
            value: 0.958
            name: Cosine Accuracy
          - type: dot_accuracy
            value: 0.042
            name: Dot Accuracy
          - type: manhattan_accuracy
            value: 0.956
            name: Manhattan Accuracy
          - type: euclidean_accuracy
            value: 0.958
            name: Euclidean Accuracy
          - type: max_accuracy
            value: 0.958
            name: Max Accuracy
      - task:
          type: triplet
          name: Triplet
        dataset:
          name: all nli test
          type: all-nli-test
        metrics:
          - type: cosine_accuracy
            value: 0.975
            name: Cosine Accuracy
          - type: dot_accuracy
            value: 0.025
            name: Dot Accuracy
          - type: manhattan_accuracy
            value: 0.9725
            name: Manhattan Accuracy
          - type: euclidean_accuracy
            value: 0.975
            name: Euclidean Accuracy
          - type: max_accuracy
            value: 0.975
            name: Max Accuracy

SentenceTransformer based on nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1

This is a sentence-transformers model finetuned from nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1. It maps sentences & paragraphs to a 768-dimensional dense vector space and can be used for semantic textual similarity, semantic search, paraphrase mining, text classification, clustering, and more.

Model Details

Model Description

Model Type: Sentence Transformer
Base model: nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
Maximum Sequence Length: 8192 tokens
Output Dimensionality: 768 tokens
Similarity Function: Cosine Similarity

Model Sources

Documentation: Sentence Transformers Documentation
Repository: Sentence Transformers on GitHub
Hugging Face: Sentence Transformers on Hugging Face

Full Model Architecture

SentenceTransformer(
  (0): Transformer({'max_seq_length': 8192, 'do_lower_case': False}) with Transformer model: NomicBertModel 
  (1): Pooling({'word_embedding_dimension': 768, 'pooling_mode_cls_token': False, 'pooling_mode_mean_tokens': True, 'pooling_mode_max_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_mean_sqrt_len_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_weightedmean_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_lasttoken': False, 'include_prompt': True})
  (2): Normalize()
)

Usage

Direct Usage (Sentence Transformers)

First install the Sentence Transformers library:

pip install -U sentence-transformers

Then you can load this model and run inference.

from sentence_transformers import SentenceTransformer

# Download from the 🤗 Hub
model = SentenceTransformer("m7n/nomic-embed-philosophy-triplets_v1")
# Run inference
sentences = [
    'of aU governments, including democracy, as follows: If moraUty presupposes individual autonomy, and every government denies that auto nomy, then no government can be moraUy justified, (p. 1) An autonomous person, Cohen points out, foUowing Kant, is one who is self-legislating, "Acting out of respect for a rule which he imposes upon Studies in Soviet Thought 25 (1983) 219. 220 REVIEWS himself, not out of fear or habit" (pp. 1?2). How, then, can an individual be self-legislating on the one hand, but obligated to obey the commands of the state on the other? Cohen finds the answer to this apparent d?emma in the notion of partici pation : In a democracy but only in a democracy each citizen has a right to a voice in the lawmaking process. Enjoyment of this right commits the citizen to respect the laws \'resulting from that process. The agreement to participate is not contingent upon getting one\'s own way. Each citizen knows, even before learning what issues w?l arise, that no one w?l always get his way. But be?eving the legislative process fair, each person is com mitted in advance to observe the rules that are its outcome. To that system, full consent is given. Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, (pp. 3-4) Cohen explains that the obligation to obey the law, wh?e a "prima facie and very powerful" one, is not absolute, (p. 5) A citizen is not required to do the bidding of the state as though he were its slave. The \'promise\' which a citizen makes to obey the law, as',
    'any other promise, may be broken moraUy in "truly exceptional circumstances" where a duty stronger than the duty to obey the law arises.3 Having argued that democracy is the only moraUy viable poUtical system, Professor Cohen moves next to explore whether democracy thrives better in a sociaUst or capitaUst economic setting. Cohen asserts that sociaUst democracy is bu?t on two main principles: (1) pubUc ownership of the means of production and distribution; and (2) planning production and distribution for the common good. (p. 58) SociaUsm is a logical extension of democracy, he notes, bringing the popular w?l to matters of production and wealth. SociaUsm involves "the democratic control of aU resources in the community by society as a whole", (p. 41) Socialism meshes weU with human nature, Cohen arugues, for human beings have "a deep and natural inclination to help (one another) ..." (p. 64) He Usts a number of practical advantages of socialism over capitaUsm. SociaUsm, he claims, is less subject to, if not immune from, inherent flaws in capitaUsm, including extremes in wealth, cycles of boom and bust, unemploy ment, wastes of competition associated with costly advertisement and packag ing, and the subordination of workers. Further, socialism has an impressive track record: "Many socialist countries, mamtaining five and seven year economic plans under continual adjustment, have met with phenomenal success", (p. 59) Even capitaUst countries impUcitly affirm the viab?ity of REVIEWS 221 sociaUsm',
    "efficiency, the design of the market can reflect other social values, as we shall see. A version of the market which is likely to appeal to socialists is the following: the means of production are owned by the state but leased to groups of workers in such a way that each worker gets productive resources of roughly equal value. Each cooperative decides on the nature and volume of its production, and sells its goods on the market. The profits are distributed among the members of each cooperative according to mutually agreed rules, though we may suppose that profits above a certain point are heavily taxed by the state, partly to accumulate resources for future generations, partly to finance an extensive welfare state which provides for essential needs without charge. For cooperatives which are unable to make a profit, there is a social security system which supplements their members' incomes until they find a more profitable line of production or move elsewhere. The private hiring of labour is, however, made illegal in the same way as slavery is today. This brief sketch of a socialist market system needs to be filled out in various ways. There are difficulties in setting down the terms on [476] POLITICAL THEORY / NOVEMBER 1977 which capital would be leased by the state to the workers' cooperatives; for instance, in establishing how far cooperatives should be allowed to accumulate capital for their own expansion. The rules of association for each cooperative need to be specified, particularly those governing the entry and exit",
]
embeddings = model.encode(sentences)
print(embeddings.shape)
# [3, 768]

# Get the similarity scores for the embeddings
similarities = model.similarity(embeddings, embeddings)
print(similarities.shape)
# [3, 3]

Evaluation

Metrics

Triplet

Dataset: nomic
Evaluated with TripletEvaluator

Metric	Value
cosine_accuracy	0.958
dot_accuracy	0.042
manhattan_accuracy	0.956
euclidean_accuracy	0.958
max_accuracy	0.958

Triplet

Dataset: all-nli-test
Evaluated with TripletEvaluator

Metric	Value
cosine_accuracy	0.975
dot_accuracy	0.025
manhattan_accuracy	0.9725
euclidean_accuracy	0.975
max_accuracy	0.975

Training Details

Training Dataset

Unnamed Dataset

Size: 10,000 training samples
Columns: anchor, positive, and negative

Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:

	anchor	positive	negative
type	string	string	string
details	min: 15 tokens mean: 253.76 tokens max: 573 tokens	min: 14 tokens mean: 252.8 tokens max: 680 tokens	min: 13 tokens mean: 273.24 tokens max: 574 tokens

Samples:

anchor	positive	negative
JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY have. Success in learning "how to know economically, liberally, effectively," is the measure of success in civilization; and the clarifying of this success which is the task of philosophy makes philosophy an effective instrument of advance. But "a problem of knowledge in general [of knowledge of 'the ontological'] is, to speak brutally, nonsense. " 5 Since the plain conjunctive experience which is the very definition of what is "radical" in James's empiricism has its being, according to his most explicit statement, in passing thought, there is most certainly another exceedingly vigorous motif in James's thought repeatedly declared by him to be his chief philosophic hope, which he had wished ardently to bring to adequate expression before he died. If a biological or situational behaviorism really runs counter to this motif, yet moves more vitally with his spirit, James himself in his dearest philosophic expectation was following a will-of-the-wisp. Now it may be the case that a majority of those who knew and loved James believe today that this is the case -both those with him in the empiricist camp and those against him in the rationalistic. No doubt most empiricists will welcome the name "radical" while repudiating James's often repeated definition so that no meaning for the term remains to them except either an implied boast or merely the profession of an ideal. The writer has long held the view that the conjunctive experience in James 's writings and the biological behaviorism (which Dewey shows as	present if not worked out in James's mind) seemingly so much at cross purposes rightly belong together and mutually support and fulfill each other. The purpose of this paper is to show how this is so. Dr. Lowe's study goes, if quietly, yet unhesitatingly, to the support of James's radical empiricism. He sums his argument up in recommending "a decision about his [James's] doctrine [of the conjuLnctive experience] as all but necessary preliminaries to the evaluation of Whitehead." 6 It is pointed out that the fulcrum of Whitehead's philosophy is his doctrine of the transmission of feelings. Sympathetic study of his philosophy depends upon initial conviction upon that point, precisely the doctrine that William James propounded with great vigor for twenty-five years. For later philosophers it is primarily directed upon the immediate temporal relation of "felt transition" displayed in "the plain conjunctive experience." The role of Whitehead's theory of prehensions is to develop this doctrine along general lines. 5 Experience and Nature, 1925, p. 21. 6 Ibid., p. 125. 7 Ibid., pp. 174 if. COMMENTS AND CRITICISM 99 In this doctrine the present moment is presented as an atom or "drop" of experience which has taken up the immediately past moment and holds it immanent in itself by a felt transition of next-to-next, which is itself a component contributing to the present drop of experience. The atomic structure of experienee, basis of pluralism, together with the felt transition from drop to drop is the central point. A "drop" or atom of	not only the specifically discriminated happenings "out there" but also the whole undiscriminated remainder.15 Our moments of experience and their associated durations succeed each other, forming a series of stratifications of nature. The successive 8 Alfred North Whitehead, An Enquiry Concerning the Principlea of Natural Knowledge, Cambridge: University Press, 1919, hereafter referred to as PNK; and The Principle of Relativity with applications to Physical Science, Cambridge: University Press, 1922, hereafter referred to as PRel. 9PNK, art. 16.1, 3.6. 10 PNK, art. 16.3-16.4; CN, pp. 106-107. 11 PNK, art. 20.2; CN, pp. 107, 187-188. 12 PNK, art. 16.5. 13 PNK, art. 14, 16.4-16.5, 18.1-18.2; CN, p. 52. 14 PNK, art. 14.1; CN, p. 51. 15 PNK, art. 19.4; CN, pp. 49-53, 186-187; PRel, pp. 25-26. APPEARANCE AND CAUSALITY IN WHITEHEAD'S EARLY WRITINGS 45 moments of experience bind the percipient events together into the locus of a directly experienced unity of awareness, with its memory of the past and anticipation of the future. The succession of associated durations or cross-sections of external nature exhibits a persisting, uniform structure which (through the operation of 'extensive abstraction') yields the uniform space-time continuum of geometry. Within this all-encompassing structure, particular happenings take place.16 The task of common sense and of physical science is to discover the particular factors that govern the directly perceived particular happenings. Two additional features of immediate experience are, as it were, given with the concrete data of sense-awareness as primordial attributions or assumptions.17 First, in sense-awareness, no clear demarcations between happenings can
`wrongdoers receive the punishment they deserve. A deserved punishment is one that is proportionate to the offender's culpability. Culpability has two components: (1) the severity of the wrong, and (2) the offender's blameworthiness. The broader aim of this article is to outline an alternative retributivist model that directly involves the victim in`	`the determination of the appropriate and just punishment. The narrower aim is to show that the methodology employed by Michael Moore (1997) in support of the standard retributive model in fact better supports this alternative model. Moore himself explicitly rejects the idea that victims can play a role in determining just punishments, because this`	some role in producing it. According to retributive theory, punishment is justified as a way of restoring the just status quo ante that was disrupted by the offender.6 How punishment performs this task remains a matter of some controversy among retributive theorists. Though the view cannot be defended here, a plausible interpretation of how the state performs this task says that legal punishment involves state efforts to restore the equality of condition that, at least in those respects designated by basic moral rights, all citizens are entitled to. All citizens are entitled to have their lives, bodies, psychological integrity, and justly held property respected and defended by the law. In these respects, at least, the state should act to ensure their equality. Whether it should act in other ways to ensure equality among citizens is, of course, a matter of considerable controversy, though this is not a controversy the resolution of which may have significant implications for the core areas of the criminal law. 32 PUBLIC AFFAIRS QUARTERLY Criminal offenders act in (legally prohibited) ways that deprive victims of some or all of the equality of condition victims are entitled to. There are, it must be admitted, various ways in which the state might attempt to restore the requisite equality of condition. But with most serious crimes it can arguably be shown that the imposition of penal losses is the only appropriate equalizing response by the state. In particular, where victims cannot be made whole again by offender compensation or restitution, the state
`modal logic (ML), suggesting that we are dealing with deeply divergent accounts of our modal talk. However, CT captures but one version of the relevant semantic intuition, and does so on the basis of metaphysical assumptions (all worlds are equally real, individuals are world-bound) that are ostensibly discretionary. Just as ML can be translated into a language that quantifies explicitly over worlds, CT may be formulated as a semantic theory in which world`	`quantification is purely metalinguistic. And just as Kripke-style semantics is formally compatible with the doctrine of world-boundedness, a counterpart-based semantics may in principle allow for cases of trans-world identity. In fact, one may welcome a framework that is general enough to include both Lewis's counterpart-based account and Kripke's identity-based account as distinguished special cases. There are several ways of doing so. The purpose of this paper is`	regular and normal modal logics K, D(a Aß)z>'3ß and universal instantiation (UI) which a formal semantics should validate if it is to be a contender for a semantics of our natural intensional languages. I show that counterpart theory does not validate these principles. Counterpart Theory The basis of the logical system for counterpart theory involves the introduction of primitive predicates and postulates to the lower predicate calculus. Lewis (1968; 113) uses the following primitive predicates,1 (1) Wx * is a possible world (2) xly X is in possible world y (3) Ax jc is actual (4) xCy y is a counterpart of x 1 My notation varies slightly from that of Lewis (1968). In particular, note that for the counterpart predicate Lewis understands Cxy to mean that x is a counterpart of y. COUNTERPART THEORY AS A SEMANTICS FOR MODAL LOGIC 257 Lewis's postulates encapsulate the principles of the semantics of counterpart theory. Most especially we note that nothing is in two worlds. We also note that anything in a world is a counterpart of itself. Thus the counterpart relation is reflexive. The following discussion meets the requirement that nothing is a counterpart of anything else in its own world although it need not presuppose this postulate. Lewis (1986; 214) remarks that while the postulate that nothing is a counterpart of anything else in its own world is a feature of some counterpart relations, such a restriction on the counterpart relation constitutes giving up some of the built-in flexibility of counterpart theory. Counterpart theory also involves the extension of

Loss: TripletLoss with these parameters:

{
    "distance_metric": "TripletDistanceMetric.COSINE",
    "triplet_margin": 0.05
}

Evaluation Dataset

Unnamed Dataset

Size: 500 evaluation samples
Columns: anchor, positive, and negative

Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:

	anchor	positive	negative
type	string	string	string
details	min: 10 tokens mean: 237.7 tokens max: 497 tokens	min: 12 tokens mean: 238.5 tokens max: 485 tokens	min: 23 tokens mean: 260.95 tokens max: 499 tokens

Samples:

anchor	positive	negative
quantified modal logic, including the famous Barcan Formula. The paper appeared in the Journal of Symbolic Logic , followed shortly afterwards by two more papers published under the name Ruth C. Barcan. Alonzo Church, editor of the Journal, eventually insisted that she publish using her official name, and so a 1950 paper in the same Journal appeared already as authored by Ruth Barcan Marcus. Had Prof. Church's naming criteria been followed throughout, we would now be discussing the famous Marcus Formula. After she received her PhD, Ruth Barcan Marcus and her husband moved to Illinois, where he had accepted a position at Northwestern University. She spent an academic year as a post-doctoral fellow at the University of Chicago where Rudolf Carnap, whose paper 'Modalities and Quantification' had appeared also in 1946, and whose seminal Meaning and Necessity was published in 1947 [Carnap (1946), (1947)], was also working on quantified modal logic.2 After that year she held a series of post-doctoral, temporary or visiting positions and taught at Roosevelt University from 1959 to 1963. In 1964 she became head of the philosophy department of the University of Illinois, Chicago Circle and taught also at Northwestern. In 1973 she moved to Yale. She retired in 1992 but continued to be actively involved in philosophy dividing the time between her position as a senior research scholar at Yale and a distinguished visiting professorship at the	University of California, Irvine. II. Modality and Modal Logic Ruth Barcan Marcus' 1946 paper presents the first system of modal logic that combines modal operators and quantifiers. A question that had arisen regarding any such system is whether theorems of the non-modal predicate calculus such as (1) Vx (Px -> Qx) -> (Vx Px -> Vx Qx) On Modality and Reference. Ruth Barcan Marcus (1921-2012) 205 would also be theorems, were the conditional uniformly interpreted as C.I. Lewis' strict conditional.3 As it turns out, the strict conditional version of (1): (2) Vx (Px => Qx) => (Vx Px => Vx Qx) is not derivable in the system that results from adding quantifiers to Lewis' S2. However, (2) is derivable if we can count on this formula: (3) O 3x Px => 3x OPx. (3) is precisely the Barcan Formula. It was introduced in the system of the 1946 paper as Axiom 11, which allows the derivation of (2) theorem 19, p. 5. Nowadays the Barcan Formula is stated as a material conditional and introduced, in some systems, as an axiom4 (BF) O 3x Px -> 3x OPx. BF says that if it is possible that something be P, then there is something that is possibly P. An equivalent version of the Barcan Formula states that if everything is necessarily P, then it is necessary that everything be P: (BF') Vx DPx ^ □ Vx Px The converse of the Barcan Formula: (CBF) 3x OPx -> O 3x Px, equivalent to (CBF') □ Vx Px ^ Vx DPx is already derivable in the system without the addition of any	of the Royal Flemish Academy of Belgium for Science and the Arts in the latter part of 2010. 3. Bayart 195811 The soundness of first and second-order S5 modal logic I. Semantic definitions 0. To formulate a semantic theory of modal logic it is not sufficient to define for example, the necessary as that which is true in every model and 10 A generalisation of Bayart's completeness proof to the system T appeared in Cresswell (1967) and later in Hughes and Cresswell (1968). A more recent proof method for systems with the Barcan Formula is found in Thomason (1970). 11 Translation by M.J. Cresswell of 'La correction de la logique modale du premier et second ordre S5', Logique et Analyse 1, 1958, pp. 28-44. In this version I have corrected obvious typos. Some of these are indicated in the website version in square brackets [..]. I have changed Bayart's notation in the present version as explained in the introduction or commentary or in footnotes. (All footnotes are my comments on the translation.) ARNOULD BAYART'S MODAL COMPLETENESS THEOREMS 95 the possible as that which is true in some model. These definitions would do no more than introduce the notions of 'necessary' and 'possible' in the metalanguage. A semantics of modal logic demands that we assume an object language containing modal symbols and that we define under what conditions to attribute the values 'true' or 'false' to the formulae of this object language. One can
`rebut four objections to the claim that attributions of intentional attitudes are`	`normative judgments, all stemming, directly or indirectly, from the widespread assumption`	`the article by sketching the picture of normative thought that results. Though I defend a particular theory of normative speech elsewhere, the core insights of this article can be used by other theorists as well. The arguments offered`
picture are co-dependent, and their concerted action makes an intuitive pre -89 Beata Stawarska sentation of something absent in the (present) picture possible. Per ceptual apprehension gives picture consciousness its intuitive charac ter, while non-perceptual apprehension "fantasizes" the absent entity into the physical thing and turns it into a picture. Picture conscious ness involves therefore three interrelated elements: the picture-thing (Bildding), i.e. the physical thing (a piece of canvas, of paper, of stone) which serves as the material of the picture; the picture-object (.Bildobjekt), i.e. the picture apprehended not simply as a perceptual object but as a representation of a referent—the so-called picture subject (Bildsujet), i.e. an absent thing or person.6 This triple thing/object/subject structure is clearly at work in the apprehension of photographs or paintings. Can it also be discerned in fantasy, which no longer supports itself on physical or "external" things? Images, unlike physical pictures, are not independent from the consciousness that apprehends them. Instead, they are contents of consciousness, forming an integral and internal part of an imaginary experience. Unlike the physical picture which persists as a piece of canvas, paper, or stone, even after it ceases to function as a pictorial representation of an absent being, the internal picture does not "sur vive" the end of the fantasy episode—there is nothing left of it once the subject ceases to fantasize. The question arises: can such an immaterial "picture" serve the function of representing an absent	pic ture-subject? Can an evanescent no-thing stand as a symbol of another thing?7 Material content seems indispensable if the picture is to fulfil its representational function: only as a perceptual thing can a picture yield an intuitive apprehension of an absent referent. In order to function as a representation (Bildobjet), the picture must be a thing (Bildding). In other words, there must be a physical support if the picture is to symbolize the absent picture-subject (Bildsujet). Yet such physical support is wanting in the case of "internal" pic tures. In fantasy, it is impossible to distinguish a picture-thing from the picture-subject it represents, and so it is difficult to see how the internal picture can serve the symbolic function at all. As a result, one can hardly sustain the interpretation of fantasy as the conscious ness of non-physical pictures and preserve a uniform theory of imag ination as picture consciousness.8 The aforementioned difficulties led Husserl to reformulate the theory of imagination, no longer taking the apprehension of a pic ture but the internal structure of consciousness in memory as a clue. The way in which memory presents something non-given or the way in which the absent past manifests itself in the present is of direct rel evance to Husserl's later conception of imaginary activity. In recol -90 Sartre on Imagination lection, an object appears in the present as belonging to the past, it is apprehended in the now and yet remains separated by temporal dis tance. Should it be concluded that one apprehends an image (or an "internal picture") of an	He found, for instance, that as we can "see" a mountain which is not present by interpreting the paint marks on a canvas which are present, so in external perception we are perceiving a tree which is not immanent in consciousness by interpreting the sensations (Empfindungen) which are im manent. It would seem, therefore, that Husserl assumed at that time that any intuitive grasp of a real particular was either an inner perception of what is immanently present, or else a case where something immanently pres ent serves as a basis for an interpretation. To his astonishment, Husserl discovered after 1905, in his analyses of inner time-consciousness, that re membering could not be understood as an act of interpretation; that, for instance, remembering a past sound-sensation could not be described as an interpretation of a presently immanent sound-sensation, but had to be de scribed as a "direct" intuitive intending of a real particular which no longer existed.7 This exploded the myth of the unproblematic nature of inner per ception, because any perception whatsover necessarily involves some reten tion of the immediate past. In other words, a restriction of the domain of descriptive psychology or phenomenology to actually immanent real par ticulars proved to be absolutely impossible, since such a restriction would 66 GUIDO K?NG veto not only the use of external perception but that of inner perception as well! The only way out of all these difficulties was to officially admit all intentional objects, i.e., the intentional correlates of all mental acts, into the domain of

Loss: TripletLoss with these parameters:

{
    "distance_metric": "TripletDistanceMetric.COSINE",
    "triplet_margin": 0.05
}

Training Hyperparameters

Non-Default Hyperparameters

eval_strategy: steps
per_device_train_batch_size: 4
per_device_eval_batch_size: 4
learning_rate: 1e-05
num_train_epochs: 5
warmup_ratio: 0.1
batch_sampler: no_duplicates

All Hyperparameters

Click to expand

overwrite_output_dir: False
do_predict: False
eval_strategy: steps
prediction_loss_only: True
per_device_train_batch_size: 4
per_device_eval_batch_size: 4
per_gpu_train_batch_size: None
per_gpu_eval_batch_size: None
gradient_accumulation_steps: 1
eval_accumulation_steps: None
learning_rate: 1e-05
weight_decay: 0.0
adam_beta1: 0.9
adam_beta2: 0.999
adam_epsilon: 1e-08
max_grad_norm: 1.0
num_train_epochs: 5
max_steps: -1
lr_scheduler_type: linear
lr_scheduler_kwargs: {}
warmup_ratio: 0.1
warmup_steps: 0
log_level: passive
log_level_replica: warning
log_on_each_node: True
logging_nan_inf_filter: True
save_safetensors: True
save_on_each_node: False
save_only_model: False
restore_callback_states_from_checkpoint: False
no_cuda: False
use_cpu: False
use_mps_device: False
seed: 42
data_seed: None
jit_mode_eval: False
use_ipex: False
bf16: False
fp16: False
fp16_opt_level: O1
half_precision_backend: auto
bf16_full_eval: False
fp16_full_eval: False
tf32: None
local_rank: 0
ddp_backend: None
tpu_num_cores: None
tpu_metrics_debug: False
debug: []
dataloader_drop_last: False
dataloader_num_workers: 0
dataloader_prefetch_factor: None
past_index: -1
disable_tqdm: False
remove_unused_columns: True
label_names: None
load_best_model_at_end: False
ignore_data_skip: False
fsdp: []
fsdp_min_num_params: 0
fsdp_config: {'min_num_params': 0, 'xla': False, 'xla_fsdp_v2': False, 'xla_fsdp_grad_ckpt': False}
fsdp_transformer_layer_cls_to_wrap: None
accelerator_config: {'split_batches': False, 'dispatch_batches': None, 'even_batches': True, 'use_seedable_sampler': True, 'non_blocking': False, 'gradient_accumulation_kwargs': None}
deepspeed: None
label_smoothing_factor: 0.0
optim: adamw_torch
optim_args: None
adafactor: False
group_by_length: False
length_column_name: length
ddp_find_unused_parameters: None
ddp_bucket_cap_mb: None
ddp_broadcast_buffers: False
dataloader_pin_memory: True
dataloader_persistent_workers: False
skip_memory_metrics: True
use_legacy_prediction_loop: False
push_to_hub: False
resume_from_checkpoint: None
hub_model_id: None
hub_strategy: every_save
hub_private_repo: False
hub_always_push: False
gradient_checkpointing: False
gradient_checkpointing_kwargs: None
include_inputs_for_metrics: False
eval_do_concat_batches: True
fp16_backend: auto
push_to_hub_model_id: None
push_to_hub_organization: None
mp_parameters:
auto_find_batch_size: False
full_determinism: False
torchdynamo: None
ray_scope: last
ddp_timeout: 1800
torch_compile: False
torch_compile_backend: None
torch_compile_mode: None
dispatch_batches: None
split_batches: None
include_tokens_per_second: False
include_num_input_tokens_seen: False
neftune_noise_alpha: None
optim_target_modules: None
batch_eval_metrics: False
eval_on_start: False
batch_sampler: no_duplicates
multi_dataset_batch_sampler: proportional

Training Logs

Epoch	Step	Training Loss	loss	all-nli-test_max_accuracy	nomic_max_accuracy
0	0	-	-	-	0.94
0.04	100	0.0106	0.0093	-	0.944
0.08	200	0.009	0.0083	-	0.944
0.12	300	0.0068	0.0073	-	0.952
0.16	400	0.0066	0.0067	-	0.96
0.2	500	0.0069	0.0061	-	0.956
0.24	600	0.0056	0.0053	-	0.966
0.28	700	0.0042	0.0050	-	0.962
0.32	800	0.0059	0.0046	-	0.962
0.36	900	0.0051	0.0048	-	0.964
0.4	1000	0.0034	0.0046	-	0.964
0.44	1100	0.0054	0.0051	-	0.962
0.48	1200	0.0034	0.0047	-	0.964
0.52	1300	0.0042	0.0049	-	0.966
0.56	1400	0.0035	0.0041	-	0.968
0.6	1500	0.0043	0.0041	-	0.972
0.64	1600	0.0029	0.0045	-	0.964
0.68	1700	0.005	0.0044	-	0.97
0.72	1800	0.0036	0.0041	-	0.968
0.76	1900	0.0031	0.0040	-	0.976
0.8	2000	0.0037	0.0041	-	0.966
0.84	2100	0.0041	0.0037	-	0.97
0.88	2200	0.0044	0.0040	-	0.966
0.92	2300	0.0038	0.0046	-	0.966
0.96	2400	0.0043	0.0050	-	0.954
1.0	2500	0.0031	0.0049	-	0.96
1.04	2600	0.0046	0.0048	-	0.964
1.08	2700	0.0017	0.0045	-	0.96
1.12	2800	0.0015	0.0047	-	0.958
1.16	2900	0.0015	0.0046	-	0.966
1.2	3000	0.0011	0.0042	-	0.966
1.24	3100	0.0009	0.0041	-	0.962
1.28	3200	0.0006	0.0040	-	0.972
1.32	3300	0.0006	0.0041	-	0.966
1.3600	3400	0.0005	0.0046	-	0.958
1.4	3500	0.0007	0.0048	-	0.964
1.44	3600	0.0004	0.0046	-	0.966
1.48	3700	0.0008	0.0048	-	0.96
1.52	3800	0.0006	0.0047	-	0.966
1.56	3900	0.0002	0.0048	-	0.958
1.6	4000	0.0004	0.0047	-	0.964
1.6400	4100	0.0004	0.0047	-	0.966
1.6800	4200	0.0003	0.0048	-	0.96
1.72	4300	0.0001	0.0049	-	0.96
1.76	4400	0.0004	0.0050	-	0.956
1.8	4500	0.0007	0.0048	-	0.96
1.8400	4600	0.0006	0.0044	-	0.96
1.88	4700	0.0001	0.0044	-	0.962
1.92	4800	0.0005	0.0043	-	0.964
1.96	4900	0.0004	0.0043	-	0.966
2.0	5000	0.0004	0.0044	-	0.958
2.04	5100	0.0002	0.0045	-	0.956
2.08	5200	0.0002	0.0044	-	0.958
2.12	5300	0.0001	0.0043	-	0.96
2.16	5400	0.0005	0.0048	-	0.96
2.2	5500	0.0003	0.0049	-	0.958
2.24	5600	0.0004	-	0.975	-

Framework Versions

Python: 3.10.12
Sentence Transformers: 3.0.1
Transformers: 4.42.4
PyTorch: 2.3.1+cu121
Accelerate: 0.32.1
Datasets: 2.21.0
Tokenizers: 0.19.1

Citation

BibTeX

Sentence Transformers

@inproceedings{reimers-2019-sentence-bert,
    title = "Sentence-BERT: Sentence Embeddings using Siamese BERT-Networks",
    author = "Reimers, Nils and Gurevych, Iryna",
    booktitle = "Proceedings of the 2019 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing",
    month = "11",
    year = "2019",
    publisher = "Association for Computational Linguistics",
    url = "https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.10084",
}

TripletLoss

@misc{hermans2017defense,
    title={In Defense of the Triplet Loss for Person Re-Identification}, 
    author={Alexander Hermans and Lucas Beyer and Bastian Leibe},
    year={2017},
    eprint={1703.07737},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    primaryClass={cs.CV}
}