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KENNETH S. HIXSON, Judge This is a postdivorce dispute. Appellant John Treloggen and appellee Stephanie Treloggen were married in 1991 and were divorced pursuant to a divorce decree entered on July 16, 2012. The divorce decree contained provisions for child support, alimony, and division of the parties' property. Relevant to this appeal, the divorce decree provided that Stephanie was entitled to her marital percentage of John's post-office retirement based on the date of their marriage through the date of the decree. On January 31, 2014, the trial court entered a Court Order Acceptable for Processing under the Civil Service Retirement System (COAP). The COAP provided in pertinent part, "The Former Spouse [Stephanie] is entitled to a 32.28% pro rata share of the Employee's [John's] gross monthly annuity under the CSRS [Civil Service Retirement System]." Beginning in November 2014, both parties filed motions to either modify or correct the COAP in different respects. After two hearings, the trial court entered two orders on October 30, 2017. The effect of these orders was to modify the COAP in the manner requested by Stephanie, and to deny the proposed modification requested by John. John now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in modifying the COAP upon Stephanie's request, while refusing to amend the decree upon his request. John also argues that the trial court erroneously calculated the post-office retirement arrearages he owed to Stephanie. We affirm. The COAP was entered into on January 31, 2014. Shortly thereafter, Stephanie began receiving benefits from the COAP in an amount considerably less than she was anticipating under the agreement. The postdivorce proceedings were initiated by Stephanie on November 20, 2014, when she filed a motion for contempt and modification. In that motion, Stephanie complained, inter alia, that while the COAP awarded her 32.28% of John's civil-service retirement, she was receiving only 14.84%, and Stephanie requested that the court order John to bring said amount current. On April 22, 2015, John filed a motion to correct a clerical error. In his motion, John alleged that the COAP contained a clerical error because it awarded Stephanie a percentage of his gross monthly retirement benefits, and the parties had agreed she was entitled to only a percentage of his net monthly retirement benefits. John asked that the COAP be corrected to reflect that Stephanie was to receive a net share rather than a gross share. The trial court held a hearing on September 30, 2015. At the hearing, John testified that the parties' agreement was for Stephanie to receive a percentage of his net monthly annuity and that the provision in the COAP that she receive a percentage of his gross monthly annuity was an inadvertent error. John did, however, acknowledge that his gross monthly annuity payment of $7,425 was being reduced by a plethora of deductions totaling $6,270, leaving only $1,155 as his net annuity payments. Many of these deductions are personal deductions and include, but are not limited to, his health-insurance premiums, his life-insurance premiums, family-insurance premiums, and his $2000 mortgage payment. Therefore, the net monthly annuity payment that John contended was available for apportionment under the COAP was substantially less than the gross monthly annuity payment. In Stephanie's testimony, she disputed John's claim that they had agreed she would receive a percentage of only his net monthly retirement earnings. Stephanie stated that, after extensive negotiations, the parties specifically agreed that she would instead receive a percentage of the gross monthly benefit. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court indicated, inter alia, that it would not rewrite the COAP on the issue of gross versus net because the parties had agreed that Stephanie would receive a portion of the gross annuity. However, no order was entered at that time. About five months later, on March 4, 2016, Stephanie filed her own motion to correct clerical error. Apparently, Stephanie discovered that the United States Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the federal agency that administers the Post Office retirement payments, had interpreted the COAP language "32.28% pro rata share" to mean that Stephanie was only entitled to 32.28% of 32.28%, thus reducing her actual benefit to 14.84%. In her motion, Stephanie alleged that the language in the COAP that she receive a 32.28% pro rata share of John's gross monthly annuity did not accurately reflect the parties' agreement and was apparently a clerical mistake. Stephanie alleged that she was supposed to receive a 32.28% share of the gross monthly annuity, and that by including the additional quantifying term "pro rata," her monthly share was being reduced twice contrary to the parties' agreement. In effect, Stephanie alleged that, instead of receiving a percentage of the gross monthly benefit, she was receiving a percentage of a percentage. Stephanie asked that the COAP be amended by deleting the words "pro rata" so that it reads, "[t]he Former Spouse is entitled to a 32.28% [ pro rata ] share of the employee's gross monthly annuity under the CSRS." Stephanie asserted that such an amendment was authorized by Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 60 as well as Paragraph 10 of the COAP, which provided, "Continued Jurisdiction: The Court shall retain jurisdiction with respect to this order to the extent required to maintain its status as a COAP and the original intent of the parties as stipulated herein." A hearing on Stephanie's motion was held on July 13, 2016. No testimony was taken at that hearing. However, at the previous hearing, both parties had testified concerning the "pro rata" language in the COAP. John had testified that he never agreed that the "pro rata" language should not be in the COAP; that the COAP was drafted by Stephanie's counsel; and that he was asking that the "pro rata" language remain. Stephanie testified that the term "pro rata" should not have been included in the COAP because, instead of receiving 32.28% of John's retirement benefit, she was getting only 14.84% as a result of receiving a percentage of a percentage. During the hearing held on July 13, 2016, John's counsel acknowledged that "the 32.28% we agree is the percentage of retirement in terms of their marriage." John's counsel further stated that "there is an assumption that the pro rata is an error" and that "I don't know if that is an error or not." On October 30, 2017, the trial court entered an order making the following findings: 1. THAT the percentage figure of [John's] annuity that [Stephanie] is entitled to, which is currently stated in Paragraph 4 of the January 31, 2014, Court Order Acceptable for Processing Under the Civil Service Retirement System , (herein referred to as "COAP"), is 32.28%. This percentage shall not be further reduced in its implementation by the United States Office of Personnel Management (OPM) by any calculation relating to the length of employment versus the length of his marriage to [Stephanie], i.e., the "pro rata share" language of the January 31, 2014, COAP shall have no application. 2. THAT the parties hereto are directed to contact OPM and seek an exact detailed itemized breakdown of what monies, if any, that should be deducted from the annuity amount [John] receives per month before [Stephanie] receives her "gross" monthly share. This breakdown should be in accordance with the applicable federal guidelines for OPM, per their regulations and procedures. Further, that in no event should [John] be responsible for payment of any taxes, federal or state, for the monies [Stephanie] receives monthly per the COAP and no such deductions shall be made from the monthly portion allocated to [Stephanie]. Also on October 30, 2017, the trial court entered a separate order finding that John owed Stephanie $84,073.80 in arrearages based upon his postal retirement. John appeals from both of these orders. Discussion Stephanie's claim for relief below alleged that the insertion of the term "pro rata" in the COAP constituted a clerical error and that the trial court had jurisdiction to correct the error under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) or pursuant to paragraph 10 of the COAP. John's first argument on appeal is that the term "pro rata" was not a clerical error and that trial court erred in modifying the COAP by striking the term "pro rata" from the COAP because the trial court did not have the authority to modify the COAP after the expiration of ninety days pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 60. First, we analyze whether the trial court had jurisdiction to correct the alleged clerical error under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 60, which provides in pertinent part: (a) Ninety-Day Limitation. To correct errors or mistakes or to prevent the miscarriage of justice, the court may modify or vacate a judgment, order or decree on motion of the court or any party, with prior notice to all parties, within ninety days of its having been filed with the clerk. (b) Exception; Clerical Errors. Notwithstanding subdivision (a) of this rule, the court may at any time, with prior notice to all parties, correct clerical mistakes in judgments, decrees, orders, or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. (Emphasis added.) Here, it is undisputed that the trial court's October 30, 2017 orders which modified the COAP were filed more than ninety days after the COAP was entered. Hence, the modification of the COAP's terms was not authorized under Rule 60(a). John argues that Rule 60(b) did not authorize any modification in the COAP because the inclusion of the term "pro rata" was not a "clerical error" within the meaning of the rule. John further argues that Rule 60 does not apply because the error was made by Stephanie's counsel, who prepared the COAP. In First National Bank of Lewisville v. Mayberry , 368 Ark. 243, 244 S.W.3d 676 (2006), the supreme court held that although Rule 60 may be used to correct clerical errors by court personnel, it may not be used to correct such errors by an attorney. Finally, John argues that if the trial court did have the authority to amend the COAP to delete the "pro rata" language, it also had the authority to amend the COAP pursuant to John's motion to change the "gross monthly annuity" language to "net monthly annuity." We agree with John's argument that the COAP could not be amended under Rule 60(b). It is undisputed that the COAP was prepared by Stephanie's counsel. Our supreme court has defined a true clerical error, one that may be corrected by a nunc pro tunc order under Rule 60, as essentially one that arises not from an exercise of the court's judicial discretion but from a mistake on the part of its officers (or perhaps someone else). Francis v. Protective Life Ins. Co. , 371 Ark. 285, 265 S.W.3d 117 (2007). However, our supreme court in First National Bank of Lewisville, supra , held that when the mistake complained of is clearly the attorney's fault, rather than being a clerical error made by the court or court staff, the trial court cannot resort to Rule 60 to correct counsel's error. Here, the phrase "pro rata" was selected and inserted into the decree by Stephanie's attorney and hence, it is not a clerical error as contemplated by Rule 60(b). Therefore, Rule 60(b) cannot be the legal basis to provide the relief ordered by the trial court. That, however, does not end our inquiry. This court has repeatedly held that a general reservation of jurisdiction in a decree will allow a trial court to modify a decree after ninety days with respect to issues that the trial court considered in the original action. Toney v. Burgess , 2018 Ark. App. 54, 541 S.W.3d 469 ; Linn v. Miller , 99 Ark. App. 407, 261 S.W.3d 471 (2007) ; Carver v. Carver , 93 Ark. App. 129, 217 S.W.3d 185 (2005) ; Jones v. Jones , 26 Ark. App. 1, 759 S.W.2d 42 (1988) ; Cox v. Cox , 17 Ark. App. 93, 705 S.W.2d 902 (1986) (supplemental opinion on denial of rehearing). In this case, the trial court reserved jurisdiction over the COAP. Paragraph 10 of the COAP provides in pertinent part: "The court shall retain jurisdiction with respect to this Order to the extent required to maintain its status as a COAP and the original intent of the parties as stipulated herein. Further, the court shall retain jurisdiction to enter any such further orders as necessary to enforce the award to the Former Spouse of the benefits awarded herein[.]" Because the trial court specifically considered Stephanie's entitlement to John's post-office retirement benefits in the COAP and because the court's order specifically empowered the court to retain jurisdiction over the COAP, we hold that the trial court retained jurisdiction to modify on that issue. Having concluded that the trial court retained authority to modify the COAP, the remaining issues are whether the trial court erred in modifying the COAP to strike the term "pro rata," and whether it erred in not modifying the COAP to reflect that Stephanie's share of the annuity would be a percentage of the net monthly annuity instead of the gross monthly annuity. In domestic-relations cases, we will not reverse a trial court's finding of fact unless it is clearly erroneous. Hunter v. Haunert , 101 Ark. App. 93, 270 S.W.3d 339 (2007). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court has made a mistake. Id. In reviewing a trial court's findings of fact, we give due deference to the trial court's superior position to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be accorded their testimony. Fletcher v. Stewart , 2015 Ark. App. 105, 456 S.W.3d 378. On this record, we cannot conclude that the trial court clearly erred in striking the "pro rata" language in the COAP to accurately reflect the intent of the parties. The divorce decree provided that Stephanie was to receive her marital percentage of the post-office retirement. John's counsel agreed at the final hearing that 32.28% was the portion of the retirement due to Stephanie based on the duration of the parties' marriage. Stephanie indicated in her testimony that she was supposed to receive 32.28% of the retirement pay, and that she assumed that the "32.28% pro rata share" language in the COAP meant that she would receive 32.28%. However, the United States Office of Personnel Management mistakenly interpreted this language to mean that Stephanie would not receive 32.28%, but would instead receive a pro rata percentage of that percentage. By directing the OPM to disregard the "pro rata" language, the trial court modified the language in the COAP to reflect what it found was consistent with the parties' agreement, i.e., that Stephanie would receive 32.28% of the retirement pay. On this record, we cannot say this was clearly erroneous. Nor can we conclude that the trial court clearly erred in not modifying the COAP, as requested by John, to reflect that Stephanie's 32.28% share of the retirement benefits be taken from John's net monthly annuity instead of the gross monthly annuity. Although John testified that the parties agreed that Stephanie would be awarded only a percentage of the net monthly benefits, this assertion was contradicted by Stephanie, making this a credibility issue to be decided by the trial court. Moreover, in concluding that the parties had agreed that Stephanie would be paid a percentage of the gross monthly benefits, the trial court had before it John's concession that many of his personal expenses, including a $2000 mortgage payment and insurance premiums, were being paid out of the gross amount before the net amount was distributed. We are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake in denying John's motion to modify the COAP. John's remaining argument is that the trial court erred in arriving at the amount of arrearages he owed to Stephanie based on his postal retirement pay. John argues that because the trial court erred in striking the "pro rata" language from the COAP, it used the wrong formula in deciding how much arrearages were owed. We disagree with this argument based on our holding herein that the trial court did not clearly err in striking the "pro rata" language to reflect the agreement of the parties. John also argues that the trial court erred in calculating the arrearages retroactively to the date the COAP was originally entered. We disagree with this argument as well. Per the parties' original agreement and as interpreted by the trial court, the "32.28% pro rata share" language in the COAP meant that Stephanie was supposed to receive a 32.28% share of John's gross monthly retirement. The fact that Stephanie was receiving a lesser amount than what was agreed to was the result of the OPM's misinterpretation of the provision. When the trial court granted Stephanie relief by directing the OPM to disregard the "pro rata" language, the court was not changing the terms of the original agreement; it was enforcing what the parties had originally agreed to-that Stephanie shall receive a 32.28% share in accordance with what she was entitled to based on the duration of her marriage to John. For this reason, we hold that the trial court properly calculated the arrearages retroactively. Affirmed. Abramson and Virden, JJ., agree. There were several other alleged violations of the decree pertaining to the division of property that are not part of this appeal. While the language "32.28% pro rata" was tangentially discussed at this hearing, the actual litigation of the interpretation of "32.28% pro rata" was the topic of a subsequent hearing held after Stephanie filed a motion to correct clerical error on March 4, 2016. We acknowledge that 32.28% of 32.28% does not amount to 14.84%. However, the record does not reflect precisely how the 14.84% was calculated and, further, that calculation is not relevant to the disposition of this appeal.

WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge Appellant John Dunn was convicted by a Clark County jury of simultaneous possession of drugs and firearms, manufacture of two or more grams of methamphetamine, use or possession of paraphernalia to manufacture methamphetamine, and possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine). He was sentenced to an aggregate term of forty years' imprisonment. Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. Rather, he argues that the trial court erred in allowing him to represent himself without having made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel and that he was not competent to conduct trial proceedings pro se. We remand the case to settle and supplement the record. We also order rebriefing for appellant to correct his abstract, brief, and addendum. We have previously held that if anything material to either party is omitted from the record by error or accident, we may direct that the omission be corrected and that a supplemental record be certified and transmitted. Here, during the April 4, 2016 hearing, there was testimony concerning several letters written by appellant to the court while he was incarcerated. According to the testimony, some of these letters showed that appellant was delusional and psychotic at the time they were written. The court stated that the letters were received at the court office and then filed and made a part of the record. However, those letters were not a part of the record on appeal. Therefore, we remand to the trial court to settle and supplement the record with the omitted letters within thirty days. An omnibus hearing was held on October 14, 2014. The entirety of that hearing, as abstracted, is as follows: "On October 14, 2014, The Court held an omnibus hearing. (R. 276). Mr. Dunn's Counsel, Mr. Beckham, notified The Court that he would file a motion for a mental evaluation with regard to Mr. Dunn's culpability. (R. 24, 277)." A mental competency review took place on January 6, 2015. The abstract of that hearing is as follows: The Court held a review to determine the status of Mr. Dunn's mental evaluation on January 6, 2015. (R. 279). The Court entered the order on Mr. Dunn's Petition for Criminal Responsibility Examination (R. 25-29). Mr. Beckham filed a petition for a mental evaluation in October. (R. 24). Mr. Dunn continued to wait for a mental evaluation appointment with Dr. Deyoub. Additionally, Dr. Sean Purifoy (phonetic) received the Release of Medical Records, but did not respond. (R. 280). Mr. Dunn attempted to discuss his case during the proceedings against counsel's advice. (R. 281). The Court also advised Mr. Dunn not to speak. (R. 280-281). All subsequent hearings in which discussions between the court, counsel, and/or appellant took place are described in third-person format as in the above examples. Our abstracting rule provides that the first-person rather than the third-person shall be used. Because appellant has submitted a brief that is not in compliance with our rules, we order rebriefing. Additionally, we find appellant's addendum deficient. Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-2(a)(8) requires the addendum to include true and legible copies of the nontranscript items on appeal that are essential for the appellate court to confirm its jurisdiction, to understand the case, and to decide the issues on appeal. Here, appellant's addendum lacks the multiple motions filed by appellant; the supporting documents filed with those motions, including appellant's certifications, psychological employment screening, and mental diagnostic evaluation; the responses to those motions as well as the orders; the order relieving counsel; the criminal information and supporting affidavit; the Faretta Motion filed by attorney Winston C. Mathis and the order relieving him as appellant's attorney of record, but listing him as standby counsel; and the order extending the time to prepare the record on appeal. All this information is essential for us to decide the issues on appeal and to confirm our jurisdiction. Also, once the record is settled and supplemented, the letters will need to be placed in the addendum. We remand to the trial court to settle and supplement the record within thirty days. We order appellant to file a substituted abstract, brief, and addendum within fifteen days from the date the supplemental record is filed. We note that the materials listed are not intended as an exhaustive list of deficiencies, and we encourage counsel to carefully review the rules to ensure that no other deficiencies exist before filing the substituted abstract, brief, and addendum. We are not authorizing appellant to modify his arguments. Remanded to settle and supplement the record; rebriefing ordered. Abramson and Klappenbach, JJ., agree. Green v. State , 2014 Ark. App. 580, 2014 WL 5482979. See Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-2(a)(5)(B) (2018). Appellant failed to abstract the testimony from page 313 of the record, contending that the page was missing from the transcript. However, the record before this court has the alleged missing page. Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-2(b)(3) (2018).

KAREN R. BAKER, Associate Justice Appellant Sharvelt Mister filed in the circuit court of the county where he is incarcerated a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The circuit court "denied and dismissed" the petition for habeas relief, after which Mister lodged this appeal. On appeal, Mister argues that the "magistrate 'never' issued a[n] [arrest] warrant for Petitioner"; the criminal information was filed without supporting documentation; and because no warrant was issued, introduction of any evidence was illegal "according to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine." Because the circuit court did not clearly err when it denied Mister's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, we affirm. A writ of habeas corpus is proper when a judgment of conviction is invalid on its face or when a trial court lacks jurisdiction over the cause. Philyaw v. Kelley , 2015 Ark. 465, 477 S.W.3d 503. Under our statute, a petitioner for the writ who does not allege his or her actual innocence and proceed under Act 1780 of 2001 must plead either the facial invalidity of the judgment or the lack of jurisdiction by the trial court and make a showing by affidavit or other evidence of probable cause to believe that he or she is being illegally detained. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-103(a)(1) (Repl. 2006); Garrison v. Kelley , 2018 Ark. 8, 534 S.W.3d 136. A habeas proceeding does not afford a prisoner an opportunity to retry his or her case, and it is not a substitute for direct appeal or for seeking postconviction relief. Davis v. Kelley , 2019 Ark. 1, 564 S.W.3d 512. Unless the petitioner can show that the trial court lacked jurisdiction or that the commitment was invalid on its face, there is no basis for a finding that a writ of habeas corpus should issue. Collier v. Kelley , 2018 Ark. 170, 2018 WL 2251147. Mister did not proceed under Act 1780 and essentially raises the same claims on appeal as he did below. None of Mister's claims are cognizable in a habeas proceeding, and he failed to establish that the writ should issue. As to the validity of Mister's arrest, a flaw in the arrest of a convicted defendant does not constitute a jurisdictional defect. We have made clear that the circuit court's jurisdiction to try the accused does not depend on the validity of the arrest. Singleton v. State , 256 Ark. 756, 510 S.W.2d 283 (1974). Because circuit courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear and determine cases involving violations of criminal statutes, Mister was properly tried in a court of competent jurisdiction. See Grimes v. State , 2018 Ark. 407, 562 S.W.3d 215. Claims of a defective information that raise a jurisdictional issue, such as a claim of an illegal sentence, are cognizable in habeas proceedings; however, general defective-information allegations are not. Anderson v. Kelley , 2018 Ark. 222, 549 S.W.3d 913. Mister's contention that the prosecutor filed the criminal information without any supporting documents is a mere assertion of trial error. Such assertions of trial error and due-process violations do not implicate the facial validity of a trial court's judgment or jurisdiction. Id. With regard to the unreasonable-search-and-seizure claim, that claim is also not cognizable in a habeas proceeding. Any allegation of a violation of his right to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure is a claim of a constitutional violation and trial error that does not implicate the facial validity of the judgment or the jurisdiction of the trial court. The issue concerns factual questions on the admissibility of evidence that could have been raised at trial and addressed there. See Davis , 2019 Ark. 1, 564 S.W.3d 512. As such, this allegation does not fall within the purview of a habeas proceeding. Because Mister fails to allege a basis for the circuit court to grant the writ, he demonstrates no error in the dismissal of his petition. Affirmed; motion moot. Hart, J., dissents. Josephine Linker Hart, Justice, dissenting. Until the briefing is complete, all this court has pending before it is Mr. Mister's motion for an extension of time to file his brief. That motion was filed on January 25, 2019. Because this court has not yet given him an extension of time to file his brief, Mr. Mister's appeal is not perfected, and we do not have jurisdiction to decide his appeal on the merits. Without conceding that this court lacks jurisdiction to dispose of this case on the merits, I note further that this is yet another case in which this court has substantially narrowed the circumstances in which relief under our state habeas corpus statute may be had. This stance continues to perplex in light of the Supreme Court of the United States' rejection of this limit on habeas corpus when it reversed Jackson v. Norris , 2011 Ark. 49, 378 S.W.3d 103 ( Jackson I ), in Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). The majority's analysis is no longer valid. As in the case before us, this court in Jackson I disposed of Jackson's habeas petition stating, "Jackson has failed to allege or show that the original commitment was invalid on its face or that the original sentencing court lacked jurisdiction to enter the sentence. We hold that the circuit court's dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas corpus was not clearly erroneous." Jackson I , 2011 Ark. 49, at 5, 378 S.W.3d at 106. Inexplicably, this court continues to cite and rely on the same rationale that the Supreme Court of the United States has expressly rejected in habeas cases. Accordingly, I must dissent. I respectfully dissent. Mister's convictions and sentences for two separate counts of delivery of cocaine with intent to deliver occurring on or about December 2 and December 20, 2010, were affirmed on appeal in Mister v. State , 2012 Ark. App. 536, 2012 WL 4478652. Mister filed a pro se motion for extension of brief time. Because he was granted a seven-day clerk's extension and filed his brief prior to the due date of his brief, the motion for extension of brief time is rendered moot. Mister argued below that the requirement of his right to a first appearance before a judicial officer pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 8.3 was violated. Mister does not raise this argument on appeal. All arguments made below but not raised on appeal are abandoned. State v. Grisby , 370 Ark. 66, 257 S.W.3d 104 (2007).

RHONDA K. WOOD, Associate Justice James Johnson III requests this court to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court so that it may consider a writ of error coram nobis. Although Johnson titles his motion as one to recall the mandate to seek this writ, he is mistaken in how to title the motion. Instead, we consider the motion for the substantive relief requested and treat it as a petition for writ of error coram nobis. We conclude that Johnson's petition is without merit. Accordingly, we deny relief. To understand his petition, a brief explanation of the facts is necessary. Charles Gaskins died as a result of an aggravated robbery by two masked men. While investigating the murder scene, a detective was notified that a confidential informant identified Johnson as a suspect. Later that day, the police stopped a car in which Johnson was a passenger. Johnson sat in the back-passenger seat while Johnson's codefendant, Donte Davis, sat in the front-passenger seat. Police arrested both Johnson and Davis. A gun located under Johnson's seat was identified as the murder weapon. Police also confiscated a cell phone that Johnson used to send a text stating that he would be gone for life if caught on "this here charge." Finally, two women passengers in the car implicated Johnson in the murder. Johnson was convicted of capital murder, and this court affirmed. Johnson v. State , 2015 Ark. 387, 472 S.W.3d 486. In his motion, Johnson primarily disputes the sufficiency of the evidence. He also alleges various trial errors and ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that he was never identified at the murder scene, that there were defects in a search warrant and some seizures, that the gun found in the car did not belong to him and instead belonged to Rhakelle Brown, and that testimony about the statements he made after returning to the car were admitted in error. Additionally, Johnson asserts claims concerning the lack of aid rendered to the victim, the admission of Brown's testimony without corroboration, testimony from an expert about the identification of the gun as the murder weapon, and another expert's testimony on the lack of DNA evidence. Johnson also attached an affidavit to his motion from Davis that implicated Brown as Davis's true accomplice in the robbery. In the affidavit, Davis asserts that Johnson had no knowledge of the murder, that Johnson was picked up after the murder, and that both the phone found on Johnson, and the gun found in the car, belonged to Brown. Johnson appears to contend that this affidavit is newly discovered evidence that would exonerate him when considered in connection with alleged violations of Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) arising from the traffic stop that uncovered the murder weapon. A writ of error coram nobis is an extraordinarily rare remedy, and coram nobis proceedings are attended by a strong presumption that the conviction is valid. Makkali v. State , 2019 Ark. 17, 565 S.W.3d 472. Fundamentally, the writ is a means of obtaining relief from a judgment when there existed some fact that would have prevented its rendition if the trial court had known of its existence at the trial. Id. Of course, the concealment of this fact cannot be attributable to the defendant's own negligence, and it is the petitioner's burden of demonstrating a fundamental error of fact extrinsic to the record. Id. The writ is issued only under compelling circumstances to achieve justice and to address errors of the most fundamental nature. Id. These errors fall into one of four categories: (1) insanity at the time of trial, (2) a coerced guilty plea, (3) material evidence withheld by the prosecutor, or (4) a third-party confession to the crime during the time between conviction and appeal. Martin v. State , 2018 Ark. 344, 2018 WL 6380740. Finally, the writ is only granted to correct some error of fact. Mosley v. State , 2019 Ark. 14, 2019 WL 311002. It does not lie to correct trial error or to contradict any fact already adjudicated. Id. Johnson alleges that a Brady violation occurred, which falls within the third category of fundamental error warranting the writ's issuance. See Isom v. State , 2018 Ark. 368, 563 S.W.3d 533. Johnson, however, fails to identify any specific evidence that was withheld. The mere fact that a petitioner alleges a Brady violation is not sufficient to provide a basis for coram nobis relief. Id. While a third-party confession, can be a ground for the writ, Davis's affidavit-confessing to the robbery and blaming Brown for the shooting-does not fall within the time period during which a writ of error coram nobis is available. Cunningham v. State , 2019 Ark. 9, 564 S.W.3d 521. Indeed, this type of claim must be raised after the conviction, but before the case is decided on appeal. Smith v. State , 301 Ark. 374, 784 S.W.2d 595 (1990). Johnson also alleged more specifically that the evidence against him was insufficient. But the writ will not lie to retry the defendant or to reexamine the strength of the evidence adduced at trial. Davis v. State , 2019 Ark. 20, 566 S.W.3d 111. A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence constitutes a direct attack on the judgment and is not cognizable in a coram nobis proceeding. Buchanan v. State , 2019 Ark. 19, 565 S.W.3d 469. Finally, Johnson's ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not cognizable in a coram nobis proceeding. Martinez-Marmol v. State , 2018 Ark. 145, 544 S.W.3d 49. Coram nobis proceedings are not to be used as a substitute for raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under our postconviction rule. Cunningham , 2019 Ark. 9, 564 S.W.3d 521. Because Johnson fails to identify any facts to support the only basis for the writ that he alleges, we deny the petition. Motion treated as a petition for writ of error coram nobis; petition denied.

ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge Appellant TEGNA, Inc. (TEGNA), appeals the May 21, 2018 preliminary injunction (PI) issued by the Pulaski County Circuit Court. TEGNA argues that the circuit court erred (1) because the PI is an unconstitutional prior restraint, and (2) in finding that appellees Justice Courtney Goodson and the Courtney Goodson Campaign (collectively Goodson) proved likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm. Because the restrictions imposed by the PI expired within the pendency of this appeal, all issues concerning the propriety of the injunctive relief granted are rendered moot by the passage of time. Accordingly, we dismiss. Justice Goodson, a sitting Arkansas Supreme Court Justice, ran for reelection in 2018. TEGNA is the parent company of KTHV Channel 11 (KTHV), a news station headquartered in Little Rock, Arkansas, whose viewers include approximately 575,000 households in Arkansas and the Pulaski County viewing area. On May 2, 2018, the Judicial Crisis Network (JCN) placed an advertisement (JCN Campaign Ad) with KTHV regarding Goodson. The JCN Campaign Ad audio stated the following: Courtney Goodson has been taking gifts and big money from donors for years. Hundreds of thousands of dollars from law firms with cases before her court. Even a fifty-thousand-dollar trip to Italy on a donor's luxury yacht. What's worse, Goodson asked for an $18,000.00 raise making her salary bigger than the Governor's. Courtney Goodson: a political insider abusing the system. Tell her to stop taking gifts and asking for money. On May 3, 2018, Goodson filed a complaint with the Rapid Response Team (RRT), which is charged by the Arkansas Judicial Campaign Conduct and Education Committee, Inc. The RRT is comprised of Judge Audrey Evans, Danyelle Walker, Hal Bass, Elizabeth Andreoli, and Roy Ockert. The RRT reviews complaints filed only by candidates or campaigns for the Arkansas Supreme Court and the Arkansas Court of Appeals. On May 14, 2018, eight days before the election, Goodson filed an emergency motion against TEGNA and other members of the media based on alleged defamation arising out of the publication of the JCN Campaign Ad. Goodson sought an ex parte temporary restraining order or, alternatively, a preliminary injunction prohibiting the media defendants from publishing the JCN Campaign Ad through the conclusion of the election. The Pulaski County Circuit Court held a hearing on Friday, May 18, to review the JCN Campaign Ad. The circuit court first heard testimony from Walker, a member of the RRT, who explained that the RRT had received a complaint about the JCN Campaign Ad from Goodson on May 3, 2018. As part of its review of Goodson's complaint, the RRT considered the determination of the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission (JDDC) from September 18, 2013, which reviewed a complaint filed by Kathy Wells over concerns about Goodson's "reported gifts, among other items in [Goodson's] financial disclosures, a $50,000.00 vacation to Italy." The JDDC determined that Goodson properly disclosed the gifts in question, which allowed the public to know of any potential conflict; that she had received many gifts in question from her husband during a time in which she was engaged to and dating her husband; and specifically found no evidence of judicial misconduct or wrongdoing by Goodson. The RRT also reviewed a summary of cases and a printout of cases in which Goodson had recused from appeals involving donors or those associated with gifts. Certified copies of Goodson's recusals were provided to the circuit court and admitted into evidence. Walker testified that on May 9, 2018, the RRT determined, after reviewing these materials, that the JCN Campaign Ad was false and misleading and requested by letter that JCN either voluntarily withdraw the advertisement or provide evidence refuting the findings of the RRT within twenty-four hours. In its letter, the RRT informed JCN of its finding that under the RRT's rules and procedures, Goodson had met the initial burden of demonstrating that the JCN Campaign Ad was false or misleading. The RRT determined that a person of ordinary intelligence would conclude that Justice Goodson did not request a pay raise, as there is no evidence to support the statement that she requested a pay raise, and it would be a violation of her duty of confidentiality to reveal her vote on the pay raise. The RRT also determined, based on its review of the materials submitted by Goodson, that a person of ordinary intelligence would conclude that Justice Goodson did not hear cases filed by or on behalf of donors, meaning donors did not receive benefits from Justice Goodson. Walker explained that the RRT informed JCN that if JCN failed to respond within twenty-four hours, the RRT would make a final finding that the JCN Campaign Ad and related print ad contained false or misleading information. JCN did not respond to the May 9, 2018 letter, and on May 10, 2018, the RRT delivered to JCN a cease-and-desist letter, in which the RRT issued its final finding that the JCN Campaign Ad contained false and misleading information based on its review of the materials provided by Goodson and JCN's failure to respond within twenty-four hours. After the RRT sent cease-and-desist letter to JCN, Goodson sent a cease-and-desist letter to KTHV and other media companies on May 11, 2018, in which she provided notice to KTHV and other media companies of the falsity of the JCN Campaign Ad. With the exception of Comcast and TEGNA, all other named defendants voluntarily withdrew the ad and did not appear at the hearing. The circuit court also heard testimony from Chad Kelley, the national and regional sales manager at TEGNA's KTHV. Although Kelley did not know the exact number of times per day the JCN Campaign Ad ran, he testified that it was probably "more than five times per day." According to his testimony, JCN paid an average of $80,000 a week for its purchase of the ad. Kelley testified that on May 11, 2018, Goodson sent TEGNA a letter threatening legal action and demanding that TEGNA, along with broadcasters across Arkansas, cease and desist publishing the JCN Campaign Ad. Kelley explained that he was notified about the campaign's letter very late in the day and that he read the letter as soon as he returned to the office on Monday, May 14, 2018. He immediately sent the letter to the liaison between TEGNA and JCN requesting that JCN provide documentation or substantiation of the JCN Campaign Ad. TEGNA received JCN's response that same day. In its response, JCN wrote that the statement regarding Justice Goodson's request for a pay raise is true because, by Justice Goodson's own admission, the Arkansas Supreme Court, of which she is a member, had authorized Chief Justice John Dan Kemp to appear on behalf of the entire Arkansas Supreme Court before the Independent Citizens Commission to ask for a raise for all the justices. JCN wrote that if Justice Goodson would publicly state that she had voted against the pay-raise proposal, JCN would revise the advertisement. Regarding the statements as to Justice Goodson's acceptance of gifts and money from donors, JCN stated that the statements are true and that Justice Goodson had not denied them. JCN submitted that Justice Goodson's response regarding recusal was a red herring because the JCN Campaign Ad contained nothing related to the issue of recusal, which is a separate matter from the issue of accepting gifts and large campaign donations. Kelley testified that he sent the cease-and-desist letter and JCN's response to Covington Burling, TEGNA's outside counsel. After receiving a response from counsel, TEGNA decided to continue running the JCN Campaign Ad. Goodson commenced legal action against TEGNA and the other media defendants on May 14, 2018, at 12:44 p.m. At the close of the hearing, the circuit court entered the PI on May 18, which was incorporated into a formal order for preliminary injunction on May 21, prohibiting the media defendants from publishing the JCN Campaign Ad effective immediately and through midnight on May 22. The circuit court found that continued publication of the JCN Campaign Ad would cause irreparable harm to Goodson's campaign and that Goodson had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of a defamation claim against the media defendants, including a likelihood of proving actual malice. TEGNA and Comcast filed timely notices of appeal on May 22, 2018. In determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the circuit court must consider two things: (1) whether irreparable harm will result in the absence of an injunction or restraining order and (2) whether the moving party has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. LaPointe , supra . Paragraph 5 of the May 21, 2018 PI states in its entirety: The Plaintiffs' request for preliminary injunction is granted. The Defendants and their stations are hereby enjoined from airing the ad from [JCN] played in open Court and labeled "Insider" according to Comcast's Exhibit 5. Such order as announced from the bench is effective immediately and through midnight on May 22, 2018. TEGNA argues that this court must reverse the PI and hold that both the United States and Arkansas Constitutions prohibit temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions silencing campaign speech because (1) campaign advertisements are protected speech; (2) temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions prohibiting publication of campaign advertisements are prior restraints; and (3) Goodson cannot overcome the heavy presumption against the constitutional validity of prior restraints. TEGNA claims that a failure to do so will result in future defamation suits from aggrieved political candidates across Arkansas who will follow Goodson's lead and sue the press to silence speech harmful to their campaigns. See Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy , 401 U.S. 265, 274 n.4, 91 S.Ct. 621, 28 L.Ed.2d 35 (1971) (noting that "[i]f actionable defamation is possible in [campaign advertising], one might suppose that the chief energies of the courts, for some time after every political campaign, would be absorbed by libel and slander suit.' ") (quoting Dix W. Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates , 49 Col. L. Rev. 875 (1949) ). We decline to reach the merits of TEGNA's arguments because any and all restrictions imposed by the PI expired by its express terms within the pendency of this appeal; accordingly, issues concerning the propriety of the injunctive relief granted have been rendered moot by the passage of time. See, e.g. , U.S. Tr. Co. v. Rich , 199 N.C.App. 320, 682 S.E.2d 248 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (reiterating that "where the restrictions imposed by a preliminary injunction expire within the pendency of an appeal, issues concerning the propriety of the injunctive relief granted are rendered moot by the passage of time.") (citing Artis & Assocs. v. Auditore , 154 N.C.App. 508, 572 S.E.2d 198, 199 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) ). Also in support of this holding, we cite as instructive Cory v. Cory , 989 So.2d 855, 859-60 (La. Ct. App. 2008), in which the Louisiana Court of Appeals noted that the order of protection that the appellant was challenging expired on June 14, 2008, by its own terms. The court held that the argument that the circuit court erred in issuing the protective order was moot: An appellate court, as a matter of judicial economy, has a right to consider the possibility of mootness on its own motion and to dismiss the appeal if the matter has in fact become moot. A moot case is one which seeks a judgment or decree which, when rendered, can give no practical relief. It is well settled that an appellate court will not render advisory opinions from which no practical results can follow. As a result, courts have established the rule that moot questions will not be considered on appeal. In cases of injunctive relief, it is clear that when the activity which a plaintiff seeks to enjoin has already occurred during the pendency of the suit, the matter is moot and the propriety of the trial court's action in denying or granting the injunction will not be considered by the reviewing court. Id. at 860 (internal citations omitted). In Wilson v. Walther , 2017 Ark. 270, at 7, 527 S.W.3d 709, 714, our supreme court noted that [a]s a general rule, appellate courts of this state will not review issues that are moot. Honeycutt v. Foster , 371 Ark. 545, 548, 268 S.W.3d 875, 878 (2007). A case becomes moot when any judgment rendered would have no practical legal effect upon a then existing legal controversy. Shipp v. Franklin , 370 Ark. 262, 267, 258 S.W.3d 744, 748 (2007). Arkansas appellate courts have consistently held that they will not review issues that are moot because to do so would be to render an advisory opinion. Keep Our Dollars in Independence Cty. v. Mitchell , 2017 Ark. 154, at 10, 518 S.W.3d 64, 70. The court has, however, also recognized two exceptions to the mootness doctrine: (1) issues that are capable of repetition, yet evade review, and (2) issues that raise considerations of substantial public interest which, if addressed, would prevent future litigation Id. We hold that this case does not fall within either of the recognized exceptions. With respect to the first exception, although the issue of allegedly defamatory campaign ads is capable of repetition in future elections, this case fails as to the second prong of the exception in that the issue is not doomed to evade review if not addressed herein. Goodson's request for a PI pertained solely to the JCN Campaign Ad. Any future allegations of defamatory campaign advertisements will deal with distinctively unique candidates, facts, and then-governing campaign rules and regulations that will need to be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. To hold otherwise would constitute a prohibited advisory opinion. As to the second exception, which also has two prongs-(1) that there be a substantial public interest in the issues being considered and (2) that addressing such issues, despite their being otherwise moot, would prevent litigation-we hold that only the first prong has been met in this case. We acknowledge an unquestionable substantial public interest in the First Amendment and prohibiting the prior restraint of expression; however, addressing this issue will not prevent future litigation. Because the election has already occurred, neither party to this case stands to gain relief based on the outcome of this appeal, and any holding with respect to similar future claims regarding political campaign-ad content would be both speculative and advisory in nature, we decline to address the merits of TEGNA's arguments. Accordingly, we dismiss. Dismissed. Harrison and Whiteaker, JJ., agree. Comcast of Arkansas, Inc., was originally an appellant in this case; however, its motion to dismiss was granted by this court on August 22, 2018. Coburn Howell, Comcast's local sales manager for the Little Rock viewing area, also testified regarding issues similar to those covered by Kelley. Appellate courts typically review grants of preliminary injunctions under an abuse-of-discretion standard. LaPointe v. New Tech., Inc. , 2014 Ark. App. 346, at 4, 437 S.W.3d 126, 129. When an appeal reaches a court via an order granting a preliminary injunction, the appellate court will not delve into the merits of the case further than is necessary to determine whether the circuit court exceeded its discretion in granting the injunction. Id. ; City of Jacksonville v. Smith , 2018 Ark. 87, 540 S.W.3d 661. TEGNA claims that this case requires the application of a more rigorous de novo standard of review because the PI involves the First Amendment. See Weiss v. McLemore , 371 Ark. 538, 268 S.W.3d 897 (2007) (holding that issues of both statutory construction and constitutional interpretation are reviewed de novo); see also El-Farra v. Sayyed , 365 Ark. 209, 226 S.W.3d 792 (2006) (conducting de novo review of the interpretation of the United States Constitution); and Thomson Newspaper Pub., Inc. v. Coody , 320 Ark. 455, 896 S.W.2d 897 (1995). Because we are deciding this case on other grounds, we need not make this determination at this time. Paragraph five of the PI expressly provides that the media defendants were enjoined from airing the JCN Campaign Ad effective immediately and through midnight on May 22, 2018, the date of the election. The judicial election runoff was held on November 6, 2018, and the results were certified by the Arkansas Secretary of State on November 16, 2018.

ROBIN F. WYNNE, Associate Justice Tonisha Mitchell appeals following her conviction for first-degree murder in the Craighead County Circuit Court, for which she was sentenced to life imprisonment. She raises the following points on appeal: (1) the trial court violated her fundamental right to a public trial by closing the courtroom to the public during the testimony of State's witness Vikkesha Menifee; (2) the trial court erred in denying trial counsel's motion to withdraw and her motion to change attorneys; and (3) the trial court erred in denying her motion for new trial based on jurors seeing her escorted into the courtroom by bailiffs while she was bound by arm restraints just prior to jury selection. We find merit in her first point, and we therefore reverse and remand for a new trial. I. Background On May 25, 2015, Nelson McCullough was shot and killed at his house in Jonesboro. Appellant was charged with first-degree murder in McCullough's death, and appellant's jury trial was held on June 20-23, 2017. Ladarius Lee testified that he and Antonio Watson, who was deceased at the time of trial, rode with appellant in a borrowed silver Dodge Charger to the victim's house to purchase marijuana. While Lee was inside, appellant came in and shot McCullough without saying anything. Watson fled, and Lee and appellant drove away and immediately exchanged the Charger for appellant's vehicle. In addition to Lee's testimony, the victim's girlfriend testified that she had identified Lee as the person who knocked on the door the day of the shooting; the owner of the Charger testified regarding appellant borrowing the vehicle; and Vikkesha Menifee testified that appellant told her she had shot the victim. Appellant was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. She filed a pro se motion for new trial and her appointed counsel filed an amended motion for new trial because members of the jury panel had allegedly seen appellant in restraints prior to voir dire. Following a hearing, the circuit court denied the motion. This appeal followed. II. Public Trial For her first point on appeal, appellant argues that the closure of the courtroom during the testimony of State's witness Vikkesha Menifee violated her constitutional right to a public trial. The issue arose in the following bench conference: [ DEPUTY PROSECUTOR ]: Your Honor, for this next witness, I would ask the Court to close the courtroom and exclude any of the audience from it. THE COURT : Who is the witness? [ DEPUTY PROSECUTOR ]: Her name is Vikkesha Menifee. She is the aunt of the defendant, and we have what we believe is credible evidence that certain members of the defendant's family have reached out in an effort to intimidate her to prevent her from testifying, and so we are going to ask that the courtroom be closed and all of the gallery excluded during her testimony. THE COURT : Well, of course the defendant would remain. [ DEPUTY PROSECUTOR ]: Of course. [ DEFENSE COUNSEL ]: Your Honor, I would object to that. She has family members here who wants to - this is a public proceeding, and there is no reason to close it for testimony. THE COURT : Well, the Court has to weigh the rights of the public with possible harm and I don't see any harm in the excluding of the public for this phase of the trial only in light of what thus far is unsubstantiated claim of possible bodily harm in the offing of the witness and over the objection, I'm going to permit the courtroom to be closed and requesting it be closed for the testimony of this particular witness as to all family members on both sides. [ DEPUTY PROSECUTOR ]: Yes, sir, any of the audience except for members of either of Mr. Simes's staff or the Prosecution staff. THE COURT : All right. Okay. [Bench conference concludes.] THE COURT : All right. Ladies and gentlemen, before this next witness is called, I'm going to ask that the courtroom be cleared of all persons who are here as spectators. The reporters may remain and court personnel may remain but the rest of you will need to remain outside until after this witness testifies so if you would escort them out. Ms. Menifee proceeded to testify that she had a good relationship with appellant, who is her sister's daughter. Shortly after May 2015, appellant stayed with Menifee for a few days, and during that time appellant seemed worried. According to Menifee's testimony, during that time appellant confided in her about the shooting. Appellant told Menifee that she had accompanied Lee to the victim's house to purchase marijuana despite being "skeptical" about going because she and the victim had "bumped heads before." Appellant was waiting in the car when she heard them "exchange some words" and got out of the car to see what was going on. Menifee testified that appellant told her that the victim "drew a gun on her" and she shot him first. Significantly, there was no testimony regarding the alleged intimidation efforts that were the bases for the closure of the courtroom. Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 2, section 10 of the Arkansas Constitution guarantee that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial." Regarding the right to a public trial, this court has previously stated: We have recognized that "[t]he right to a public trial is one of the most important safeguards in the prosecution of persons accused of crime." Sirratt v. State , 240 Ark. 47, 53, 398 S.W.2d 63, 66 (1966) (quoting People v. Murray , [89 Mich. 276] 50 N.W. 995, 997 (Mich. 1891) ). "The right to a public trial has long been viewed as 'a safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of persecution.' " United States v. Thunder , 438 F.3d 866 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting In re Oliver , 333 U.S. 257, 270 [68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682] (1948) ). "The requirement of a public trial is for the benefit of the accused; that the public may see he is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned, and that the presence of interested spectators may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility and to the importance of their functions[.]" Waller v. Georgia , 467 U.S. 39, 46 [104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31] (1984) (quoting In re Oliver , 333 U.S. at 270, n.25 [68 S.Ct. 499] ). "The importance we as a Nation attach to the public trial is reflected both in its deep roots in the English common law and in its seemingly universal recognition in this country since the earliest of times." Gannett Co. v. DePasquale , 443 U.S. 368, 414 [99 S.Ct. 2898, 61 L.Ed.2d 608] (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As enunciated by the Waller Court, the values advanced by the fundamental right of a public trial are (1) to ensure a fair trial; (2) to remind the prosecutor and the judge of their responsibility to the accused and the importance of their functions; (3) to encourage witnesses to come forward; and (4) to discourage perjury. Schnarr v. State , 2017 Ark. 10, at 11-12, 2017 WL 374727. The right to a public trial is not absolute, however. In Waller v. Georgia , the United States Supreme Court adopted the following test for determining when the right of an accused to a public trial may give way to other rights or interests, i.e., when the closure of a courtroom is justified in a criminal trial: [1] the party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, [2] the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, [3] the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and [4] it must make findings adequate to support the closure. Waller v. Georgia , 467 U.S. 39, 48, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984). The issue presented in this case is whether the Waller test was met. We first address the State's contention that appellant has changed her argument on appeal. It is axiomatic that a party cannot change the grounds for an objection on appeal, but is bound by the scope and nature of the arguments made at trial. E.g. , Mayes v. State , 351 Ark. 26, 29, 89 S.W.3d 926, 928 (2002). The State contends that appellant's objection at trial was aimed at the right of her family, as members of the public, to an open trial-not appellant's personal right to a public trial. The State correctly notes that, separate from the accused's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, the press and the general public have a constitutional right of access to criminal trials under the First Amendment, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Presley v. Georgia , 558 U.S. 209, 212, 130 S.Ct. 721, 175 L.Ed.2d 675 (2010). Here, appellant's counsel clearly and timely objected to the prosecution's request to close the courtroom, stating that the trial was a public proceeding. Counsel noted the presence of family members and argued that there was no reason to close the courtroom. While counsel did not specifically state the constitutional provisions on which he based his objection, counsel's reference to the trial being a "public proceeding" was sufficient to apprise the trial court of the nature of the objection and to preserve the argument for appellate review. We simply do not agree with the State's argument that defense counsel, who was charged with representing appellant in her criminal trial, was asserting the rights of the public rather than those of his client when he objected to the closure of the courtroom. Therefore, we hold that appellant's argument is preserved for our review on appeal. Turning now to the merits, appellant argues that none of the requirements of Waller have been satisfied in this case. The crux of the issue is whether a mere allegation of witness intimidation, without more, is a sufficient basis for closing a courtroom. Other jurisdictions have held that closure of a courtroom for the testimony of a witness who had allegedly been threatened or intimidated, without proper application of the Waller test, is reversible error. E.g. , Com. v. Penn , 386 Pa.Super. 133, 562 A.2d 833, 838 (1989) ("[A] bald assertion of alleged intimidation does not justify the kind of encroachment on a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial which clearing the courtroom for a witness' testimony entails."); State v. Mahkuk , 736 N.W.2d 675 (Minn. 2007) (prosecutor's statements regarding intimidation and threats made against witnesses were inadequate to support closure of courtroom without evidence in the record and adequate findings by the trial court). The present case is analogous to Guzman v. Scully , 80 F.3d 772 (2d Cir. 1996), in which the trial court excluded four individuals from the cross-examination of a prosecution witness based solely on representations by the prosecution that their presence was intimidating to the witness. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit wrote: Under the circumstances presented in this case, the trial court's partial closure of its courtroom violated Guzman's right to a public trial. This constitutional infirmity stems primarily from the fact that the trial court relied on the unsubstantiated statements of the prosecutor, rather than conducting an inquiry of the prosecution witness on whose behalf the closure request was made. This resulted in a violation of the first Waller criterion and consequently led to noncompliance with the other criteria as well. Guzman , 80 F.3d at 775. Similarly, in the case at bar no record was developed before the trial court to demonstrate that Menifee was actually intimidated or threatened, or by whom. There was no evidence presented on which the trial court could have determined (1) that there was an overriding interest likely to be prejudiced, (2) how broad any closure might need to be, or (3) what reasonable alternatives to closure might exist. It naturally follows that the trial court did not make findings necessary to support the closure. On this record, we hold that appellant's constitutional right to a public trial was violated. Our analysis does not require a demonstration of actual prejudice, as both this court and the Supreme Court of the United States have held that a showing of prejudice is not necessary when an appellant's right to a public trial has been violated. See Schnarr , 2017 Ark. 10, at 16. Consequently, we reverse and remand for a new trial. We do not address the remaining two points on appeal because they are not likely to arise on retrial. Reversed and remanded. Thus, this appeal is before us pursuant to Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 1-2(a)(2) (2018). There is some suggestion of a less than complete closure by the trial court's statement that "[t]he reporters may remain," and partial closures have typically been treated differently than complete closures. See United States v. Simmons , 797 F.3d 409, 414 (6th Cir. 2015) ("All federal courts of appeals that have distinguished between partial closures and total closures modify the Waller test so that the "overriding interest" requirement is replaced by requiring a showing of a "substantial reason" for a partial closure, but the other three factors remain the same."); State v. Uhre , 2019 S.D. 8, ¶ 19, 922 N.W.2d 789 ("[W]e have modified the first Waller factor by allowing a partial closure to be supported by a "substantial reason" rather than the more stringent "overriding interest" described by Waller for complete courtroom closures."). But cf. State v. Turrietta , 308 P.3d 964, 970 (N.M. 2013) (adopting the "overriding interest" standard as discussed by the Supreme Court in Waller for any type of courtroom closure). Here, however, the parties brief the case as though there was a complete closure of the courtroom, and our conclusion is the same regardless of whether Waller 's "overriding interest" requirement or a less stringent "substantial reason" standard is applied. It is unnecessary to decide in the present case whether the closure of the court room was complete or partial, or whether a less stringent standard should be applied to partial closures. Of course, we do not mean to suggest that protecting a witness's safety could not constitute an overriding interest or a substantial reason for closing a courtroom.

DAVID M. GLOVER, Judge LaFrancis Sanford, Jr., was convicted by a Benton County Circuit Court jury of residential burglary, a Class B felony, and theft of property, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced as a habitual offender to thirty years in the Arkansas Department of Correction. Pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and Rule 4-3(k) of the Rules of the Arkansas Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, Sanford's counsel has filed a motion to withdraw on the basis this appeal is wholly without merit. The motion is accompanied by an abstract and addendum of the proceedings below, which addresses all objections and motions decided adversely to Sanford, and a brief in which counsel explains why there is nothing in the record that would support an appeal. The clerk of our court provided Sanford with a copy of his counsel's brief and notified him of his right to file a pro se statement of points for reversal; Sanford has submitted no points. We affirm Sanford's convictions and grant counsel's motion to withdraw. Sufficiency of the Evidence At trial the victim, Belinda Christopher, testified she left her residence around 2:10 p.m. on May 18, 2016, to pick up her niece's children from school, and she left the front door unlocked when she left. When she returned between 2:40 and 2:50 p.m., she noticed a man walking away from her residence on her driveway; she thought it was "weird" because the man would not look at her when she saw him. Christopher said as she pulled into the driveway, the man looked scared and nervous, would not make eye contact, and began removing what looked like batting gloves; he then began jogging up the street and around the corner. She testified the man would not look at her, he did not stop and talk to her in the driveway, and he never explained what he was doing in her driveway. Christopher followed the man in her car; when she caught up to him, she took pictures of him with her cell phone while he pretended to be talking on his phone. She said the man kept grabbing the left pocket of his pants, and she could clearly see there were items in his pocket. Christopher identified Sanford as the man who had been in her driveway. She immediately returned to her residence after taking pictures of Sanford and noticed her dog was agitated and upset, which was not normal; she further discovered that five to seven one-dollar bills were missing from the kitchen counter that were there before she went to pick up the children. She determined that medication was missing from the kitchen windowsill; on further inspection, she realized medicine had also been taken from the medicine cabinet in her niece's bathroom. Additionally, she concluded that the passport application she had been completing with personal information, along with her birth certificate, were also missing. After verifying that none of her family members had removed the items, and after making sure Sanford was not simply delivering advertising flyers or had been coming from her house for some other legitimate reason, Christopher called the Bentonville Police Department and made a report. She testified she had never seen Sanford prior to May 18, 2016, and he did not have permission to be in her home on that day. Bentonville police officer Michael Alexander testified he responded to Christopher's residential-burglary report, at which time she advised him that she had observed a black male, approximately five feet, four inches tall, with short hair, and wearing a gray jacket, gray shorts, black shoes, and gloves that were light on one side and darker on the other side, walking down her driveway from her house toward the street as she was returning home. According to Officer Alexander, Christopher reported she had discovered items missing from her house; the man she saw in her driveway was acting suspiciously; and his pockets were bulky, leading her to believe something was in them. She provided a copy of the photo she had taken of the man to Officer Alexander, who circulated the photo by email to the entire police department. He received responses from two officers, both of whom immediately identified the subject as Sanford. Officer Alexander testified that a search warrant was issued for Sanford's address, which was approximately two miles from Christopher's house, but none of the stolen items were located at Sanford's house. However, Sanford's roommate informed Officer Alexander that Sanford had not been home from the time the burglary was committed to the time the search was conducted, and Officer Alexander surmised it was therefore unlikely to find the stolen items at Sanford's house. After receiving information that Sanford might be at a different address, Officer Alexander and Officer Nick Brown went to that address, where they found Sanford in the garage at the house. Sanford ran inside the house when he saw the officers. The officers entered the house and ordered Sanford to the ground at gunpoint. Sanford's girlfriend told the officers he was not fleeing but was just bringing a child inside and putting his shoes on; however, Sanford failed to take the child, who was in the garage with him, when he ran inside the house. Officer Brown's testimony regarding Sanford's apprehension was the same as Officer Alexander's testimony. Detective Mark Jordan testified that when Officer Alexander circulated the photo of the suspect in the Christopher residential burglary, he confidently recognized the person as Sanford; he identified Sanford in open court as the defendant. According to Detective Jordan, he said he called Sanford the day after the residential burglary and asked him why he would go into that lady's house; Sanford hung up on him and would not answer the phone when Detective Jordan called him back. After his arrest, Sanford admitted to Detective Jordan that he was the man in the picture, but he denied burglarizing Christopher's house or even being in her driveway. Sanford told Detective Jordan he had run out of gas at a Kentucky Fried Chicken and that was why he had been walking, but Detective Jordan said his statement was inconsistent with where he was in Christopher's neighborhood. At the close of the State's case, Sanford moved for a directed verdict, which was denied. He rested without calling any witnesses and renewed his directed-verdict motion, which was again denied. In his directed-verdict motions, with regard to residential burglary, Sanford argued the State failed to prove he entered or remained unlawfully on the premises of another with the intent to commit a crime punishable by imprisonment; with regard to theft of property, Sanford argued the State failed to prove a theft had occurred, much less that he was ever in the house he was alleged to have burglarized. A directed-verdict motion is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Holland v. State , 2017 Ark. App. 49, 510 S.W.3d 311. Our test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial. Wells v. State , 2017 Ark. App. 174, 518 S.W.3d 106. Evidence is substantial if it is of sufficient force and character to compel reasonable minds to reach a conclusion and pass beyond suspicion and conjecture. Id. The law makes no distinction between circumstantial and direct evidence when reviewing for sufficiency of the evidence. Fronterhouse v. State , 2015 Ark. App. 211, 463 S.W.3d 312. Circumstantial evidence may constitute substantial evidence to support a conviction if it excludes every other reasonable hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused. Holland, supra. The question of whether circumstantial evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence is a determination for the finder of fact; on review, we must determine whether the fact-finder had to resort to speculation and conjecture to reach its decision. Davis v. State , 2015 Ark. App. 234, 459 S.W.3d 821. On appeal, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State, and only the evidence supporting the verdict is considered. Wells, supra. Weighing the evidence, reconciling conflicts in testimony, and assessing credibility are all matters exclusively for the trier of fact. Holland, supra. A person commits residential burglary "if he or she enters or remains unlawfully in a residential occupiable structure of another person with the purpose of committing in the residential occupiable structure any offense punishable by imprisonment." Ark. Code Ann. § 5-39-201(a)(1) (Repl. 2013). A person commits theft of property "if he or she knowingly takes or exercises unauthorized control over ... the property of another person with the purpose of depriving the owner of the property." Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-103(a)(1) (Repl. 2013). The evidence, although circumstantial, is sufficient to support Sanford's convictions. Christopher's testimony established that when she returned home after a short errand, she found Sanford walking down her driveway away from her house; he would not look at her, did not stop to explain why he was in her driveway, and began to look nervous and jog down the street quickly away from her. She then discovered items were taken from her house in the thirty to forty minutes she was gone from her house. She testified she had never seen Sanford before May 18, 2016, and had not given him permission to be in her house. When questioned by Detective Jordan, Sanford gave an inconsistent explanation as to why he was in Christopher's neighborhood. Furthermore, when officers arrived at the house where Sanford was located, he attempted to flee. A person's flight to avoid arrest can be considered as corroboration of evidence tending to establish his guilt. Ricks v. State , 316 Ark. 601, 873 S.W.2d 808 (1994). Given this evidence, a jury could conclude that the circumstantial evidence excluded every other reasonable hypothesis other than Sanford's guilt. Other Adverse Rulings In addition to the denial of Sanford's directed-verdict motions, there were two other rulings during Sanford's trial adverse to him. The first adverse ruling occurred during Officer Alexander's testimony. On cross-examination, Sanford's counsel questioned Officer Alexander about his interview of Jacob Moody, a man who was working as a lawn-care provider on Christopher's street at the time of the incident; what Moody told him during the interview; and whether he considered Moody to be a suspect in the residential burglary and theft of property. Officer Alexander replied he did not consider Moody to be a suspect. On redirect, the prosecutor inquired about Officer Alexander's conversation with Moody; defense counsel objected, arguing Moody's responses were hearsay, and if Moody's statement was needed, he should have been subpoenaed as a witness. The State argued defense counsel had asked Officer Alexander if he considered Moody a suspect, and the State was entitled to ask Officer Alexander to explain why he did not. The trial court overruled the objection, stating it was going to allow a "limited amount," to the extent defense counsel had opened the door. Our court will not reverse a circuit court's evidentiary rulings unless there was an abuse of discretion. Williams v. State , 2012 Ark. App. 447, 2012 WL 3744714. It has been recognized that otherwise inadmissible testimony may be offered when one party has opened the door for another party to offer it. Larimore v. State , 317 Ark. 111, 877 S.W.2d 570 (1994). Here, defense counsel elicited hearsay testimony about what Moody had told the officer in an attempt to suggest Moody could have also been a suspect in the residential burglary and theft of property. The circuit court then allowed the State to ask Officer Alexander to explain why he did not consider Moody to be a suspect, which was not an abuse of discretion. The second adverse ruling occurred during the State's redirect examination of Detective Jordan. The State asked Detective Jordan if it was correct that about twelve days had elapsed between Sanford's breaking into Christopher's house and his arrest. Defense counsel objected and requested that the circuit court ask the prosecutor to be more careful with her language, arguing that she made it sound like there was a conclusion Sanford had broken into Christopher's house, and that assumed facts not yet properly in evidence. The prosecutor responded that the State had charged Sanford with doing exactly that, therefore, there was no sort of mischaracterization. The circuit court overruled the objection. There was no error in overruling the objection. The State charged Sanford with entering Christopher's house without her permission. Christopher had already testified Sanford was the person she saw coming down her driveway from her house and that he did not have permission to be in her house right before she discovered items missing from her house. From our review of the record and the brief presented, we find counsel has complied with the requirements of Rule 4-3(k) and hold that there is no merit to this appeal. Accordingly, Sanford's convictions are affirmed, and counsel's motion to withdraw is granted. Affirmed; motion to withdraw granted. Abramson and Brown, JJ., agree.

JOHN DAN KEMP, Chief Justice Appellant Tony Alan Ray appeals from an order of the circuit court denying him a resentencing hearing and imposing a sentence of life with parole eligibility pursuant to the Fair Sentencing of Minors Act of 2017 (FSMA or "the Act"). We reverse the circuit court's order and remand for resentencing in accordance with our decision in Harris v. State , 2018 Ark. 179, 547 S.W.3d 64. I. Facts In 1999, a Crawford County Circuit Court jury found Ray guilty of theft of property and capital murder after he and an accomplice broke into Lisa Lewis's home, shot her multiple times, and then fled the scene in her car. See Ray v. State , 344 Ark. 136, 40 S.W.3d 243 (2001). Ray was sixteen years old when the crimes were committed, and he received consecutive sentences of life imprisonment without parole for capital murder and twenty years for theft of property. In 2012, the Supreme Court of the United States held that "the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders." Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 479, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). The Court further held that defendants who committed homicide crimes as juveniles and faced a sentence of life without parole were entitled to a sentencing hearing that would permit a judge or jury to consider the individual characteristics of the defendant and the individual circumstances of the crime as mitigating factors for a lesser sentence. Id. at 489, 132 S.Ct. 2455. Following the Court's decision in Miller and this court's decision on remand in Miller 's companion case, Jackson v. Norris , 2013 Ark. 175, 426 S.W.3d 906, Ray petitioned for writ of habeas corpus in the Lincoln County Circuit Court and argued that his sentence was unconstitutional. On June 27, 2016, the circuit court granted Ray's petition, vacated his sentence, and remanded his case to the Crawford County Circuit Court for resentencing. The circuit court had yet to conduct a Miller hearing, however, when the Arkansas General Assembly passed the FSMA, which, among other things, eliminated life without parole as a sentencing option for juvenile offenders and extended parole eligibility to juvenile offenders. On May 2, 2017, the State filed a motion for resentencing under the FSMA. Ray opposed the motion, contending that the FSMA was inapplicable to his case and that he was entitled to a resentencing hearing at which he could present Miller evidence. On August 2, 2017, the circuit court held a hearing on the State's motion. Although Ray's sentence had been vacated before the FSMA was enacted, the circuit court nevertheless relied on the Act's provisions in resentencing him to life with the possibility of parole after thirty years. On appeal, Ray challenges the circuit court's application of the FSMA to his case. II. Juvenile Sentencing In Harris , 2018 Ark. 179, 547 S.W.3d 64, this court considered whether the FSMA's penalty and parole-eligibility provisions apply to a defendant whose sentence had been vacated before the FSMA was enacted. We held that the penalty provisions of the FSMA are not retroactive; therefore, the revised punishment for juveniles convicted of capital murder applies only to crimes committed on or after March 20, 2017, the effective date of the FSMA. Id. at 14, 547 S.W.3d at 71. Further, we held that the parole-eligibility provision did not apply at the time of Harris's May 8, 2017 resentencing hearing because "by its plain language, the provision applies only to those juvenile offenders who are serving a sentence for either capital or first-degree murder." Id. at 11, 547 S.W.3d at 70. We noted that Harris's sentence had been vacated in 2016, and thereafter, he was no longer serving a sentence to which parole eligibility could attach. Id. at 11, 547 S.W.3d at 70. Therefore, we held that the parole-eligibility provision of the FSMA did not apply to Harris at the time of his hearing. Id. at 11, 547 S.W.3d at 70. The facts in this case are analogous to those in Harris . Ray, like Harris, committed his crime before the effective date of the FSMA; therefore, the penalty provisions do not apply. Ray's sentence, like Harris's sentence, was vacated by the circuit court in 2016. Thereafter, Ray, like Harris, was no longer serving a sentence to which parole eligibility could attach. Accordingly, the parole-eligibility provision of the FSMA did not apply to Ray at the time of his hearing on the State's motion for resentencing. Based on our decision in Harris , we hold that the circuit court erred in applying the FSMA to Ray's case. Ray is entitled to a hearing to present Miller evidence for consideration and sentencing within the discretionary range for a Class Y felony, which is ten to forty years or life. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-401(a) (Repl. 2013); Harris , 2018 Ark. 179, 547 S.W.3d 64 ; Jackson , 2013 Ark. 175, 426 S.W.3d 906 ; see also Segerstrom v. State , 2019 Ark. 36, 566 S.W.3d 466, and Robinson v. State , 2018 Ark. 353, 563 S.W.3d 530 (holding that the circuit court erred in applying the FSMA to the juvenile offender's case and ordering resentencing pursuant to Harris ). Reversed and remanded. Wood and Wynne, JJ., concur. Womack, J., dissents. See Act of Mar. 20, 2017, No. 539, 2017 Ark. Acts 2615. Ray was born on November 13, 1980, and the crimes were committed on June 24, 1997. The law in effect at that time authorized a punishment of either death or life imprisonment without parole for offenders who were sixteen years of age or older when they committed capital murder. See Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5-10-101(c) (Supp. 1995), 5-4-615 (Repl. 1993), and 5-4-104(b) (Supp. 1995); Stanford v. Kentucky , 492 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 2969, 106 L.Ed.2d 306 (1989) (permitting imposition of death penalty on offenders aged at least sixteen years old at the time of the commission of the crime); Ward v. State , 293 Ark. 88, 99, 733 S.W.2d 728, 733 (1987) (stating that the imposition of the death penalty on a juvenile is not a per se violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution). In this case, the State sought the death penalty against Ray, but the jury instead imposed a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. In 2005, the Supreme Court of the United States held that "the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed." Roper v. Simmons , 543 U.S. 551, 578, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005). Ray's conviction and sentence for theft of property are not at issue in this case. In Montgomery v. Louisiana , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), the Supreme Court of the United States indicated that states could remedy Miller violations by extending parole eligibility to juveniles serving unconstitutional sentences. Id. at ----, 136 S.Ct. at 736. In 2017, the legislature passed the FSMA. See FSMA, No. 539, § 3, 2017 Ark. Acts at 2617 (codified at Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-104(b) (Supp. 2017) ); § 6, 2017 Ark. Acts at 2618-19 (codified at Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-101(c)(1)(B) (Supp. 2017) ). We again decline the State's invitation to overrule Harris . See Robinson , 2018 Ark. 353, at 4 n.5, 563 S.W.3d at 531 n.5 (denying the State's request to overrule Harris ).

RITA W. GRUBER, Chief Judge The Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) appeals from the circuit court's reversal of an administrative decision placing Santino Salcido's name on the Child Maltreatment Central Registry. The DHS Office of Appeals and Hearings (OAH) dismissed Salcido's appeal due to his failure to timely provide it with a copy of the final disposition of his criminal proceeding. On Salcido's petition for review of the administrative order dismissing his appeal, the circuit court remanded for a hearing on the merits. We reverse the decision of the circuit court and affirm OAH's order dismissing the case. On April 2, 2014, a referral alleging the child maltreatment of AP listed Salcido as the alleged offender. The investigative agency determined the allegation to be true based on the preponderance of the evidence. On July 1, 2014, notice of the finding was mailed to Salcido, who timely submitted a written request for an administrative hearing. OAH set the hearing for September 4, 2014. Salcido subsequently obtained counsel. Pursuant to his counsel's request, OAH granted Salcido a continuance and reset the hearing for October 12, 2014, to allow counsel to familiarize himself with the case. Before the September hearing occurred, the parties learned that criminal charges regarding the matter had been filed on June 12, 2014, and the OAH administrative law judge (ALJ) sent a letter to Salcido's counsel staying the administrative hearing pending resolution of the criminal charges. The ALJ's letter dated October 13, 2014, stated the following: Based on information provided to the Office of Appeals and Hearings by CACD that a criminal charge has been filed regarding the occurrence that is the subject of the administrative hearing, the hearing is stayed. The 180 day time limit shall not apply during this stay. Pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 12-18-801 , the hearing is stayed pending final disposition of the charges. It shall be your duty as the petitioner to report the final disposition of the proceeding to this office, including a file-marked copy of the disposition. The administrative case will be dismissed and your name will be placed on the Child Maltreatment Central Registry, if you as the petitioner fail to provide a file-marked copy of the final disposition of the criminal proceedings within thirty (30) days of the entry of a dispositive judgment or order. At the expiration of one (1) year from the date the criminal charge was filed, the stay will be lifted and the case will be set for an administrative hearing if no final disposition has been provided to the OAH. A stay may only be extended after one (1) year upon a written notice from the party requesting the extension that the criminal proceeding is still ongoing. Please pay careful attention to the reporting requirements imposed on the Petitioner in this letter. (Emphasis in original.) On February 24, 2016, over a year and a half after the criminal charges had been filed, OAH sent a notice that a hearing had been scheduled for May 5, 2015. A corrected notice was emailed on March 8, 2016, with the correct hearing date of May 5, 2016. On March 8, Salcido's counsel emailed OAH stating that the criminal matter was still pending and it was his understanding the administrative hearing could not proceed until the criminal process was complete. After checking Court Connect records for Salcido, OAH discovered that Salcido's case had been "nolle prossed," at which point OAH emailed a request to Salcido's counsel for the new criminal-hearing date. On April 21, 2016, Salcido's counsel emailed OAH indicating that he had "just talked to the Circuit Clerk in Logan County" regarding the criminal case and discovered that it had been dismissed on August 7, 2015. He explained that he had not been provided a copy of the order of dismissal until that day. On May 3, 2016, the ALJ sent an email to Salcido's counsel and DHS counsel notifying them that the appeal was dismissed because a file-marked copy of the order in the criminal case had not been provided to OAH within thirty days of its filing, that the hearing was canceled, and that he would promptly issue an order to that effect. An order was issued the same day dismissing Salcido's appeal due to his failure to provide a file-marked copy of the disposition of his criminal case within thirty days of its entry as required by Ark. Code Ann. § 12-18-801(b)(3)(D)(ii) (Repl. 2016). On June 3, 2016, Salcido filed a petition for review of the ALJ's decision with the circuit court. He argued that he had been denied due process because he was never afforded a hearing and a chance to confront the witnesses against him. He argued that he received no notice of the dismissal order entered in the criminal case and learned of it only after calling in April 2016 to inquire as to the status of his case. The circuit court heard arguments and entered an order on April 18, 2018, effectively nullifying the ALJ's decision and remanding for a hearing on the merits. See Ark. Dep't of Fin. & Admin. v. Naturalis Health, LLC , 2018 Ark. 224, 549 S.W.3d 901. DHS appealed the circuit court's decision to this court. Our review of administrative agency decisions is directed not to the decision of the circuit court but to the decision of the agency because administrative agencies are better equipped by specialization, insight through experience, and more flexible procedures than courts to determine and analyze legal issues affecting their agencies. Staton v. Ark. State Bd. of Collection Agencies , 372 Ark. 387, 390, 277 S.W.3d 190, 192 (2008). When reviewing such decisions, we uphold them if they are supported by substantial evidence and are not arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by an abuse of discretion. Id. at 390, 277 S.W.3d at 193. We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo, City of Ft. Smith v. Carter , 372 Ark. 93, 95, 270 S.W.3d 822, 824 (2008) ; however, the interpretation placed on a statute or regulation by an agency or department charged with its administration is entitled to great deference and should not be overturned unless clearly wrong. Seiz Co. v. Ark. State Highway & Transp. Dep't , 2009 Ark. 361, at 2, 324 S.W.3d 336, 338. The Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides that a reviewing court may reverse or modify the agency's decision if it concludes that the substantial rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are (1) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions, (2) in excess of the agency's statutory authority, (3) made upon unlawful procedure, (4) affected by other error or law, (5) not supported by substantial evidence of record, or (6) arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by abuse of discretion. Ark. Code Ann. § 25-15-212(h) (Supp. 2017). On appeal, DHS contends that the governing statute required the ALJ to dismiss the appeal for Salcido's failure to timely provide the final disposition in his criminal case; the statute does not provide a "good cause" exception to this requirement; and Salcido did not preserve his due process arguments for appellate review because he failed to raise them at the administrative level. We turn first to the relevant statute, which provides in pertinent part as follows: (a)(1) (A) The administrative hearing under this chapter shall begin within one hundred eighty (180) days from the date of the receipt of the request for a hearing. (B) However, delays in completing the administrative hearing that are attributable to either party shall not count against the limit of one hundred eighty (180) days if the administrative law judge determines that good cause for the delay is shown by the party requesting the delay and the request for delay is made in writing and delivered to the Office of Appeals and Hearings of the Department of Human Services and all other parties. .... (b)(1) The limit of one hundred eighty (180) days for an administrative hearing under this chapter shall not apply if upon request of any party a stay is granted as permitted under this section. (2) The administrative law judge may stay the case upon a showing by any party that there is an ongoing criminal or delinquency investigation regarding the occurrence that is the subject of the child maltreatment report. (3)(A) If a criminal or delinquency proceeding is filed regarding the occurrence that is the subject of the child maltreatment report and a request for a stay is accompanied by the written notification of the date the criminal or delinquency proceeding was filed by a party, the administrative hearing shall be stayed for a period of not more than one (1) year from the date the criminal or delinquency proceeding is filed. (B) The stay shall be lifted and the case set for a hearing upon the earlier of: (i) A petition and showing by any party that there is good cause to conduct the administrative hearing before the conclusion of the criminal or delinquency proceeding; (ii) The final disposition of the criminal or delinquency proceeding; or (iii) The expiration of one (1) year from the date the criminal or delinquency proceeding was filed. (C) A stay granted under this section may be extended after the one-year expiration upon a written notice from the requesting party that the criminal or delinquency investigation or proceeding is still ongoing. (D)(i) It is the duty of the petitioner to report the final disposition of the criminal or delinquency proceeding to the office for a stay granted under this subdivision (b)(3). (ii) The case shall be dismissed and the petitioner's name placed on the Child Maltreatment Central Registry if the petitioner fails to provide a file-marked copy of the final disposition of the criminal or delinquency proceeding within thirty (30) days of the entry of the final disposition. (4) The administrative law judge shall stay the case upon a request by the Department of Human Services or the Department of Arkansas State Police when there is an ongoing criminal or delinquency investigation or pending criminal charges regarding the occurrence that is the subject of the child maltreatment report. Ark. Code Ann. § 12-18-801 (Repl. 2016). The Arkansas Supreme Court has held that a party appearing before an administrative agency is entitled to due process in the proceeding. Smith v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. , 2018 Ark. App. 438, at 8, 559 S.W.3d 291 (citing C.C.B. v. Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. , 368 Ark. 540, 247 S.W.3d 870 (2007) ). The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Ark. Dep't of Corr. v. Bailey , 368 Ark. 518, 525, 247 S.W.3d 851, 856 (2007) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) ). There is no dispute in this case regarding whether Salcido received notice of the true report of maltreatment; he did. There is no dispute that he timely requested an administrative hearing; he did. Finally, there is no dispute that OAH stayed Salcido's hearing because of his pending criminal case concerning the events that were the subject of the child-maltreatment report; it did. The dispute concerns the effect of Salcido's failure to follow the clear statutory requirement that he "provide a file-marked copy of the final disposition of the criminal or delinquency proceeding within thirty (30) days of the entry of the final disposition." This failure prompted the ALJ to dismiss the case pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 12-18-801(b)(3)(D)(ii). Salcido alleged that enforcement of the statute against him violated his right to due process because the circuit court did not inform him of the disposition of his criminal case when it entered the order, and he did not discover that his case had been dismissed until almost nine months later when his counsel called to check the status of his case. Salcido was granted two continuances of his administrative appeal. When the ALJ granted the second continuance, staying the hearing due to the pending criminal charges, he sent Salcido's counsel a letter specifically setting forth Salcido's duties: Pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 12-18-801 , the hearing is stayed pending final disposition of the charges. It shall be your duty as the petitioner to report the final disposition of the proceeding to this office, including a file-marked copy of the disposition. The administrative case will be dismissed and your name will be placed on the Child Maltreatment Central Registry, if you as the petitioner fail to provide a file-marked copy of the final disposition of the criminal proceedings within thirty (30) days of the entry of a dispositive judgment or order. Indeed, in the final paragraph of the letter, the ALJ again reminded counsel to "Please pay careful attention to the reporting requirements imposed on the Petitioner in this letter." The ALJ very clearly explained that timely reporting the disposition of Salcido's criminal case was critically important. Moreover, according to Ark. Code Ann. § 12-18-801(b)(3)(B), the stay in this case was to be lifted on June 12, 2015, a year after Salcido's criminal case was filed unless extended upon written notice from Salcido that the criminal proceeding was still ongoing. There is no record that Salcido ever provided such a notice. In any case, he failed to inform OAH of the August 7, 2015, dismissal of his case until OAH notified him that it had scheduled a hearing for May 5, 2016. Arkansas law imposes a duty on lawyers and litigants to exercise reasonable diligence to keep up with the status of their cases. Barber v. State , 2015 Ark. 267, at 2, 2015 WL 3542161. The statutory mandate requiring Salcido to provide a file-marked copy of the disposition within thirty days of entry is clear. There is no "good faith" exception for failure to comply. The ALJ specifically informed him of this requirement and the stiff penalty for failure to adhere to it in a letter to Salcido's counsel. Salcido was provided the opportunity to be heard, and his substantial rights have not been prejudiced. Therefore, we affirm OAH's decision and reverse the order of the circuit court. Reversed. Gladwin and Brown, JJ., agree.

ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge In this termination-of-parental-rights case, both parents, in separate briefs, appeal the Madison County Circuit Court's order of April 16, 2018, terminating their parental rights to two children, EP (born June 3, 2001) and CP (born February 3, 2008). Both Malisa Phillips and Wayne Phillips argue that appellee Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) failed to prove that it made meaningful efforts to remedy their lack of housing. Malisa also contends that the circuit court erred in terminating her parental rights because there was insufficient evidence to support the grounds for termination or that termination was in the children's best interest. We affirm. I. Standard of Review We review termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo. Mitchell v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. , 2013 Ark. App. 715, 430 S.W.3d 851. At least one statutory ground must exist, in addition to a finding that it is in the child's best interest to terminate parental rights; these must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341 (Supp. 2017); M.T. v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. , 58 Ark. App. 302, 952 S.W.2d 177 (1997). Clear and convincing evidence is that degree of proof that will produce in the fact-finder a firm conviction as to the allegation sought to be established. Anderson v. Douglas , 310 Ark. 633, 839 S.W.2d 196 (1992). The appellate inquiry is whether the circuit court's finding that the disputed fact was proved by clear and convincing evidence is clearly erroneous. J.T. v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. , 329 Ark. 243, 947 S.W.2d 761 (1997). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Yarborough v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. , 96 Ark. App. 247, 240 S.W.3d 626 (2006). When determining the clearly erroneous question, the appellate court gives due deference to the opportunity of the circuit court to judge the credibility of witnesses. Dodd v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. , 2016 Ark. App. 64, 481 S.W.3d 789. In making a best-interest determination, the circuit court is required to consider two factors: (1) the likelihood that the child will be adopted and (2) the potential of harm to the child if custody is returned to a parent. Swangel v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. , 2018 Ark. App. 197, at 3, 547 S.W.3d 111, 113. II. Facts DHS filed a petition for emergency custody and dependency-neglect (DN) alleging in the attached affidavit that AP, appellants' daughter born March 22, 1999, had been the victim of sexual abuse. Officers feared for the safety of her siblings, EP and CP, and they were taken into protective custody. The circuit court signed an ex parte order finding probable cause to believe the children were dependent-neglected (DN) and could not remain with their parents. The probable-cause order reflects that it was still in the children's best interest to remain in DHS custody because of AP's allegations of sexual abuse in the home. The circuit court also found that appellants did not have stable housing and that the children had many unexcused absences in school. The parents were granted supervised visitation and ordered to (1) cooperate with DHS; (2) attend the case-plan staffing; (3) keep DHS informed of their address and phone number; (4) refrain from using illegal drugs or alcohol; (5) obtain and maintain stable housing, employment, and a clean, safe home; (6) demonstrate the ability to protect the children; (7) maintain contact with their attorney; and (8) follow the case plan and court orders. By order of January 27, 2017, the court found that the goal of the case should be reunification with both parents. The court ordered that the parents should submit to weekly random drug screens. In the March 7, 2017 order, the children were found to be DN due to neglect and parental unfitness. The court based its finding in part on its determination that appellants had "inappropriate and unstable housing." The parents were ordered to participate in individual counseling. The court found that DHS had not made reasonable efforts because it had not held a case-plan staffing or developed a case plan. After a review hearing on July 28, 2017, the children were ordered to remain in DHS custody because of a pending "CACD" investigation "which gives concern as to safely returning the children home to parents." The goal remained reunification, and it was ordered that the children be placed in a foster home together. Both parents were found to have complied with the court orders in that they had "maintained a home, attended counseling, completed parenting classes and cooperated with" DHS. DHS was found to have complied with all the court orders and the case plan. Further, the court found that DHS had made reasonable efforts to provide family services and to finalize the permanent plan of the juveniles by providing services to achieve reunification. In its permanency-planning order, the court found that the parents were not complying with the case plan and orders, had not made significant measurable progress, and had not worked diligently toward reunification. The court authorized a plan for adoption with a concurrent goal of APPLA (Another Planned Permanent Living Arrangement). The court found that the parents had participated in counseling, completed parenting classes, and maintained visitation with CP. However, neither had maintained weekly contact with DHS, maintained stable housing, maintained a clean and safe home, kept DHS informed of their address and telephone number, or maintained stable employment. The court found that the residence the parents had been in for three months was "filled with roaches, filth, nastiness, holes in walls, ceilings, and there is a very large gap all around the front exterior door." The court found that "at no time during this one-year case have parents had safe, clean, stable housing for the children." The court found that DHS had made reasonable efforts to provide services for reunification. DHS filed a petition for termination of parental rights alleging three grounds: (1) the children had been out of the custody of the parents for twelve months, and despite meaningful efforts by DHS to rehabilitate the parents and correct the conditions which caused removal, those conditions had not been remedied, citing Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i)(a) (Repl. 2015); (2) subsequent to the filing of the original petition for DN, other factors or issues arose which demonstrated that placement of the children in the parents' custody would be contrary to their health, safety, or welfare and that despite the offer of appropriate family services, the parents had manifested the incapacity or indifference to remedy the subsequent issues, citing Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(vii)(a) ; and (3) the parents had subjected the children to aggravated circumstances, citing Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a) . For each ground pled, DHS alleged that the children were taken from the home due to the sexual-abuse allegations and unstable housing and that the parents had been unable to provide clean, safe, and stable housing throughout the case. DHS also alleged that the children were highly adoptable and that they would be subjected to potential harm if returned to the parents, who continued to have unstable, inappropriate housing. At the March 2, 2018 termination hearing, Whitney Widner, DHS family service worker, testified that the sexual-abuse allegations and unsanitary home conditions were the reasons the case had been opened. She said that the parents were not the alleged offenders of the sexual abuse. She said that the children were doing well in foster care and that she believed they were adoptable. She said that CP wanted to return to his parents' custody and that EP was almost seventeen years old. She said the children were not in a potential adoptive home, but the foster family was willing to keep them as long as they needed to stay. The children had been placed together and were bonded. Widner said that Malisa had participated in individual counseling, completed parenting classes, regularly visited with CP, visited with EP when EP desired to visit, and maintained contact with DHS. She also said that Malisa did not obtain and maintain stable housing, and she believed the parents had slept in their car at one point. She was aware that the parents had obtained a new home in Fort Smith but had moved in only the day before the hearing. She opined that the children could not return to the custody of their parents because she did not believe the parents had shown stability in their housing. She said that DHS recommended that the parents' parental rights be terminated. Malisa called Wayne to testify in her defense, and he confirmed that they had moved into a new home in Fort Smith the day before the hearing. He explained that there had been a delay in moving into the home because they had to wait for the landlord to install a stove and a refrigerator. He said that the home has electricity, water, and heat and that they have beds and food for the children. Wayne also said that he and his wife receive Social Security income and have sufficient funds to pay for their rent, utilities, and food. Wayne said that he is not working because he recently had suffered two heart attacks, and he was looking for new employment. Wayne told the court that he and Malisa have a close bond with CP and that their visits had gone well. CP had expressed to Wayne that he wants to return home. Wayne said that EP had attended three visits during the case and that, while he wants EP to return home, considering her age, he was not going to force her. Wayne was concerned that if EP turned eighteen and left foster care, CP would be traumatized by being left alone. Wayne also explained that he and Malisa never missed any drug-screen requests, that he went whenever he was called, but that he simply did not receive many calls requesting random drug screens. Wayne also testified that while he did not talk with Ms. Widner daily, he talked with her regularly and kept her informed of everything. Wayne explained their housing difficulties. He said that when the case began, the family was living with relatives. After that, the family lived in two separate homes in Lincoln, Arkansas. He acknowledged that one home had a sewer issue. He said that they attempted to work with the landlord. When the landlord refused to fix the home's issues, they had no choice but to move. He said they had another home that had structural issues, and because of this, the home was not appropriate. They looked "all over" to find a new home. He said that he was told his housing was inappropriate every time he obtained different housing, and they would move out and look for new housing. Wayne said that he learned that housing was cheaper in Fort Smith, and they were able to secure a home without any structural issues. He said that the rent for the new home was almost half as much as it had been in Lincoln, Arkansas. Wayne testified that the home was appropriate, and he offered pictures. Danica Stout, the CASA advocate, testified that she had prepared the report and recommended that the children be adopted and that parental rights be terminated. Ms. Widner testified again, stating that DHS learned that the parents had been living in their car as of mid-January 2018. She said that she had met them at a gas station and they told her they had been staying in their van for a few nights. She said the van had a very strong odor and that the parents had been trying to maintain their hygiene when they could at a church or at friends' houses. The circuit court terminated parental rights by order filed April 16, 2018. The court found that DHS had proved two grounds by clear and convincing evidence-failure-to-remedy and subsequent-factors. The order states as follows: The Court finds today that these children were adjudicated [DN] due to parents' unsafe and unstable housing, and parents have just moved again yesterday. The Court finds that parents just got a new house yesterday, but that is not enough-Mother and Father need to show that they can maintain a home for these children. Throughout the life of this case, Mother and Father have consistently failed to maintain safe, stable housing, and they haven't demonstrated an ability to protect these children and keep them safe from harm. The Court finds that there is clear and convincing evidence that despite meaningful efforts by [DHS], parents have not remedied the conditions which caused removal. They have moved multiple times throughout the life of this case, including yesterday, and none of their homes have been safe or appropriate for the children. These parents have not demonstrated the most important part of the case plan: that they can provide a safe, stable home for these children. .... [DHS] has provided the following services to the family: counseling, parenting class referrals, transportation services, medical services, dental services, clothing, case management, home visits, head lice treatment, drug screens, and family counseling. Despite these services, Mother and Father have not been able to obtain and maintain safe, stable, clean housing that would be appropriate for themselves and their children. Thus, despite the offer of appropriate family services, Mother and Father have manifested the incapacity or indifference to remedy the subsequent issues of unstable, unsafe housing which prevents the placement of the juveniles in the custody of the parents. The Court finds today that parents have not remedied the subsequent issues that prevent the placement of the children in their custody. Specifically, parents have moved multiple times throughout the life of this case, including again yesterday, and none of the homes have been safe or appropriate for the children. Throughout the life of this year-long case, parents have failed to demonstrate the most important part of their case plan: the ability to provide a safe, stable home for these children. The circuit court also found that it was in the children's best interest to terminate parental rights, considering the likelihood that they would be adopted and the potential harm of returning the children to their parents. The circuit court cited testimony of Ms. Widner that the children are extremely adoptable and found that the potential harm in returning them to their parents was "great" because the parents had not shown any stability throughout the life of the case. Both parents filed a timely notice of appeal, and this appeal followed. III. Wayne's Statutory-Grounds Argument Both parents argue that there was insufficient evidence to support the circuit court's order terminating their parental rights because there was no evidence that DHS made meaningful efforts to remedy their lack of housing. Wayne argues that DHS failed to prove meaningful efforts in regard to their housing only in relation to the failure-to-remedy ground. Because Wayne does not challenge the circuit court's subsequent-factors finding, he failed to challenge one of the statutory grounds on which the circuit court relied to terminate his parental rights. Accordingly, we must affirm the termination of Wayne's parental rights based on the circuit court's finding of subsequent factors. When an appellant fails to attack the circuit court's independent, alternative basis for its ruling, we will not reverse. Casarreal v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. , 2010 Ark. App. 622, 2010 WL 3700209. IV. Malisa's Statutory-Grounds Arguments Malisa argues that there was a lack of evidence regarding DHS's efforts to remedy the housing issue in relation to both the failure-to-remedy ground and the subsequent-factors ground. She argues that the record does not demonstrate that DHS made meaningful efforts to rehabilitate her and correct the conditions that caused removal based on "the housing issue." Malisa acknowledges that the circuit court found that DHS had made reasonable efforts to reunify the family and argues that none of those efforts addressed the housing situation. She claims that at the termination hearing, nothing was offered to address housing and no testimony was offered as to what services addressed housing. Thus, Malisa claims that DHS failed to meet its burden of showing that it had made meaningful efforts to remedy the causes for removal. Malisa's arguments are not preserved. We will not address an argument that DHS failed to make meaningful efforts to reunify the family when the appellant did not appeal from an earlier permanency-planning order finding reasonable efforts. Anderson v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. , 2011 Ark. App. 526, 385 S.W.3d 373. Further, Malisa did not object at the termination hearing to DHS's failure to provide services, which is a waiver of that issue on appeal. Contreras v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. , 2015 Ark. App. 604, 474 S.W.3d 510. Even though Malisa also contends that the circuit court erred in regard to the subsequent-factors ground, we do not address her arguments because only one ground is necessary to terminate parental rights. Whitaker v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. , 2018 Ark. App. 61, 540 S.W.3d 719. Because Malisa's argument regarding the failure-to-remedy ground is not preserved, we hold that the circuit court can be affirmed based solely on its findings regarding the parents' failure to remedy the conditions that caused removal. V. Malisa's Best-Interest Argument Finally, Malisa claims that the circuit court erred in finding that it was in the children's best interest to terminate her parental rights because insufficient evidence supports the decision. She contends that the circuit court failed to consider that EP would soon be eighteen years old; thus, it would be unnecessary to terminate parental rights as to EP because she could achieve her concurrent goal of APPLA, which would allow EP to leave the foster-care system as an adult. And CP would be left alone in a system without either his parents or his sister. Further, CP wanted to return to his parents. Malisa argues that the circuit court's failure to consider these facts warrants reversal. Malisa also contends that the circuit court's potential-harm analysis was flawed in that DHS failed to offer services to assist the parents in finding appropriate housing. She contends that without DHS assistance, they did find appropriate housing. She argues that the potential harm in traumatizing CP by terminating parental rights, rather than maintaining the status quo of the case for a limited period of time for the parents to demonstrate they could maintain the new home while the children remained in their same foster home, cannot be in the children's best interest. The best-interest finding must be based on a consideration of two factors: (1) the likelihood that if parental rights are terminated, the juvenile will be adopted, and (2) the potential harm caused by continuing contact with the parent. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(A). Malisa does not challenge the circuit court's adoptability finding. We hold that the circuit court's findings regarding the children's best interest are not clearly erroneous. The court was not required to find that actual harm would result or to affirmatively identify a potential harm. McFarland v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. , 91 Ark. App. 323, 210 S.W.3d 143 (2005). Potential harm is viewed broadly and in a forward-looking manner, and there is no requirement that an actual harm be identified or proved. Bearden v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. , 344 Ark. 317, 42 S.W.3d 397 (2001). Admitted failure to comply with court orders can suffice as indicating a potential harm. B.H.1 v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. , 2012 Ark. App. 532, 2012 WL 4478389. The intent of the termination-of-parental-rights statute is "to provide permanency in a juvenile's life in all instances in which the return of a juvenile to the family home is contrary to the juvenile's health, safety, or welfare and it appears from the evidence that a return to the family home cannot be accomplished in a reasonable period of time as viewed from the juvenile's perspective." Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(a)(3). In determining potential harm, which is forward-looking, the court may consider past behavior as a predictor of likely potential harm should the child be returned to the parents' care and custody. Dowdy v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. , 2009 Ark. App. 180, 314 S.W.3d 722. There is no requirement to establish every factor by clear and convincing evidence; after consideration of all factors, the evidence must be clear and convincing that termination is in the best interest of the child. Jessup v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. , 2011 Ark. App. 463, 385 S.W.3d 304. Malisa failed to comply with the circuit court's orders. Further, the family's extensive history with DHS indicates past behavior that predicts likely potential harm. Accordingly, the circuit court's determination that it was in the children's best interest to terminate parental rights is not clearly erroneous. Affirmed. Gruber, C.J., and Brown, J., agree. AP was not included in the termination-of-parental-rights order because she was not a minor when the order was filed. The affidavit also included DHS's history with the family beginning in March 2011 with a true finding for environmental neglect; May 2011 true findings of EP and another sibling having been victims of sexual contact and indecent exposure by a man who was not their parent; February 2012 true finding that AP and EP were victims of sexual contact and sexual penetration by two men who were not their fathers; true finding of sexual contact and sexual penetration in January 2016 listing AP as the alleged victim and the offender as a man who is not her father; current investigation open for inadequate supervision listing CP as the alleged victim and an unknown offender; open investigation for AP, EP, and CP as the alleged victims and appellants as the offenders; and several unsubstantiated reports of environmental and/or educational neglect beginning in 2008.

COURTNEY HUDSON GOODSON, Associate Justice Appellant Jonathan Antonio Woods appeals an order of the Drew County Circuit Court denying his petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 37 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure. For reversal, Woods argues that (1) the circuit court erred when it denied without a hearing his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel compared his case to the O.J. Simpson case, and (2) appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on direct appeal. We affirm. I. Background In January 2016, Woods stood trial before a Drew County Circuit Court jury. The State introduced evidence demonstrating that on March 14, 2014, the Monticello Police Department was called to the Save-A-Lot store in Monticello for reports of a man assaulting a woman in the parking lot. The woman proved to be Samantha Poole, and the man was Woods. The incident began inside the store when Woods grabbed Poole by the hair and dragged her outside. Witnesses reported that the man eventually forced Poole at gunpoint into the driver's seat of a Cadillac. One eyewitness reported hearing gunshots and seeing Poole exit the vehicle once before Woods "brought her back." The two then drove away. James Slaughter served as a Drew County sheriff's deputy on the date of the crime. Slaughter testified that he was on the way to the Save-A-Lot when he saw the Cadillac pulling out of the parking lot. Slaughter blocked the Cadillac with his cruiser. Once the Cadillac was stopped, Woods shot Poole multiple times, killing her. Slaughter shot Woods during the confrontation, but Woods survived. Woods was charged with kidnapping and capital murder under Arkansas Code Annotated § 5-11-102 (Repl. 2012) and Arkansas Code Annotated § 5-10-101 (Supp. 2017). Section 5-11-102 provides that: (a) A person commits the offense of kidnapping if, without consent, the person restrains another person so as to interfere substantially with the other person's liberty with the purpose of: (4) Inflicting physical injury upon the other person; .... (6) Terrorizing the other person or another person Section 5-10-101 provides that a person commits capital murder if the person commits certain felonies, including kidnapping, and "[i]n the course of and in furtherance of the felony or in immediate flight from the felony, the person or an accomplice causes the death of a person under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life[.]" Woods was convicted of both kidnapping and capital murder and was sentenced respectively to forty years imprisonment and life imprisonment without parole. Woods filed a timely Rule 37 petition alleging multiple points at which trial and appellate counsel allegedly rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance, including trial counsel's references to the Simpson case and appellate counsel's failure to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence that are the bases of this appeal. The State argued in response that Woods (1) did not show that he was prejudiced by any discussion of the Simpson case, (2) did not explain how counsel's response to a juror's comment about the case was ineffective, and (3) did not demonstrate that any argument by appellate counsel as to the sufficiency of the evidence would have been successful. The circuit court issued written findings and denied the petition without a hearing, and Woods filed a timely appeal. II. Standard of Review This court reviews the trial court's decision on a Rule 37.1 petition for clear error. Gordon v. State , 2018 Ark. 73, 539 S.W.3d 586. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate court, after reviewing the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Lacy v. State , 2018 Ark. 174, 545 S.W.3d 746. III. Analysis The effectiveness of counsel is measured according to the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In Strickland , the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel. The Strickland court articulated a two-part test to determine whether counsel's assistance was effective: first, the defendant must prove that the counsel's performance was deficient, and second, the defendant must prove that the deficient performance was prejudicial to the extent that the defendant was deprived of the right to a fair trial. There is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. E.g. Mancia v. State , 2015 Ark. 115, 459 S.W.3d 259. Additionally, Rule 37.3 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that an evidentiary hearing should be held in a postconviction proceeding unless the files and record of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief. Wooten v. State , 338 Ark. 691, 1 S.W.3d 8 (1999) (citing Bohanan v. State , 327 Ark. 507, 939 S.W.2d 832 (1997) (per curiam) ). If the files and the record show that the petitioner is not entitled to relief, the circuit court is required to make written findings to that effect. Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.3(a). A. Effectiveness of Trial Counsel Woods first argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because he referred to the Simpson case. Counsel first mentioned Simpson's case in general voir dire. Although the circuit court erroneously stated that a juror first mentioned the case, the circuit court concluded that counsel's references to the Simpson case fell within the range of reasonable professional assistance. The trial record reveals that Woods's trial counsel asked the entire venire panel for a show of hands as to who thought Simpson was guilty. When he received little response, trial counsel explained the reason for the question: Here's the reason I asked the question. All of you have said that you believe that a defendant is innocent until they are proven guilty. But you say it - But you see, sometimes you don't believe it. Because what do we know about O.J. Simpson? Twelve men and women have found him not guilty. Okay. You may think that's a lawyer trick, but it's not. It illustrates my point. And so, I guess my point is, is that can all of you commit - I understand how you get to where you are. But can you commit to us that you will, indeed, follow that principle that, indeed, a defendant is innocent until the government proves him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt? Can I see the hands of all those who will commit to that? Matters of trial strategy and tactics, even if arguably improvident, are not grounds for a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. Hayes v. State , 2014 Ark. 104, 431 S.W.3d 882. It is clear that trial counsel's references to the Simpson case were part of a strategy to identify potential jurors who might view his client unfavorably. The files and the record show that Woods is not entitled to relief, and the circuit court's findings sufficiently reflect that fact. The circuit court did not clearly err in determining that the references to the Simpson case fell within the range of reasonable professional assistance or in denying without a hearing Woods's petition as to this point. B. Effectiveness of Appellate Counsel Woods next argues that appellate counsel was ineffective because he did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on direct appeal. Woods notes that the only issue that appellate counsel raised was that the prosecution excused jurors in a racially discriminatory manner in violation of Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). Alternatively, Woods argues that his case should be remanded for the circuit court to enter more specific findings on this point. A petitioner who claims that appellate counsel was ineffective bears the burden of making a clear showing that counsel failed to raise some meritorious issue on appeal. State v. Rainer , 2014 Ark. 306, 440 S.W.3d 315. Woods must demonstrate that the issue was raised at trial, that the circuit court erred in its ruling, and that an argument concerning the issue could have been raised on appeal to merit appellate relief. Id. On appeal, we treat a motion for directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Starling v. State , 2016 Ark. 20, 480 S.W.3d 158. In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we determine whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial. Reynolds v. State , 2016 Ark. 214, 492 S.W.3d 491. Substantial evidence is evidence that is of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the other, without resorting to speculation or conjecture. Id. In reviewing a sufficiency challenge, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, considering only evidence that supports the verdict. Mercouri v. State , 2016 Ark. 37, 480 S.W.3d 864. At trial, Woods's attorney moved for a directed verdict on the kidnapping charge. Trial counsel argued that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that Poole was restrained against her will because she could have driven away when she was in the vehicle by herself while Woods was walking around to the passenger door. Woods's trial counsel also argued that there was no evidence that he had any intention of inflicting injury upon Poole or terrorizing her when he forced her into the vehicle. Trial counsel argued that because the evidence was insufficient to support the kidnapping charge, by definition there could be no capital murder. The underlying felony is an essential element of a capital-felony murder charge. Flowers v. State , 342 Ark. 45, 25 S.W.3d 422 (2000). To prove capital-felony murder, the State must first prove the felony. Id. In response to Woods's motion, the State argued that evidence from events inside the store demonstrated that a kidnapping had already occurred. The State also pointed to testimony that Poole was screaming that Woods would kill her, and that Woods had forced her into the vehicle at gunpoint. The State contended that a jury could have reasonably believed that the facts demonstrated that Woods was either in the act of kidnapping Poole, or in flight therefrom. The circuit court agreed and denied the motion. In his petition below, Woods argued that his appellate counsel failed to "comb the record and present the insufficiency of the evidence claim to the Appellate Court." Woods cited no facts to support his contention that a meritorious argument was not raised on appeal. With respect to his appellate counsel's alleged deficiencies, Woods wrote: Denial of the effective assistance of Counsel upon direct appeal because appellate counsel failed to raise the properly Preserved issue of the insufficiency of the evidence relied upon by the Jury to convict the Petitioner. And but for appellate counsel's failures to raise this meritorious issue of the insufficiency of the evidence as to the Kidnapping charge, his failures Precluded Appellate review of the matter, and amounts to Denial of Counsel as a right upon direct appeal. Penson v. Ohio , Martinez vs. Ryan , 566 U.S. 1, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012) ; and Dansby v. Norris , (8th Cir. 2012) For the Proposition that Petitioner was entitled to the effective assistance of counsel as of right to raise his insufficiency of the evidence claim upon the Kidnapping charge. Woods's petition did not identify any specific facts in the record that could have been used to buttress his insufficiency argument. Allegations that are unsupported by facts do not provide a basis for either an evidentiary hearing or postconviction relief. Greene v. State , 356 Ark. 59, 146 S.W.3d 871 (2004). It is Woods's obligation to show in his petition that counsel failed to raise some meritorious issue on appeal. Walton v. State , 2013 Ark. 254 (per curiam). Counsel's failure to raise a specific issue had to amount to error of such magnitude that it rendered appellate counsel's performance deficient under the Strickland criteria. Id. Woods's petition failed to identify any such issue, and the circuit court did not clearly err by denying relief on this point. Additionally, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, and considering only evidence that supports the verdict, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the verdict. Woods therefore cannot make a clear showing that his appellate counsel failed to raise a meritorious issue on appeal. Finally, because Woods identified no facts to support his appellate insufficiency argument below, his alternative argument that remand is required for more specific findings is also not persuasive. Affirmed. Hart, J., concurs. Josephine Linker Hart, Justice, concurring. This case must be affirmed because the circuit court did not clearly err in disposing of the argument that Mr. Woods actually made in his Rule 37 petition without an evidentiary hearing. I write separately because the majority has utterly disregarded our preservation jurisprudence to craft a holding that ignores the most basic precepts of Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). As Justice Goodson recently wrote in another briefed Rule 37 appeal, Watson v. State , 2014 Ark. 203, 444 S.W.3d 835, "An appellant cannot change the grounds for an argument for the first time on appeal." As a consequence, the Watson court refused to consider the argument. Inexplicably, the majority has abandoned this well-settled rule. In his Rule 37 petition, Woods argued this point as follows: Trial counsel knew or should have known that his Representation of the Petitioner did not hinge on the O.J. Simpson case, but on the facts proven in his own case. Inflaming a all white Jury about a Prejudicial case like O.J.'s could have Prejudiced the secret minds of the Jurors to form a Prejudice opinion in their minds towards the Petitioner. The trial records will show where Prospective Juror Jimmy Phillips initiated his opinion in his mind about the O.J. Simpson case and defense counsel agreed that we learned a lot from the O.J. Case. The trial court on its own motion could have requested that such comments and opinion were inappropriate to the court and other Jury members that heard the comments that we learned a lot about the O.J. Case, Who is the "WE" the Prospective Juror Jimmy Phillips was referring to? What did we learn about the O.J. Case? under United States v. Cronic , 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) Prejudice can result when defense counsel fails to Represent his client Properly. Trial Counsel's Performance in this record must be examined under the test of Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) to determine was the comments Prejudicial to the Petitioner, did the Jurors Possess a Prejudice opinion towards the Petitioner from the O.J. Simpson case since he to was on trial for killing a white woman. The facts of this claim can only be developed at a evidentiary hearing. Malcom v. Houston , 518 F.3d 624 (8th Cir. 2008) ; Knowles v. Mirzayance , 556 U.S. 111, 129 S.Ct. 1411, 173 L.Ed.2d 251 (2009). The State opposed Woods's argument by stating the following: 4. A member of the venire, Jimmy Phillips, brought up the O.J. Simpson case during the questioning concerning the right of a defendant not to testify. (R. 415-16) The defendant suggests that he could have been prejudiced by the comments, but he makes no showing of the same, and fails to explain how his counsel was ineffective in responding to the comment. In its order disposing of Mr. Woods's petition, the circuit court framed the issue as follows, describing Woods's argument as: (b) Counsel was ineffective in making inflammatory remarks to the jury comparing Petitioner's case to the O.J. Simpson murder case. The circuit court characterized the State's response as: Additionally, the State, in light of Defendant's argument that the defense counsel was ineffective in bringing up the O.J. Simpson murder case, argues that case was in fact raised by a member of the jury venire, Jimmy Phillips, who brought up the fact of the O.J. Simpson case in responding to questions about a defendant's right not to testify, citing the record at R. 415-16. It argues that the defendant makes no showing that he was in any way prejudiced by Mr. Phillips' comments and that he fails to explain how the defendant's counsel in following up on those comments, was ineffective in any manner. In disposing of Woods's argument, the circuit court found: 16. Mention of the O.J. Simpson case. The record in this case reflects that the mention started with a venire man while defense counsel was questioning the jury panel. Any questioning by the defense counsel regarding that matter was certainly within the province of defense counsel exercising independent professional judgment in his approach to the issue. While it might have been improper for defense counsel to bring up the subject, he didn't. He just addressed it when it was brought up and the defendant made no showing of a failure to operate within the wide range of effectiveness provided by law and trial counsel. Thus, the only issue before the circuit court was whether Woods's trial counsel was ineffective in how he responded to a remark made by a venire person raised. The argument raised on appeal and addressed by the majority is, of course, much broader. Pursuant to Watson , this court should not have addressed the argument that Mr. Woods makes on appeal. If I believed that Mr. Woods's argument comported with our preservation jurisprudence, I would have dissented from the majority's decision. First, the majority has apparently lost sight of the relief that Mr. Woods has requested in this case: an evidentiary hearing. The majority has likewise failed to notice that in the case it relies on, Hayes v. State , 2014 Ark. 104, 431 S.W.3d 882, there was an evidentiary hearing. While there were some questionable trial decisions in Hayes , they were defended by the trial counsel at the evidentiary hearing. Furthermore, on review, we did not uphold the circuit court's finding that all of the decisions were reasonable trial strategy. In the case before us, the circuit court did not find that analogizing Mr. Woods's case to the O.J. Simpson trial was reasonable trial strategy. In fact, the circuit court suggested otherwise: "While it might have been improper for defense counsel to bring up the subject, he didn't." Perhaps that was why the majority abandoned its role as an appellate court and made its own findings. In my view, the majority's findings are clearly erroneous. While the Strickland Court stated that "Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential," trial strategy must nonetheless be "reasonable." Strickland , supra . There is nothing reasonable about comparing Mr. Woods's case to the O.J. Simpson case. Like Simpson, Mr. Woods is an African American who was accused of brutally murdering his Caucasian girlfriend. Simpson was famously found not guilty in what is regarded as the trial of the century. Furthermore, while the O.J. Simpson trial took place over twenty years before Woods's trial, a docudrama about the sensational murder and trial debuted February 2, 2016, which was less than a week after Woods's trial. Promotion of the FX network series, however, had begun in October 2015, and flooded the airways. Furthermore, O.J. Simpson remained in the news because he was charged and convicted of kidnapping and armed robbery in 2008 and was up for parole in 2017. It is widely believed that Simpson got away with murder. It is inconceivable that any lawyer would bring up the O.J. Simpson case to a venire from which an all-white jury was selected. Calling it trial strategy ignores the fact that the purpose of a defense attorney is to defend his or her client, not ensure the client's conviction. I concur. A potential juror did state later in voir dire that "[w]e learned that from the O.J. case, didn't we?" That remark was made in response to trial counsel's statements that an accused has the right to not testify, and nothing negative could be inferred from such a decision. Trial counsel responded that "[w]e learned a lot from the O.J. case."

BART F. VIRDEN, Judge Fabiola Falcon appeals from the decision of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission ("Commission") denying her claim for temporary total-disability (TTD) benefits following treatment for a neck, shoulder, and arm injury while working for Northwest Medical Center ("Northwest"). We affirm. On August 22, 2014, Falcon suffered a compensable injury to her neck, shoulder, and left arm while assisting a patient. Falcon reported the injury immediately. On the day of the accident, Falcon went to the emergency room, and attending physician Dr. Diedre Bass prescribed medication for pain and muscle spasms. On August 29, Falcon was seen by Dr. Shawn Holcomb who placed her on light duty with a ten-pound lifting restriction. Falcon was also given conservative treatment, including a course of steroids, pain medication, and physical therapy. Falcon continued to have pain in the affected areas, and Dr. Holcomb ordered an MRI scan of her cervical spine area and referred her to orthopedic surgeon Dr. John Marcus Heim. Dr. Heim concluded that Falcon had a small disc herniation at the C4-5 level and that surgery was not recommended. Falcon next saw Dr. George Deimel who, over the course of several appointments, treated her with medication, physical-activity modification, modified physical therapy, and steroid injections, none of which alleviated her pain. Dr. Deimel stated in his report that he was managing Falcon's symptoms but could not offer her any further treatment options. He referred her to a neurosurgeon, Dr. Barry Katz, and while Dr. Katz's patient, she became pregnant. During her October 19, 2015 appointment Dr. Katz concluded that Falcon should follow up with him after she had given birth. Dr. Katz opined that Falcon was "a good candidate for ACDF" (discectomy and fusion surgery), and he would reevaluate her after the birth of her child. Dr. Katz also recommended that Falcon perform only light duty and that she lift no more than ten pounds. In 2016, Dr. Katz moved his practice to Joplin, Missouri. While Falcon was still Dr. Katz's patient, Northwest referred Falcon to its physician, Dr. Chuck Nalley, who ordered an MRI on Falcon's neck and shoulder. On November 22, 2015, after he had reviewed Falcon's MRI results, Dr. Nalley ordered a steroid injection. Dr. Nalley opined that if the steroid injection did not relieve Falcon's symptoms, then surgery would also be ineffective, and he would have no further treatment to offer her. Falcon gave birth to her child in February 2016. On March 17, she saw Dr. Nalley again, and he noted that Falcon's symptoms were basically unchanged except that her pain was possibly worse due to having to lift her newborn. Dr. Nalley ordered that the steroid injection take place now that she was not pregnant, and he noted that he would not recommend surgery if the injection did not alleviate her symptoms. He further opined that if there was no relief from the injection, she should be determined to have reached maximum medical improvement and given a disability rating. On April 13, 2016, she received the injection. On May 5, 2016, Falcon returned to Dr. Nalley and reported that the injection had made her symptoms worse. He concluded that if the injection made her feel worse, then surgery would do the same. On June 3, 2016, after a functional-capacity evaluation, Falcon was found to be at maximum medical improvement with work status consistent with sedentary work with occasional lifting of up to fifteen pounds. Falcon was assigned a 4 percent impairment rating, and Northwest accepted the rating. Northwest paid Falcon TTD benefits up to the date Dr. Nalley declared her at maximum medical improvement. On October 19, 2016, Falcon requested a change in physician from Dr. Nalley to Dr. Luke Knox, which was approved. On November 22, 2016, Dr. Knox recommended another steroid injection, but he noted that the injection might provide relief for only five to six hours. Dr. Knox issued the same caveat that if the injection did not afford her some pain relief, surgery would not be in her best interest. From November 2016 to April 2017, Dr. Knox recommended a ten-pound weight-lifting restriction for work. Falcon requested a hearing on the issue of whether she was entitled to TTD benefits from October 15, 2016, to a date to be determined. At the hearing, Falcon argued that she had reentered the healing period when she began seeing Dr. Knox, who recommended surgery. Falcon testified that Dr. Knox performed a steroid injection as a diagnostic tool to ascertain whether surgery would be successful and that the injection made her pain worse. Falcon also contended that Dr. Knox had scheduled her surgery for July 20, 2017. The administrative law judge ("ALJ") found that Falcon had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she was entitled to additional TTD benefits or attorney's fees. Specifically, the ALJ found that each doctor reported that conservative treatment had not alleviated her symptoms. The ALJ agreed with Dr. Nalley's assessment that Falcon had reached maximum medical improvement on June 3, 2016. The ALJ found that there was no evidence that Falcon reentered a healing period after June 3 and noted that Falcon's assertion that Dr. Knox planned to perform surgery for her symptoms was unfounded and not supported by the record. Falcon appealed to the Commission, which affirmed and adopted the ALJ's opinion. Falcon filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, Falcon argues that sufficient evidence does not support the Commission's finding that she did not prove that she reentered a healing period and that she was entitled to TTD benefits from October 15, 2016, when Dr. Knox "clearly had more testing and treatment for her." Falcon's argument is without merit, and we affirm. When reviewing a decision of the Commission, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the findings of the Commission. Evans v. Bemis Co., Inc. , 2010 Ark. App. 65, 374 S.W.3d 51. This court must affirm the decision of the Commission if it is supported by substantial evidence. Id. Substantial evidence is that evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion of the Commission. Id. We reverse the Commission's decision only if we are convinced that fair-minded persons could not have reached the same conclusion with the same facts before them. Id. Questions regarding the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony are within the exclusive province of the Commission. Id. To receive TTD benefits, the claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she is within the healing period and is totally incapacitated from earning wages. Union Drilling, Inc. v. Griffith , 2015 Ark. App. 273, 2015 WL 1952691. The healing period ends when the employee is as far restored as the permanent nature of the injury permits; thus, if the underlying condition causing the disability has become stable and nothing in the way of treatment will improve that condition, the healing period has ended. Id. The determination of when the healing period has ended is a factual determination for the Commission. Smallwood v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. , 2010 Ark. App. 466, 375 S.W.3d 747. Falcon contends that she testified at the hearing that Dr. Knox planned to perform surgery to treat her symptoms, and her testimony supports her argument that more treatment options were available according to her physician. First, she does not cite the record to support her statement that surgery had been scheduled. What the record does show is almost perfect consistency from her treating physicians: medication, steroid injections, and physical therapy had not lessened her symptoms, and each doctor agreed that if the steroid injection did not abate her symptoms, surgery would not provide relief either. Falcon's symptoms persisted for almost two years before she was declared to have reached maximum medical improvement. Furthermore, although each doctor recommended a lifting restriction of between ten and fifteen pounds, Falcon was never removed from work. Falcon's physicians deemed her able to perform "light duty" work; thus, she was never "totally incapacitated from earning wages." See Union Drilling, Inc., supra. Moreover, Falcon admitted that Dr. Knox performed the steroid injection as a diagnostic tool for the purpose of determining whether surgery might be successful. There was no evidence that Dr. Knox had treated her with the steroid shot to improve her condition, and the record shows that the treatment might provide relief for five to six hours at most. In contrast, as we stated above, there was evidence that he treated her with the shot to rule out the possibility of surgery. Falcon failed to show that the Commission's decision was based on insufficient evidence that she had reached maximum medical improvement on June 3, 2016. Because this court need only find that fair-minded persons with the same facts before them could have reached the same conclusion as the Commission, we affirm. See Evans, supra. Affirmed. Gladwin and Whiteaker, JJ., agree.

LARRY D. VAUGHT, Judge Tina Webb appeals the opinion of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) finding that she failed to prove that she sustained a compensable low-back injury while in the course and scope of her employment with Wal-Mart Associates, Inc. (Wal-Mart). On appeal, Webb contends that the Commission's opinion is not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm. On November 9, 2015, Webb, a Wal-Mart department manager, was working on a ladder when she fell six feet to the floor. She suffered a significant fracture injury to her left tibia that required four surgeries. Wal-Mart accepted Webb's leg injury as compensable and paid all benefits related to the injury. While still receiving medical treatment for her left-leg injury, Webb first sought medical treatment for low-back complaints on January 21, 2016. She sought additional medical treatment for low-back pain on January 25 and 27, 2016; July 21, 2016; and October 18, 2016. Webb eventually requested a referral to neurosurgeon Dr. Robert Abraham, who had performed L4-5 back surgery on Webb in 2013. Dr. Abraham saw Webb on December 19, 2016, and his note of that date states that she presented with low-back and left-leg pain caused by a fall off a six-foot ladder at work. He recommended an MRI, which was performed on January 20, 2017. Webb returned to Dr. Abraham on February 1, 2017, and in that report Dr. Abraham states that the MRI showed interspace narrowing with minimal post-op changes on the left side at L4-5 with what appeared to be a recurrent disc herniation. He recommended an L4-5 decompressive lumbar laminectomy. At Wal-Mart's request, Dr. Carlos Roman of Southern Regional Anesthesiology Consultants, PLLC, performed an independent medical evaluation (IME) on Webb on February 3, 2017. Dr. Roman's IME report concluded that Webb's back "injury is not related to the fall in that she had a pre-existing condition of back pain and degenerative disc disease, thus, the back surgery in 2013." On February 16, 2017, Dr. Abraham performed an L4-5 decompressive lumbar laminectomy. The following day, Dr. Abraham opined that Webb's November 9, 2015 fall aggravated her preexisting back condition. When Webb sought additional medical treatment and temporary total-disability benefits for her low-back injury, Wal-Mart controverted her claim, contending that the low-back injury did not arise out of her November 9, 2015 fall. At the hearing before the administrative law judge (ALJ), Webb, who was forty-eight years old at the time, testified that following her back surgery in 2013, she missed only six weeks of work and felt "wonderful." She stated that before her 2015 fall at Wal-Mart, she did not have any back discomfort or pain; she did not take any medicine or prescriptions for her back; and she did not miss any time from work because of back pain. Webb also testified about her fall from the ladder at work, the significant injury she sustained to her left leg, and the extensive medical treatment she received for her leg injury. She stated that she first noted discomfort in her back while she was in the hospital receiving treatment for her leg. At that time, she believed the back discomfort was due to being bedbound. She said that on January 21, 2016, she turned over in bed at home and experienced "a huge pain" in her low back that made her scream and cry. She stated that she went to the emergency room that day and was eventually seen by Dr. Abraham. Webb said that Dr. Abraham performed L4-5 surgery in February 2017, and she has not been released from his care. Webb testified that the pain medication she took for her leg may have masked her back injury. Dr. Abraham testified, via deposition, that when Webb first presented in 2016, she told him that she had been suffering low-back pain since her November 2015 fall. Based on that history, it was his opinion that the fall aggravated her preexisting low-back injury and caused a recurrent disc herniation. When advised that Webb's low-back complaints did not arise until three months after the fall, Dr. Abraham testified that he could not state when the recurrent disc herniation occurred. However, he stated that it was his opinion that because Webb had very few low-back symptoms prior to November 2015 and the fall from the ladder involved significant force, the recurrent disc herniation at L4-5 was more likely than not caused by the fall rather than simply turning over in bed. The ALJ issued an opinion on October 10, 2017, finding that Webb suffered a compensable aggravation of a preexisting low-back injury as a result of the November 9, 2015 fall while working for Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart appealed, and on April 24, 2018, the Commission reversed the ALJ's decision, finding that Webb did not sustain a low-back injury when she fell from the ladder on November 9, 2015. The Commission found that Webb suffered from a preexisting low-back injury; there were no reports of a low-back injury immediately following her fall or for three months thereafter; when she initially reported her back complaints, she did not relate them to the November fall; she inaccurately reported to Dr. Abraham that she had been suffering from low-back pain since she fell, and thus, she lacked credibility; Dr. Abraham's opinion was based on Webb's inaccurate history and was entitled to no credit; and the IME finding that the back injury was not related to the November 2015 fall was credible. This appeal, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the Commission's opinion, followed. In appeals involving claims for workers' compensation, our court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commission's decision and affirms the decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Grothaus v. Vista Health, L.L.C. , 2011 Ark. App. 130, at 6, 382 S.W.3d 1, 5. Substantial evidence exists if reasonable minds could reach the Commission's conclusion. Id. , 382 S.W.3d at 5. The issue is not whether the appellate court might have reached a different result from the Commission; if reasonable minds could reach the result found by the Commission, the appellate court must affirm. Id. at 6-7, 382 S.W.3d at 5. When the Commission denies a claim because of the claimant's failure to meet his or her burden of proof, the substantial-evidence standard of review requires that we affirm the Commission's decision if its opinion displays a substantial basis for the denial of relief. Id. at 7, 382 S.W.3d at 5. An employer takes an employee as the employer finds him or her, and employment circumstances that aggravate preexisting conditions are compensable. Id. , 382 S.W.3d at 5. An aggravation of a preexisting noncompensable condition by a compensable injury itself is compensable. Id. , 382 S.W.3d at 5. An aggravation, being a new injury with an independent cause, must meet the requirements for a compensable injury. Id. , 382 S.W.3d at 5. Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-102(4)(A)(i) (Repl. 2012) defines a compensable injury as "[a]n accidental injury causing internal or external physical harm to the body ... arising out of and in the course of employment and which requires medical services or results in disability or death." In this case, the Commission was asked to determine whether Webb's low-back injury was an accidental injury that arose out of and in the course of her employment. Whether a causal connection between employment and an injury exists is a question of fact for the Commission to determine. Smith v. Sw. Ark. Food Bank , 2011 Ark. App. 181, at 8, 381 S.W.3d 889, 894. Webb argues on appeal that the Commission's opinion-that her low-back injury did not arise out of her November 9, 2015 fall off a ladder-is not supported by substantial evidence. She admits that she had L4-5 surgery in 2013, but she states that she felt "wonderful" after that surgery, she was able to work, and she did not have back pain or problems leading up to her 2015 fall. She concedes that she did not experience or report back pain immediately following her fall and that she first reported back pain seventy-three days later. But she argues that when she sought medical treatment for low-back pain on January 27, 2016, she reported that it was caused by her fall off the ladder. She also contends that her back pain may have been masked by the prescription medications she was taking for her leg injury. Webb also calls into question the IME report because the doctor who authored it is an anesthesiologist, he did not review any of the records regarding her recent back injury, and he was not aware that an aggravation of a preexisting injury could be a compensable injury. Webb contends that her treating neurosurgeon, Dr. Abraham, opined that her fall from the ladder more likely than not aggravated her preexisting back condition, that the Commission improperly discounted the opinion because it was based on Webb's history that she had been suffering from back pain since the fall, and that his opinion is entitled to more weight than that of the IME doctor. Finally, she argues that her back injury arose soon after the fall and is logically attributable to it with nothing to suggest any other reasonable explanation. Our holding in Smith v. Commercial Metals Co. , 2011 Ark. App. 218, 382 S.W.3d 764 is instructive. In Smith , the appellant sought to prove that he suffered a compensable back injury following a fall or strenuous activity at work. The evidence in that case demonstrated that the appellant suffered from prior back problems; when he first sought medical treatment for his back he did not relate his complaints to his work or a work injury; he gave inconsistent accounts of whether, how, and when he hurt his back at work; MRI testing showed objective findings of a disc herniation; and his doctor opined, based partly on the appellant's history, that the back injury was the result of a trip and fall at work. Smith , 2011 Ark. App. 218, at 2-7, 382 S.W.3d at 765-68. The ALJ found that the appellant failed to prove that his spinal abnormalities were causally related to a fall or were a result of strenuous activities at work. Id. at 7, 382 S.W.3d at 768. The Commission affirmed and adopted the ALJ's opinion. Id. at 8, 382 S.W.3d at 768. On appeal, we affirmed the Commission's finding that the appellant's symptoms-that began six weeks after his fall-were not causally connected or logically attributable to his work. Substantial evidence demonstrated different accounts of when and how his symptoms began and contemporaneous medical records contained no mention of the appellant's having suffered a work-related injury. Given the inconsistencies, we held that the Commission was entitled to find that the appellant's recollection was not trustworthy and that his doctor's opinion, based on the appellant's inaccurate statements, was entitled to no weight. Id. at 11-12, 382 S.W.3d at 770. Accordingly, we held that given the lapse of time between the appellant's fall and the manifestation of his symptoms, reasonable persons might disagree about the causal connection between the appellant's accident and his disability. Id. at 12, 382 S.W.3d at 770. In the case at bar, the Commission likewise found that Webb failed to prove a causal connection between her fall from the ladder and her back injury, and we hold that substantial evidence supports the Commission's decision. None of the many medical records contemporaneous to Webb's November 9, 2015 fall include complaints of back pain. Webb's first low-back complaints began three months after her fall, and she first sought treatment for her back pain seventy-three days after the fall. Given the lapse of time between Webb's fall and the manifestation of her symptoms, reasonable persons might disagree about the causal connection between her accident at work and her low-back injury. Smith , 2011 Ark. App. 218, at 12, 382 S.W.3d at 770. Additionally, the evidence is undisputed that Webb suffered from a preexisting low-back condition for which she had surgery in 2013. There is evidence that this preexisting condition caused Webb to question whether it (her preexisting condition) or the fall was the cause of her new back complaints. When Webb did seek treatment for back pain, she did not report that the pain was caused by her fall at work. For example, the January 21, 2016 medical report states that there was "[n]o mechanism of injury ... [g]radual onset of symptoms, 2 days." The January 25, 2016 report states that the "[p]atient denies any recent injury or trauma to back at L4-L5." The January 27, 2016 report refers to Webb's fall from the ladder but states that Webb's chronic back pain "has been worse since Wednesday." Moreover, at the hearing, Webb testified that when she first saw Dr. Abraham, she told him, "I'm not positive if [the back pain] occurred from my fall." Webb claimed that she had no problems following surgery; however, the Commission did not have to believe her testimony. The Commission expressly found that Webb lacked credibility because she inaccurately reported to Dr. Abraham that she had been suffering from low-back pain since her fall. Questions concerning the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony are within the exclusive province of the Commission, and when there are contradictions in the evidence, it is within the Commission's province to reconcile conflicting evidence and to determine the true facts. Id. at 8-9, 382 S.W.3d at 769. The Commission is not required to believe the testimony of the claimant or any other witness but may accept and translate into findings of fact only those portions of the testimony that it deems worthy of belief. Flynn v. J.B. Hunt Transp. , 2012 Ark. App. 111, at 9, 389 S.W.3d 67, 71. Because Dr. Abraham's causation opinion was based on Webb's inaccurate history, the Commission afforded no weight to his opinion. The Commission has the authority to accept or reject medical opinions, and its resolution of the medical evidence has the force and effect of a jury verdict. Smith , 2011 Ark. App. 218, at 13, 382 S.W.3d at 771. Finally, in this case, the Commission afforded more weight to the opinion in the IME report than to Dr. Abraham's opinion. We acknowledge that the physician who authored the IME report is from an anesthesiology consultant company, that he devoted just one paragraph of his report to Webb's back injury, and that he did not review Webb's recent low-back medical records. However, a finding of causation in a workers'-compensation case does not need to be expressed in terms of a reasonable medical certainty when there is supplemental evidence to support the causal connection. Heptinstall v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co. , 84 Ark. App. 215, 222, 137 S.W.3d 421, 425 (2003) (citing Osmose Wood Preserving v. Jones , 40 Ark. App. 190, 193, 843 S.W.2d 875, 877 (1992) ; see also Sneed v. Colson Corp. , 254 Ark. 1048, 497 S.W.2d 673 (1973) (holding medical evidence is not necessary in establishing a causal connection) ). As set forth above, the Commission made multiple non-medical-related findings in support of its conclusion that there was no causal connection between Webb's fall and her back injury. On the facts presented at the hearing in this case, our court could have found that Webb's low-back injury was caused by the six-foot fall from a ladder on which she was working at Wal-Mart, but whether there is a causal connection between employment and an injury is a question of fact for the Commission to determine. Smith , 2011 Ark. App. 181, at 8, 381 S.W.3d at 894. Pursuant to our standard of review, we are not to determine whether we might have reached a different result from the Commission; if reasonable minds could reach the result found by the Commission, we must affirm. Here, substantial evidence supports the Commission's decision that Webb failed to meet her burden of proving that her back injury arose out of and in the course of her employment. Accordingly, we must affirm. Affirmed. Whiteaker and Murphy, JJ., agree.

MIKE MURPHY, Judge On October 23, 2017, appellant J.L. pleaded true to one count of theft by receiving, a Class C felony, and one count of breaking or entering, a Class D felony, in the juvenile division of the Benton County Circuit Court. Following a restitution hearing held on January 22, 2018, J.L. was ordered to pay $4302 in restitution. On appeal, J.L. argues that the circuit court erred in ordering him to pay restitution for an offense with which he was neither charged nor adjudicated delinquent and that the circuit court erred when it found J.L.'s actions were the proximate cause of the damages. We affirm. Fourteen-year-old J.L. pleaded true to theft by receiving after he was arrested for driving a stolen automobile. At the adjudication hearing, the testimony established that J.L. was in possession of a white Nissan that he was able to steal because the keys had been left inside the vehicle. Additionally, J.L. broke into another car to try and find money. At the conclusion of the adjudication hearing, the State requested a restitution hearing because there was a substantial amount of damage done to the Nissan. J.L. contested the amount of restitution, and the circuit court set a restitution hearing for December 11, 2017. When J.L. did not appear at the hearing, the matter was reset, and a second restitution hearing was held on January 22, 2018. J.L. again failed to appear, but the circuit court heard testimony regarding the damage to the vehicle and the costs of repair. At the restitution hearing, the victim testified that she reported her vehicle stolen in August 2017. She explained that before it was stolen, the front right side and headlight of the vehicle were damaged. She further explained that after the vehicle was recovered, the back-left bumper had two big dents in it and the wheels were bent. The manager of an auto-body repair shop testified that based on his experience he believed the damage was from impact. He further testified regarding the costs of repair. He estimated that repairs to the vehicle would cost $4672. He admitted that the estimate included a fee of $370 for detailing the vehicle, changing the oil, and flushing the radiator. At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court ordered restitution in the amount of $4302. This appeal followed. On appeal, J.L. contends he should not have to make restitution because he was not adjudicated delinquent due to criminal mischief. He also argues that he should be precluded from making restitution because the State did not present evidence to support the circuit court's finding that J.L.'s actions were the proximate cause of the damages. We are not persuaded. The correct application and interpretation of an Arkansas statute is a question of law, which we decide de novo. State v. V.H. , 2013 Ark. 344, 429 S.W.3d 243. The basic rule of statutory construction to which all interpretive guides must yield is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. Id. When reviewing issues of statutory interpretation, the first rule in considering the meaning and effect of a statute is to construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning. Id. We will not engage in statutory interpretations that defy common sense and produce absurd results. W.J.S. v. State , 2016 Ark. App. 310, at 3-4, 495 S.W.3d 649, 652. The plain language of the relevant statutes in the juvenile code does not support J.L.'s argument. A "delinquent juvenile" is defined as a juvenile who is ten years old or older who committed an act other than a traffic offense or game and fish violation that, if the act had been committed by an adult, would subject the adult to prosecution for a felony, misdemeanor, or violation under the applicable criminal laws of this state. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-303(a)(15)(A)(1) (Repl. 2015). Further, if a juvenile is found to be delinquent, the circuit court may enter an order of restitution to be paid by the juvenile, a parent, both parents, the guardian, or his or her custodian. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-330(a)(7)(A). An adult who commits theft by receiving would be subject to restitution. See Fortson v. State , 66 Ark. App. 225, 989 S.W.2d 553 (1999). Thus, it was not necessary for J.L. to be adjudicated for any offense other than theft by receiving to impose restitution. Next, J.L. contends the State failed to establish that he was the proximate cause of the damage to the vehicle. An order of restitution is authorized by statute only after proof by a preponderance of the evidence that specific damages were caused by the juvenile and that the juvenile's actions were the proximate cause of the damage. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-331(e)(1). Restitution is the actual economic loss sustained by an individual or entity as a proximate result of the delinquent acts of a juvenile. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-303(50)(A) (Supp. 2017). Such economic loss shall include, but not be limited to, expenses for repair or replacement of property. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-303(50)(B). Here, J.L. pleaded true to one count of theft by receiving, and it is undisputed that he was driving the stolen vehicle. Likewise, there was uncontroverted testimony that before the vehicle was stolen there was no damage to the back bumper and wheels and that once it was recovered, there was damage to the bumper and wheels. Based on these circumstances, we cannot say the circuit court's finding that J.L. caused the damage to the vehicle was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Affirmed. Harrison and Hixson, JJ., agree.

Jim Hannah, Justice. This matter arises from contempt proceedings against attorney Laura L. Cunningham regarding a motion for rule on the clerk filed by her in her representation of Randolph McDonald. Cunningham asserts that this court erred in finding her notice of appeal untimely although it was filed more than six months after entry of the order appealed from in the notice. A notice of appeal must identify the order appealed from and must be filed within thirty days of the entry of the order appealed from. Cunningham failed to file a notice of appeal within thirty days of the order appealed from and is at fault for fading to do so. Cunningham argues, however, that the filing was not untimely because her error was only a failure to note the correct order in the notice of appeal, that the doctrine of substantial compliance makes the notice adequate even if there are failings in the notice of appeal, and that the court’s reading of the rule on filing a notice of appeal violates due process. There is no merit to these arguments. Cunningham’s motion for rule on the clerk is granted as a motion for belated appeal, and a copy of this decision will be forwarded to the Committee on Professional Conduct. Our jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(a)(1, 5) (2003). Facts The essential facts regarding the notice of appeal are not in dispute. Cunningham filed a notice of appeal more than six months after entry of the order appealed from. McDonald is appealing the denial of a motion to suppress under Ark. R. Crim. P. 24.3 (2002). McDonald moved to suppress evidence seized in a vehicle, stop and inventory search. That motion was denied by a pretrial order entered November 4, 2002. The Plea Agreement and Order was not entered until April 14, 2003. The Judgment and Commitment Order was not filed until June 4, 2003. An order attempting to preserve the right to appeal from the denial of the motion to suppress was filed May 5, 2003. The Notice of Appeal was filed May 7, 2003, and states that appeal is taken from the “Order and Opinion denying his Motion to Suppress entered herein on the 4th of November, 2002.” The clerk of this court rejected the appeal because the Notice of Appeal was not filed within thirty days of the November 4, 2002, order appealed from as required by Ark. R. App. P. — Crim. 2 (2003). Cunningham filed a motion for rule on the clerk. She denied any fault for the late notice of appeal. This court issued a per curiam on September 11, 2003, providing that the motion for rule on the clerk would be granted when Cunningham filed an affidavit accepting responsibility for failing to timely file the notice of appeal. Cunningham filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial of her motion for rule on the clerk stating that she would not accept fault and would not file an admission of fault. By a per curiam dated November 6, 2003, Cunningham was ordered to appear before this court on November 20, 2003, to show cause why she should not be held in contempt for failing to comply with the September 11, 2003, per curiam. At the hearing, Cunningham plead not guilty to contempt, and this court ordered that Cunningham file a brief to assist this court in making its decision. The Notice of Appeal was Untimely Cunningham identified the order or judgment appealed from in her notice of appeal as the November 4, 2002, order on the motion to suppress. A notice of appeal must identify the order appealed from and be filed within thirty days of that order. Ark. R. App. P. — Crim. 2. Cunningham filed the notice of appeal on May 7, 2003, more than six months after the order appealed from. The notice of appeal was untimely under Ark. R. App. P. — Crim. 2. Cunningham asserts, however, that she is in substantial compliance. She did file the notice of appeal within thirty days of the entry of the Plea Agreement and Order as well as the judgment; however, the clerk of this court received a notice of appeal showing that McDonald was attempting to appeal from a November 2002 order in May 2003. The notice of appeal was properly rejected by the clerk. The rule requires that the notice of appeal be filed within thirty days of the order appealed from. This was not done. Substantial compliance does not apply under these facts. Relief For Failure To Perfect An Appeal We take this opportunity to clarify the application of our rules providing for relief for failure to perfect an appeal. A brief discussion of the history predating the current rules is pertinent to our discussion. The remedy for failure to perfect an appeal is granted by this court under Ark. R. App. P. — Crim. 2 and Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 2-2 (2003) as a part of the right to a criminal appeal. Rule 2 provides relief where a notice of appeal is not timely filed, and Rule 2-2 provides relief where the record is not timely docketed. We first note that this court sets the terms for obtaining relief from the failure to perfect an appeal. Relief from failure to perfect an appeal is provided as part of the appellate procedure granting the right to an appeal. The State is not required under the United States Constitution to grant a criminal appeal. Gilliam v. State, 305 Ark. 438, 808 S.W.2d 738 (1991); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). However, this state has granted the right to appeal for many years. This court, long before Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 100 L.Ed. 891, 76 S. ct. 585 (1955), and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 9 L.Ed. 811, 83 S. ct. 814, reh. den. 373 U.S. 905, 10 L.Ed.2d 200, 83 S. ct. 1288 (1963), permitted paupers to appeal their convictions, a full transcript of the proceedings at the trial being furnished without cost, with court appointed counsel directed to handle such appeals. Manning v. State, 246 Ark. 1013, 1016, 442 S.W.2d 207 (1969). Even though there is no mandate for a State to provide an appeal, restraints are imposed by the United States Constitution when the right to appeal is granted. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000). For example, to the extent that a right of appeal is granted, equal protection applies. Gilliam, supra. Also, where a right to appeal is granted, there is a consequent right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin, supra. These restraints also apply to our rules on relief from failure to perfect an appeal. Under Ark. R. App. P. —Crim. 2 and Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 2-2, this court provides an attorney or a party the right to argue that there is good reason why the appeal was not timely perfected and also the right to concede error. We first clearly distinguish our rules. If the issue of failure to perfect an appeal involves a notice of appeal, then relief must be sought under Ark. R. App. P. — Crim. 2. If the issue of failure to perfect an appeal involves docketing the record, then relief must be sought under Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 2-2. Rule 2(a)(1) of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure is titled “Time and method of taking appeal,” and provides in pertinent part, that a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days from the date of entry of a judgment. Ark. R. App. P. — Crim. 2(a)(1). Rule 2(e) provides: Failure to pursue appeal. Failure of the appellant to take any further steps to secure the review of the appealed conviction shall not affect the validity of the appeal but shall be ground only for such action as the Supreme Court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal. The Supreme Court may act upon and decide a case in which the notice of appeal was not given or the transcript of the trial record was not filed in the time prescribed, when a good reason for the omission is shown by affidavit. However, no motion for belated appeal shall be entertained by the Supreme Court unless application has been made to the Supreme Court within eighteen (18) months of the date of entry of judgment or entry of the order denying postconviction relief from which the appeal is taken. If no judgment of conviction was entered of record within ten (10) days of the date sentence was pronounced, application for belated appeal must be made within eighteen (18) months of the date sentence was pronounced. Ark. R. App. P. — Crim. 2(e) (2003). Under Ark. R. App. P. — Crim. 2, an attorney or a criminal defendant may seek rehef when he or she is not at fault for the failure to perfect the appeal and where good reason can be shown. Examples where “good reason” was shown and the motion was granted may be split into two types of cases. The first type is where the court makes the error causing the appeal to be untimely. For example, in Kelly v. State, 301 Ark. 294, 783 S.W.2d 369 (1990), the record failed to show that the circuit clerk notified Kelly of the denial of his petition for postconviction relief. This court stated that when the record is silent on whether the clerk complied with the rule requiring notice, and the Attorney General in his response to a motion for belated appeal is unable to provide the clerk’s affidavit or some other proof that the order was mailed, it will be assumed that the petitioner was not notified of the denial of his motion. In Kelly, the motion to file a belated appeal was granted. See also Porter v. State, 287 Ark. 359, 698 S.W.2d 801 (1985). The second type of case where “good rfeason” is found under Ark. R. App. P. — Crim. 2(e) includes motions for belated appeal filed by parties where the attorney has failed to timely file the notice of appeal. In these cases, it is the party, and not the attorney, who has good reason to show why the notice of appeal was not timely filed. In Langston v. State, 341 Ark. 739, 19 S.W.3d 619 (2000), Langston’s motion to file a belated brief under Rule 2(e) was granted where there was no evidence contradicting Langston’s assertion that she told her attorney that she wished to appeal, and he failed to do so. It should be noted that the relief in Langston was granted to the party and not to the attorney who erred in refusing to perfect the appeal. In the case before us, the reason the notice of appeal was defective was because Cunningham failed to comply with the rule. It was Cunningham who filed the notice of appeal. While McDonald might be able to show “good reason” by way of Cunningham’s failure to file an effective notice of appeal, Cunningham can show no “good reason” for her error. “[I]f merely declaring ignorance of the rules of procedure were enough to excuse lack of compliance, it would be just as well to have no rules since an appellant could simply bypass the rules by claiming a lack of knowledge.” Garner v. State, 293 Ark. 309, 310, 737 S.W.2d 637, 638 (1987). An attorney is expected to know the law. Lewellen v. Supreme Court Comm. on Pro. Conduct, 353 Ark. 641, 110 S.W.3d 263 (2003). We note that Cunningham states that she was told to file a motion for rule on the clerk by the clerk of this court. A motion for rule on the clerk was not the proper motion. Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 2-2 provides in pertinent part: (a) Record tendered late. Where a record is tendered which, on its face, appears to be outside the time allotted for docketing the case, it shall be the duty of the Clerk to notify the attorney representing the appellant and note on the record the date the tender was made. Rule 2-2 provides that a motion may be brought pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 2-1 (2003) where the attorney asserts that the clerk of this court erred in refusing to docket the appeal. Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 2-2(b) (2003). Additionally, relief is available under Rule 2-2 where an attorney has erred. Hudson v. State, 351 Ark. 383, 93 S.W.3d 694 (2002). Although the proper motion should be filed, the procedure followed by this court under each rule is similar. The proper motion in this case was a motion for belated appeal. Cunningham cannot rely on representations of the clerk. An attorney is responsible for filing the appeal and cannot shift that responsibility to another. See Beavers v. State, 341 Ark. 649, 19 S.W.3d 23 (2000); Lewis v. State, 295 Ark. 165, 747 S.W.2d 91 (1988). However, where a motion for rule on the clerk is filed in error, it will be treated as a motion for belated appeal. Smith v. State, 325 Ark. 34, 921 S.W.2d 953 (1996). Our oft cited case on failure to perfect an appeal is Harkness v. State, 264 Ark. 561, 572 S.W.2d 835 (1978). Although Harkness involved the failure to timely tender the record, it has also been cited in cases involving failure to file a timely notice of appeal. Ervin v. State, 352 Ark. 517, 102 S.W.3d 501 (2003). Our best starting point in setting out the law lies in the discussion of federal cases that lead to Harkness, supra. In Gross v. Bishop, 273 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Ark. 1967), the United States District Court discussed due process rights and the failure of counsel to file a timely appeal. Gross was convicted of first-degree murder and confined to prison. Gross informed his trial attorney that he wished to appeal his conviction. The attorney asked the trial judge if he had to represent Gross on appeal. The trial judge told counsel he did not need to file an appeal and trial counsel took no action on the appeal beyond informing Gross of time periods within which Gross had to perfect his appeal. Gross wrote the attorney asking that he notify the circuit court of his desire to appeal. The attorney did not do so. Gross tried to write the circuit court, but prison officials would not allow the letters to be mailed. The federal district court concluded that Gross’s due- process rights had been violated, and that the circuit court was not free to simply leave Gross to his own resources. The conviction was set aside. Three years later in Blanchard v. Brewer, 429 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1970), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed the issue of denial of the right to an appeal by way of the right to counsel, as well as under due process. In Blanchard, the court discussed whether Blanchard was denied appellate review through no fault of his own. In Blanchard, the attorney erred in attempting to perfect the appeal by use of Iowa civil appellate procedure and suffered a dismissal. From Blanchard, it is clear that denial of appellate review based on failure to perfect the appeal may constitute a denial of due process and a denial of effective assistance of counsel. This court responded to Blanchard in Harkness, supra, stating: Since to deny the motion for a Rule on the Clerk would furnish grounds for Petitioner to obtain a new trial in a post-conviction proceeding, we as a pragmatical matter must grant the motion to docket the record as a belated appeal. Harkness, 264 Ark. at 562. In Harkness, the attorney filed an affidavit stating he had inadvertently miscalculated the time to tender the record. Blanchard was cited in Harkness as holding that the denial of an appeal for such a cause “amounts to a denial of a constitutional right, on the theory that such a miscalculation, although honestly made, amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel.” Harkness, 264 Ark. at 561-62. The law on belated appeals caused by attorney error was further developed in In Re Belated Appeals in Criminal Cases, 265 Ark. 964, 582 S.W.2d 7 (1979), where this court stated: The purpose of the exception, to take care of hardship cases, is being disregarded, in that counsel tender out-of-time transcripts without a good reason for the delay. In order to put the responsibility where it belongs, on the shoulders of the lawyer who is at fault, hereafter when no good cause for the error is shown, the court will publish a per curiam order allowing the appeal, giving the name of the lawyer, and stating why no good reason has been shown for the omission. A copy of the order will be sent to the court’s Committee on Professional Conduct, to be kept in its files for the Committee’s information if any complaint of any kind should later be filed against that lawyer. In Re Belated Appeals, 265 Ark. at 965. In Re Belated Appeals lays out the principle that where an attorney is at fault for a belated appeal, the attorney will be reported to the Committee on Professional Conduct. The law can be summarized simply. Where an appeal is not timely perfected, either the party or attorney filing the appeal is at fault, or there is good reason that the appeal was not timely perfected. The party or attorney filing the appeal is therefore faced with two options. First, where the party or attorney filing the appeal is at fault, fault should be admitted by affidavit filed with the motion or in the motion itself. There is no advantage in declining to admit fault where fault exists. Second, where the party or attorney believes that there is good reason the appeal was not perfected, the case for good reason can be made in the motion, and this court will decide whether good reason is present. The discussion in Shuffield v. State, 292 Ark. 185, 729 S.W.2d 11 (1987), is particularly helpful to understanding the application of the rules providing relief from failure to perfect an appeal. This court in Shuffield refers to Rule 5, which was the earlier version of Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 2-2: There is, however, a solution available to remedy these omissions, i.e. a motion for a rule on the clerk under Rule 5, Rules of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, based on an admission by counsel that the failure to lodge the record after the notice of appeal was filed was due to his own neglect. That procedure has been established and frequently followed since Harkness v. State, 264 Ark. 561, 572 S.W.2d 835 (1978), and In Re: Belated Appeals in Criminal Cases, Per Curiam, February 5, 1979, 265 Ark. 964. Where counsel assumes responsibility the motion for a rule on the clerk is granted routinely. Where counsel fails to accept responsibility, but it is plain from the record where the fault lies, we have granted the rule on the clerk upon a finding that counsel’s neglect was the occasion for the failure to tender the record in a timely manner. In both instances the Committee on Professional Conduct is informed of the occurrence. Shuffield, 292 Ark. at 187-188. Shuffield followed Harkness, supra. We note that some confusion has arisen in our cases in more recent years because we have often required an admission of fault before a motion for rule on the clerk will be granted. See Welch v. State, 353 Ark. 654, 111 S.W.3d 378 (2003); Jones v. State, 353 Ark. 121, 111 S.W.3d 853 (2003); Fisher v. State, 352 Ark. 567, 104 S.W.3d 744 (2003); Sanders v. State, 338 Ark. 216, 991 S.W.2d 611 (1999); Willingham v. State, 326 Ark. 468, 932 S.W.2d 751 (1996); Rockett v. State, 317 Ark. 430, 877 S.W.2d 593 (1994). We will no longer require an affidavit admitting fault before the motion will be considered by this court. However, where an attorney has erred, and is responsible for the failure to perfect the appeal, the attorney should candidly admit fault in the interest of proyiding his or her client with an expeditious appeal. If an attorney is at fault, and becomes an obstacle to the appeal in refusing to cooperate in resolving the reason the appeal was not perfected, the contempt powers of this court will be used. An attorney should do all in his or her power to see that a client’s appeal moves forward without delay, and as this court has noted, where an affidavit of fault is filed the motion will be routinely granted. Shuffield, supra. We now clarify the application of both Ark. R. App. P. — Crim. 2 and Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 2-2. When it is plain from the motion, affidavits, and record that relief is proper under either rule based on error or good reason, the relief will be granted. If there is attorney error, a copy of the opinion will be forwarded to the Committee on Professional Conduct. Where a motion seeking relief from failure to perfect an appeal is filed, and it is not plain from the motion, affidavits, and record whether there is attorney error, the clerk of this court will be ordered to accept the notice of appeal or record, and the appeal will proceed without delay. However, the matter of attorney error will be remanded to the trial court to make findings of fact. See, e.g., Frazier v. State, 339 Ark. 173, 3 S.W.3d 334 (1999). Upon receipt by this court of the findings, this court will render a decision on attorney error. Id. By way of example, that this court will decide the matter on the motion, affidavits, and record where possible, we cite to Stewart v. State, 319 Ark. 242, 889 S.W.2d 771 (1995), where we stated: Although Mr. Finkelstein apologizes for failing to meet the deadline, he does not admit fault. We will, however, treat his failure to state good cause as an admission of fault and forward a copy of this opinion to the Committee on Professional Conduct. Anderson v. State, 277 Ark. 391, 641 S.W.2d 715 (1982). Stewart, 319 Ark. at 242. In the case before this court, the record shows that Cunningham referred to the wrong date in the notice of appeal, making it defective. No further facts need to be determined. There is no merit to Cunningham’s claims of constitutional violations or that she is being compelled to admit fault. She asserted that she was not at fault. This court considered her arguments and concluded she was at fault. There is no need for Cunningham to admit fault. The record plainly shows that she is at fault. No contempt citation is merited on these facts. The motion for rule on clerk is granted as a motion for belated appeal. This opinion will be forwarded to the Committee on Professional Conduct. We note that Ark. R. App. P. — Crim. 2(e) discusses an affidavit; however, this court has historically also allowed an admission to be made in the motion, and we will continue to do so.

Per Curiam. Appellant William Terry, by his attorney, has again filed for a rule on the clerk. In a per curiam opinion issued March 16, 1981, we denied a similar motion. His attorney, E. Alvin Schay, has attached an affidavit admitting that the record was tendered late due to a mistake on his part. We find that such an error, admittedly made by the attorney for a criminal defendant, is good cause to grant the motion. See our per curiam opinion dated February 5, 1979, 265 Ark. 964, In Re: Belated Appeals in Criminal Cases. A copy of this opinion will be forwarded to the Committee on Professional Conduct.